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Summary
During the 2000s, after almost two decades of poor growth performance, Latin
American countries have experienced a period of growth acceleration. Even though
it has been led mainly by a faster growth of external demand for natural resources,
this demand has increased national income, and, by increasing wages and investment,
it has recovered domestic markets. Nonetheless, even in face of a more diversiﬁed
demand, Latin American countries have specialised in the production and exports of
less technologically advanced goods, increasing the asymmetry between the structures
of demand and supply. This dynamics contrasted with the pattern followed by East
Asian developing economies, where the strategy of development for production and
trade has focused on technological upgrading. As the demand for high-tech manufac-
turing has increased, these countries have sophisticated their structure of production
and promoted exports of high-tech goods.
With the aim of analysing the long-term consequences of these diﬀerent patterns
of production and trade specialisation, this study considers a Kaldorian approach, in
which growth is demand driven and strictly related to sectoral speciﬁcities. Based on
this perspective, it seeks to identify which sectors are capable of promoting higher long-
term growth rates and the mechanisms through by this process take place. The study
shows that specialisation in sectors with both high dynamic increasing returns and
high income elasticities can trigger a cumulative causation growth process. Addition-
ally, countries' structures of production and trade are analysed through input-output
methods to assess to what extent the Latin American growth pattern is sustainable
in the long run. The impacts of countries' trade liberalisation and the eﬀects of their
integration into global supply chains is compared across countries with the aim of
evaluating which ones that are beneﬁting the most from these changes in commercial
structure and which are losing sectors crucial to promote high and sustained growth
rates.
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Introduction
After nearly two decades of virtual stagnation, during the 2000s Latin American
countries have experienced a signiﬁcant period of growth acceleration. According to
the World Bank  World Development Indicators (WB-WDI), between 1980 and 2002,
Latin American developing countries' income per capita grew by 0.2% per year, whilst
between 2002 and 2008 this growth rate increased to 3.2% per year. Besides having
experienced a substantial acceleration of income growth, which contrasted to previous
years, these countries have proﬁted from a signiﬁcant decline in unemployment rates
and an increase in public and private investment rates. The unemployment rate in
the region dropped from 9.1% to 6.4% between 2002 and 2008, and the investment
rate (measured as gross ﬁxed capital formation as percentage of GDP) increased from
17.3% to 21.3%, with special regards to public investment, which has risen from 3.0%
of GDP, in 2002, to 4.6%, in 2008.
This growth period, on the one hand, occurred in parallel with a rapid growth in the
world economy, when these countries' terms of trade appreciated, their capital inﬂows
increased, and external demand become stronger, especially the demand for natural
resources. On the other hand, increasing wages, decreasing unemployment rates and
increasing public and private investments led to the recovery of the domestic market
as an important source of demand. Consequently, even though external demand for
natural resources contributed signiﬁcantly to these countries' growth acceleration, do-
mestic demand, which tends to be more diversiﬁed in terms of its sectoral structure,
was also an important component of this growth acceleration process.
Nevertheless, whereas these economies' sources of demand became stronger and
more diversiﬁed over this decade, their production structure did not appear to move
in the same direction. Despite increasing considerably for the economy as a whole, do-
mestic production was not suﬃcient to absorb part of this increase in demand in some
sectors. As a result, imports increased signiﬁcantly, especially in the most technologic-
ally advanced sectors. Between 2002 and 2008, Latin American imports of goods and
services presented a generalised increase, rising from 21.8% to 26.0% of GDP. How-
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ever, whilst high-tech imports accounted for 60.0% of Latin American trade imports,
high-tech exports accounted for only 33.6% of international sales1.
This process has stressed the asymmetry between the structures of demand and
supply in Latin American countries. Even though demand has increased in a wide
range of sectors, especially due to an increase in domestic markets, Latin American
economies have specialised in the production and exports of less technologically goods.
These dynamics contrast to the pattern followed by other developing countries, such as
the East Asian economies. These countries increased their specialisation in manufac-
turing activities, with special regards to those sectors with high technological content.
Consequently, in contrast to Latin American countries, where the share of high-tech
exports diverge from the share of high-tech imports, East Asian low and middle in-
come countries' high-tech exports accounted for 53.3% of trade exports in 2008, and
high-tech imports accounted for 50.6% of trade imports2.
To understand the consequences of these diﬀerent patterns of production and trade
specialisation, this study will consider a Kaldorian approach for countries' growth
processes, which is demand driven, cumulative and related to sectoral speciﬁcities.
Considering that some sectors might present low dynamic increasing returns to scale
and reduced income elasticities of demand, from the Kaldorian perspective, specialisa-
tion in this group of sectors will reduce countries' long-term growth rate. Conversely,
specialisation in sectors that present the highest dynamic increasing returns and the
highest income elasticities will promote countries' growth acceleration. Therefore,
this research investigates the importance of the sectoral structures of production and
trade to promote high and sustained growth rates with the aim of evaluating countries'
growth patterns. Moreover, the structures of production and trade of developing coun-
tries will be analysed through input-output matrices to assess to what extent Latin
American growth in the 2000s is sustainable in the long run.
This work is divided into two main sections. The ﬁrst section is dedicated to
understanding the importance of the sectoral structure of production and trade to
1Latin American low- and middle income-countries' imports and exports from/to outside the
subcontinent. High-tech sectors are classiﬁed according to UNIDO (2013:205) classiﬁcation, which is
based on International Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (ISIC), Revision 2. It includes divisions 24,
29 to 34 and 35 (excluding group 351). Data is available at United Nations COMTRADE Database
(UN-COMTRADE).
2East Asian low- and middle-income countries' imports and exports from/to outside the subcon-
tinent.
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guarantee high growth rates based on the Kaldorian approach. This section seeks to
identify the sectors capable of promoting the highest growth rates in the long run.
The second section assesses the impact of the countries' trade liberalisation during the
1990s and 2000s on sectoral output, as well as the eﬀects of countries' integration into
global supply chains. This section compares these impacts sectorally across countries
to evaluate which ones are beneﬁting the most from these processes and those that are
losing sectors essential to the promotion of high and sustained growth rates.
The ﬁrst section is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the importance
of considering structural changes to understand countries' economic dynamics from a
Kaldorian perspective. Although Kaldor was not the ﬁrst author to consider this as-
pect, his systematisation is an important starting point to analyse the relation between
countries' growth and their productive and commercial structures. The understanding
of this approach is crucial to address the main issue of this thesis, i.e.: to what ex-
tent the growth pattern followed by Latin American economies in the 2000s is capable
of promoting high growth rates in the long run. Thereby, this chapter provides the
theoretical basis for the subsequent chapters of the ﬁrst section.
The following chapter seeks to analyse the impacts of a faster growth of developing
economies on long-term growth rates of natural-resource exporters. The Balance-of-
Payments Constrained Growth (BPCG) model is modiﬁed to account for the impact of
diﬀerent growth rates among trading partners with speciﬁc structures of demand. Be-
cause low- and middle-income countries have been growing faster than high-income
countries since the 1990s, and the former group demand relatively more natural-
resource-based products than the latter, this process might have beneﬁted those coun-
tries which export predominantly these products. The aim of the chapter is to assess
to what extend a growth pattern based on these exports, such as the one experienced
by Latin American countries, is able to promote sustained high growth rates.
Chapter 3 investigates the reason why productivity growth rates diﬀer between
countries and regions in diﬀerent stages of development. According to the Kaldorian
approach, sectors have diﬀerent degrees of dynamic increasing returns. Consequently,
total productivity grows faster in some countries due to their sectoral structure of
production. In this vein, Verdoorn's law (the long-term relationship between out-
put growth on productivity growth) is estimated to evaluate those sectors capable of
providing more rapid productivity growth according to countries' income level.
The last chapter of the ﬁrst section, Chapter 4, seeks to address the long-term
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implications of the sectoral diﬀerences in the degree of dynamic increasing returns and
income elasticities of demand for countries' growth. In this chapter, despite being
the determinant of countries' growth in the long run, income elasticities of demand
are considered partially endogenous to countries' growth rates due to the existence
of dynamic increasing returns to scale. This chapter presents a sectoral model with
cumulative causation to explain the importance of structural change for countries'
long-term growth. Moreover, based on the ﬁndings of Chapters 2 and 3, this model is
applied to identify which sectors are able to promote faster growth rates. Essentially,
it shows that although Kaldor has stressed the importance of structure of production
and trade for growth, Kaldorian growth models do not fully incorporate these issues.
In this vein, a model that contemplates them is necessary to explain how sectoral
specialisation can trigger a cumulative causation processes in open economies.
The second section is divided into Chapters 5 and 6. In the ﬁrst chapter of this sec-
tion, changes in countries' production structures, as well as changes in demand absorp-
tion, are investigated using Structural Decomposition Analysis (SDA). The chapter
presents a method to decompose changes in countries' intermediate consumption into
technological changes and substitution of imported inputs. The aim of this decom-
position is to identify to what extent substitution of imported for domestic inputs
have reduced output growth across sectors, and compare it with the positive impact
of exports growth. This analytical tool is relevant in order to provide a sectoral in-
vestigation of developing countries' trade liberalisation during the 1990s and 2000s.
Countries' patterns of specialisation are addressed with the aim of assessing which
sectors have beneﬁted from the removal of tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers.
Chapter 6 seeks to evaluate to what extent countries' engagement into Global
Value Chains (GVC) have aﬀected their productive and commercial structures, and
what are the consequences of this process for economic growth. This chapter presents
a technique to evaluate the impact of countries' vertical specialisation in the domestic
content of exports, and it is contrasted to the positive impact of market share growth
that this fragmentation process might have promoted. The net impact for each sector's
production chain is compared among countries to assess which sectors have contributed
the most in each case. Based on the ﬁndings of the ﬁrst section on the capability of
diﬀerent sectors to promote growth, countries' potential to reach high and sustained
growth rates in the long run is analysed.
This work ﬁnishes with an additional chapter dedicated to providing the concluding
remarks. Besides presenting the main conclusions of the thesis, with special regards to
4
its consequences for Latin American economies, this chapter discusses the importance
of promoting selective industrial policies to guarantee structural changes towards those
sectors capable of triggering a cumulative causation process of increasing growth rates.
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Chapter 1
A Survey on the Kaldorian Approach
for Structural Change and
Cumulative Causation
1.1 Introduction
One of the most important issues in economic theory is why some developing coun-
tries were able to reduce the income gap to developed economies and others were not.
Economic historians present many examples of countries that were able to catch up
and reduce the income gap, such as the USA and Germany during the nineteenth cen-
tury, Japan in the mid-twentieth century and, more recently, the Asian Tigers (South
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore). However, probably the most common
cases are those countries that have failed to reduce the income gap to developed coun-
tries. Thereby, from a historical perspective, neither convergence nor divergence is the
rule in economics.
Essentially, to understand why some countries were successful in this catching-up
process (and why others have failed). one has to investigate the reason why growth
rates diﬀer between countries and regions in diﬀerent stages of development. Many
diﬀerent approaches have addressed this issue. On the one hand, neoclassical and
new growth theories assert that the explanation for the diﬀerences between countries'
growth rates is related to the availability of production factors and their allocation,
which characterises a supply-oriented approach. On the other hand, the Keynesian
perspective emphasises the relevance of eﬀective demand as a primary driver of accu-
mulation, and thus the long-term growth rate is demand driven.
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With some notable exceptions, however, none of these approaches take explicitly
into account one of the most evident characteristics of the catching-up processes. Look-
ing at those countries that were able to reduce the income gap to the most developed
economies, an evident similarity is the process of structural transformation. More
speciﬁcally, this is the process of moving the structure of production and trade from
some speciﬁc sectors to others. As Pasinetti (1993) has noted, although classical au-
thors have paid some attention to the importance of structural dynamics for economic
growth, economists have virtually neglected this aspect since the marginal revolution.
Adam Smith, for example, stressed that an increase in the share of `productive' work
(in contrast with `unproductive' work) was at the root of a process of economies' expan-
sion. Marginalists and subsequent neoclassical models, on the other hand, considered
factor allocation as the central explanation for countries' growth, and, consequently,
they viewed structural changes and the learning process as secondary issues. Pasinetti
also argues that even the modern dynamic macroeconomic models were compelled to
abandon any hypothesis of change in structure. According to him, early Keynesian
growth models, such as Harrod-Domar model, and the subsequent Post-Keynesian
models hardly incorporate structural changes as a driving force for economic growth,
even though they recognise their importance.
Despite being neglected by the main core of economic models, structural changes
and their relation to economic dynamics is at the root of those views that accounted
for historical facts to understand the process of countries' development. Kaldorian
and structuralist approaches, for example, present signiﬁcant contributions in favour
of specialisation in modern sectors to promote growth. They show that specialisation
in manufacturing activities is essential to promote a cumulative process of increas-
ing growth rates, whereas specialisation in primary goods may negatively aﬀect total
productivity growth and lead to a balance-of-payments crisis, constraining countries'
long-term growth rates. These approaches argue that the relation between structural
change and economic growth is an important issue and it cannot be neglected in under-
standing countries' growth in the long run. Nevertheless, the vast majority of economic
growth models are constructed assuming a single sector. Based on this assumption,
they try to identify general factors, such as R&D and educational spillovers, that have
led developing countries to achieve higher growth rates and reduce the income gap, as
well as those that have led high-income countries to keep growing faster, increasing
the income diﬀerential to low- and middle-income countries.
Although the importance of these general factors is not negligible, one important
issue that has to be taken into account is that the potential of these factors to enhance
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growth varies among sectors. Spillovers from research activities, for example, might
be more important in technology-intensive sectors than in sectors intensive in labour
or natural resources. Thereby, in order to understand why some countries were able
to reduce the income gap and others have failed, it is crucial to comprehend how
diﬀerent sectors play diﬀerent roles in the dynamics of growth, focusing on their speciﬁc
contributions to the diﬀerent stages of development.
This chapter provides some empirical evidence and the theoretical basis for this
analysis, seeking to explain how this issue was addressed in the economic literature. It
aims to present the main framework of the Kaldorian approach for the relation between
economic growth and structural dynamics, with some insight into other approaches,
such as the neo-Schumpeterian and the structuralist.
The chapter has eight sections. After this introduction, in the next section, some
stylised facts are presented to show how inter- and intra-sectoral structural changes
are relevant to explain long-term growth rates for countries in diﬀerent stages of devel-
opment. Section 3 discusses the basics of the Kaldorian approach in contrast with the
neoclassical and new growth theories. These diﬀerences are important in understand-
ing how the sectoral approach will be taken into account during this work. Section
4 addresses the impacts of transferring labour from sectors with low levels of pro-
ductivity to modern sectors. This section highlights the importance of these changes
to overall productivity growth for low-income countries, as well as its limitation for
middle- and high-income countries. Section 5 discusses the technological gap literature
from a sectoral perspective, highlighting its relevance to reducing the diﬀerential of
productivity levels and, thus, to promoting a catching-up process. Section 6 presents
the Kaldorian approach to explaining why productivity diverges among countries due
to diﬀerent sectoral specialisations and how this issue is relevant to explaining a cumu-
lative causation process. Section 7 analyses how sectoral diﬀerences are important to
explain growth rate divergences focusing on the Kaldorian models for open economies,
i.e., the Export-Led Cumulative Causation (ELCC) and Balance-of-Payments Con-
strained Growth (BPCG) models. Finally, the last section presents a systematisation
of this discussion, addressing the need for a sectoral approach to explain a cumulative
process of growth in open economies, which will be the aim of this work.
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1.2 Stylised facts on structural change and growth
dynamics
Even though the relationship between structural change and economic growth is
not a new issue in economics (it was focused by the classics, such as Adam Smith, as
stressed by Pasinetti, 1993), in the 1940s and 1950s many economic theories (inspired
by historical evidence) have emerged to explain the importance of industrialisation for
growth. This group of theories, usually associated with the structuralist approach,
advocates that an increase in the share of industrial activities promotes economic
growth through certain mechanisms. They argue, for example, that productivity level
is greater in industrial activities (Lewis, 1954), that industry has higher forward and
backward linkages (Hirschman, 1958) and, once this sector presents increasing returns
to scale, rather than diminishing returns, such as primary sectors, that industrialisation
promotes a circular process of cumulative causation (Myrdal, 1957)3.
More recently, since comparable data for developing countries has become avail-
able, there has been a large number of works that addressed this issue, and showed the
importance of the dynamics of sectoral composition of production and trade in pro-
moting growth in the long run. Szirmai (2012), for example, presents strong evidence
that manufacturing is the engine of growth in developing countries. According to the
author, there are no important examples of countries that have experienced success in
economic development without a strong industrial base.
Figure 1.1 shows how the degree of industrialisation is related to the income gap
for those countries that have reduced the income diﬀerential to the United States the
most. In the vertical axis, we have the relative degree of industrialisation, measured as
the share of total industry in the GDP of the country under consideration divided by
the same variable in the US. In the horizontal axis, we have a measure for countries'
income gap to the US (presented in logarithmic scale).
The ﬁgure presents data for all those countries that reduced the income gap to the
US at least by half between 1960 and 2010. They were China, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. It is clear that these two
variables are strictly related. In all cases but Hong Kong, periods of faster reduction
of income gap are those when the relative degree of industrialisation has grown faster.
3For more details on the importance of manufacturing in the structuralist approach, see Rocha
(2015).
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Figure 1.1: Income gap and degree of industrialisation relative to the US (1960-2010)
Sources: GGDC and PWT 7.1; author's elaboration
In China, for example, from 1990 to 2010, the industrial share in GDP has grown
from 1.9 times the US's share to 3.0 times, and the relative income was reduced from
3.7% to 17.4%. The Chinese case is not diﬀerent from Taiwan between 1960 and
1985, from Singapore, Korea, Thailand and Malaysia between 1965 and 2010 (with
exception of some periods, such as 1995-2000, when these countries were aﬀected by
the Asian crisis), and from Indonesia during the 1970s and between 1985 and 1995.
All these countries have experienced a fast income-gap reduction simultaneously with
an increase in the relative degree of industrialisation.
The Korean case is the one in which this relation between the share of industry in
GDP and gap reduction is probably the clearest. From 1965 to 2010, Korea experienced
a virtually constant income-gap reduction and a constant increase in the relative degree
of industrialisation. In 1965, Korean income per capita (in PPP) was one tenth of the
US income, and its industrial share in GDP was 0.73 of the US's share. In 2010, Korean
income increased to 63% of the US income, which means that the gap has reduced by
84%, and, simultaneously, its industry increased to 37.9% of GDP, becoming relatively
2.6 times larger than US industry.
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The relationship between industrialisation and a faster increase of income becomes
even clearer when countries that were able to reduce the gap to the US during a
certain period but could not sustain it are taken into account. Table 1.1 compares the
periods of faster reduction and increase in the gap of the three largest Latin American
economies (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico4) and Asian economies (China, South Korea
and Indonesia5). As can be seen from this table, the importance of structural change
towards industrial activities is evident.
Table 1.1: Income gap and industrial share in GDP: speciﬁc cases (1960-2010)
Country Period
Gap reduction Industrial share in GDP
(in %) Initial year Final year Diﬀerence
Brazil 1967-1980 43.5% 33.9% 43.8% 10.0 p.p.
1980-1994 -47.4% 43.8% 40.0% -3.8 p.p.
Mexico 1966-1981 29.9% 26.1% 31.4% 5.3 p.p.
1983-1995 -44.4% 45.6% 32.4% -13.2 p.p.
Argentina 1974-1990 -72.1% 39.3% 34.2% -5.1 p.p.
China 1990-2010 78.5% 38.1% 42.4% 4.3 p.p.
South Korea 1962-1996 82% 17.0% 32.6% 15.6 p.p.
Indonesia 1967-1981 62.6% 13.3% 38.4% 25.1 p.p.
Sources: GGDC and PWT 7.1; author's elaboration
The relationship between gap reduction and industrial share in GDP is valid not
only in those periods in which countries have reduced the gap, but also when the
income gap has increased. During the periods when countries have experienced a faster
reduction in the gap, the share of industry in GDP has increased more signiﬁcantly.
On the other hand, those periods in which the income gap to the US has increased are
associated with a reduction of the degree of industrialisation. In Brazil, the contrast
of these processes is very clear. From 1967 to 1980, the income gap to the US reduced
by 43.5% (Brazilian income increased from 16.3% to 28.7% of the US income), whilst
the industrial share in GDP increased from 33.9% to 43.8%. Nevertheless, from 1980
to 1994, the Brazilian relative income dropped by 32.2% (in 1994 it reduced to 19.4%
of the US income) and the industrial share in GDP not only stopped increasing, but
decreased by 3.8 percentage points (p.p.).
This situation is not diﬀerent from those experienced by the other Latin American
4These periods are the ones the countries presented the faster growth rates in gap reduction or
the faster growth rates in gap increases. Because there are breaks in the industrial series of Mexico
and Brazil in the years 1983 and 1994, respectively, these years are used to avoid comparing series
obtained by diﬀerent methodologies.
5Although the Indian economy is larger than Indonesia, this country was not considered because
it did not have any long period of gap reduction or increase.
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countries. In Argentina, from 1974 to 1990, and in Mexico, from 1983 and 1995, the
relative income to the US reduced signiﬁcantly, simultaneous to the degree of indus-
trialisation. Furthermore, in Mexico, from 1966 to 1981, as well as in the East Asian
economies for the periods presented in the table, the share of industry in GDP grew
in parallel with the income gap reduction. Therefore, the degree of industrialisation
and the relative income are strictly correlated for those economies that are catching
up, as well as for those that are falling behind.
This relationship has shown that industrialisation is an important issue to be con-
sidered when convergence and divergence processes are analysed. Until now, however,
the analysis has focused on the importance of moving from other sectors towards in-
dustry as a whole. Not surprisingly, when intra-sectoral changes are taken into account,
a similar pattern is veriﬁed. Figure 1.2 shows the relationship between the relative
technological intensity of manufacturing production and the income gap for the same
countries analysed previously6. The horizontal axis, such as in Figure 1.1, presents
the income gap to the US, measured as the relative income per capita. The vertical
axis presents the relative technological intensity of manufacturing production, which
is measured by the share of high-tech (HT) industries7 in total manufacturing value
added relative to the US.
From the ﬁgure, it is clear that reduction in the income gap is directly related to an
increase of the share of high-tech industries in total manufacturing, suggesting the im-
portance of intra-sectoral structural change for growth. In all analysed cases (now even
in Hong Kong), the periods of the faster reduction in income gap are those associated
with a higher increase in technological intensity. This relationship is especially inter-
esting because it seems to be more important for those countries in advanced stages of
development. As can be seen from Figure 1.2, South Korea is again a clear example.
From 1968 to 2008, it signiﬁcantly reduced the income gap to the US, and, simultan-
eously, increased the share of high-tech manufacturing industries. Notwithstanding,
the faster the increase in South Korean technological intensity of manufacturing value
added, the faster its income growth relative to the US was.
A comparison between Singapore and Hong Kong shows explicitly the importance
6Thailand was excluded from the graph only to make it more clear, but the country follows a
pattern very similar to Malaysia.
7High-tech industries includes Chemicals, Machinery, Electrical and Transport (divisions 24, 25
and 29 to 35 in the ISIC, Rev. 2). This aggregation is based on UNIDO (2013:205) classiﬁcation,
but it includes division 24 and group 351 due to classiﬁcation constraints at the UNIDO-INDSTAT2
database.
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Figure 1.2: Income gap and technological intensity of manufacturing (1963-2008)
Sources: UNIDO-INDSTAT2 and PWT 7.1; author's elaboration
of technologically intensifying countries' production structures. Both countries presen-
ted around the same income from 1973 to 1988, growing at similar rates. Singapore,
however, kept increasing the share of high-tech manufacturing industries after 1988,
whilst in Hong Kong, it stopped increasing. Consequently, whereas the latter was
unable to reduce the gap to the US after 1993, the former kept increasing its relative
income, which rose from 85% to 146% between 1993 and 2008. Hence, Singapore be-
comes the only country (of those under consideration) that has been able to overtake
the US income.
This relationship between income growth and the technological intensity of pro-
duction shows that not only inter-sectoral structural changes, such as moving from
agriculture to industry, are important in promoting faster growth rates, but also intra-
sectoral structural changes. Moreover, it shows that moving the structure of produc-
tion towards high-tech industries is especially relevant to explain faster growth rates
in middle- and high-income economies, such as in the cases of South Korea and Singa-
pore. A relative increase in the share of high-tech products in total manufacturing is
strictly related to faster growth rates for those countries in more advanced stages of
development.
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The relation between technological intensity and economic growth in the long run
is not restricted to countries' structures of production. Technological intensity of trade
also embodies a close relationship with high and sustained growth rates. Addressed
originally by the early Latin American structuralists, the structure of exports and im-
ports has been an important explanation for the uneven growth rates among countries.
Prebisch (1952) argued that because income elasticities of demand for primary goods
is lower than one, and for manufacturing it is higher, as countries' incomes per capita
grow, the demand for more technological goods increases faster than for primary goods.
Consequently, the relative price of the latter decreases and those countries that ex-
port predominantly these products face balance-of-payments crisis due to a long-term
deterioration of their terms of trade. Furtado (1961) presents a complementary explan-
ation for natural resource exporters' underdevelopment. According to him, economic
development is a process of incorporation and diﬀusion of new technologies. However,
these countries produce predominantly through imported capital inputs, which reduces
their capability to assimilate technologies embodied in these goods. Consequently, they
are unable to promote economic development through innovation.
Recently, many studies empirical studies have advocated that export composition
is crucial to promoting sustainable growth rates in the long run. Berg, Ostry, and
Zettelmeyer (2012), for example, showed that export product sophistication (meas-
ured by manufacturing share in exports) tend to predict prolonged growth. It has
been argued that product export shares of the more complex products are positively
related with countries' income, as sophisticated goods hold a vast amount of productive
knowledge (Felipe et al., 2012; Hausmann, Hidalgo et al., 2011). Thereby, technologic
sophistication in trade has been addressed as a central issue to explaining divergence
in countries' growth rates.
Figure 1.3 presents, in the vertical axis, countries' relative technological intensity
of merchandises' exports and, in the horizontal axis, income per capita in relation
to the US for those countries that reduced the gap to the US by at least half. A
clear relationship can be seen between these two variables: the higher the relative
technological intensity of exports, the lower the income gap.
The fast growth experienced by Malaysia, South Korea and Singapore from 1970
to 1995 is clearly related to an increase in high-tech exports. These countries started,
in 1970, with a relatively low technological intensity of exports (lower than 0.3 times
the US's intensity) and increased it by more than 0.8 times in 1995. Even Hong
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Figure 1.3: Income gap and technological intensity of merchandise exports
(1965-2010)
Sources: COMTRADE and PWT 7.1; author's elaboration
Kong experienced the same trend during this period, even though on a lower scale.
Technological intensity of exports in Hong Kong increased from less than 0.3 times the
US's intensity to almost 0.7 times in 1995.
Chinese growth from 1990 to 2010 is also clearly related to the increase in techno-
logical intensity of exports. Diﬀerent from the results for the technological intensity
of manufacturing production, where China presented a high but constant level during
this period, the share of high-tech in Chinese exports was 0.4 times the US's share in
1990, and, in 2010, it overlapped it, as can be seen from Figure 1.3.
These stylised facts on trade and production show that a process of structural
change towards industrial activities is crucial to explaining countries' growth rates
in the long run. More speciﬁcally, it shows that high and sustained growth rates
are strictly related to the increase of high-tech products in manufacturing output
and trade, especially for countries in more advanced stages of development. In the
next sections, some theoretical approaches, mainly based on historical evidence, will
be presented to explain this relationship between inter- and intra-sectoral structural
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change and economic dynamics.
1.3 Convergence and divergence in supply and de-
mand approaches
Although classical economists have contributed signiﬁcantly to understanding the
reason why some countries grow faster than others, the ﬁrst dynamic macroeconomic
model of economic growth was developed by Harrod (1939) and Domar (1947). Despite
being developed separately, both models tried to address the same basic questions:
what are the investment and saving growth rates capable of maintaining a growing
economy in equilibrium, and what is the economic growth rate compatible with this
equilibrium? Because the Harrod-Domar growth model did not consider explicitly a
self-adjustment mechanism, it was the basis for both the supply- and demand-oriented
approaches developed by Neoclassical and Keynesian economists.
Neoclassical models (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956) solve this issue by assuming di-
minishing returns to factors of production (rather than constant returns to capital,
such as in the Harrod-Domar model) and that savings are exogenously determined by
the propensity to consume. In these models, because all countries have access to the
same freely available technology, countries' income gaps tend to reduce in the long run,
bringing the notion of convergence. Because capital has diminishing returns (due to the
assumption of constant returns to scale and convex production functions), poor coun-
tries have higher marginal productivity of capital than the rich ones. Consequently,
once economies have access to foreign capital and foreign markets, which guarantees
access to international funding8, countries' income levels tend to convergence in the
long run. Only continuous technological changes could explain the long-term diﬀer-
ence between countries' growth rates in neoclassical models. However, they treat the
determinants of technological change as exogenous, and thus they do not explain the
persistent diﬀerences in growth rates between countries, as well as why countries' in-
comes have not converged (McCombie, 2006).
In the late 1980s, Romer (1986, 1990) and Lucas (1988) criticised these old growth
models arguing against the constant returns to scale assumption and its immediate
result: exogenous technological progress. This critique was the basis for the new
or endogenous growth models, which assumes that productivity growth is endogen-
8Once countries access international funding, investments ﬂow to those countries where marginal
productivity is the highest. Hence, poor countries receive investments from the rich ones.
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ously determined by output growth and that technology is an excludable good. In
these models, technologies are not viewed as manna that falls from heaven. Instead,
they are produced during the growth process, and the access to technology is costly.
This assumption has shifted the focus of the neoclassical models from exogenous tech-
nological changes to the externalities generated by the process of capital accumulation.
Consequently, in contrast to "old" generation models, these models might explain the
historical divergence in countries' income9.
These growth models can be organised in two basic groups. Firstly, the AK models,
ﬁrst developed by Romer (1986), which consider that capital is subject to constant re-
turns. Hence, rather than convergence among countries, they predict countries growing
at diﬀerent (but constant) rates. Secondly, the models developed by Lucas (1988) and
Romer (1990), which assert that production stimulates other activities, such as R&D.
By assuming technology (and knowledge in general) as an excludable good, rather
than available freely to everyone, they allow for the existence of increasing returns to
scale in the production process10. Hence, growth is treated as an endogenous process,
and divergence among countries is explained by the growth process itself, rather than
exogenously, such as in neoclassical models.
Although these changes have been essential to bring countries' growth back to the
debate in mainstream economics, these models have provided limited contributions to
the understanding of the reasons why some developing countries were able to catch up
and the vast majority were not. According to Palma (2005), in spite of being activity-
speciﬁc, "endogenous" growth models are sector indiﬀerent. Essentially, countries'
growth rates are explained by the existence of increasing returns in activities, such as
R&D and education, but they are not associated with the size of one speciﬁc sector,
such as manufacturing, agriculture or services. Furthermore, according to McCombie
(2002) and Dutt (2006), endogenous growth models, besides ignoring the role played
by diﬀerent sectors in the economy, neglect the importance of factors determining
the growth of demand. Although they take into account the existence of increasing
returns to scale, productivity growth is ultimately constrained by the growth of factor
inputs, which are exogenously given. According to Dutt (2006), in these models, the
9Empirical evidence on convergence and divergence hypothesis is very controversial. Barro (1991)
and Mankiw et al. (1992), for example, provide evidence that low-income countries tend to grow
faster than rich countries, which suggests convergence. On the other hand, Durlauf and Johnson
(1995) present empirical evidence that diﬀerent regimes may take place when countries are divided
into more than two groups, which supports the notion that countries' income per capita might diverge
in the long run.
10For more details about these models and the diﬀerences in explaining convergence and divergence
processes, see Aghion and Howitt (2009) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004).
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economy is always in full employment and thus all savings are invested. The market
mechanisms solve the problems of unemployment and aggregate demand does not
deviate from aggregate supply in the long run. Hence, investment is not determined
by aggregate demand in the long run, but exclusively by savings.
In contrast to neoclassical and new growth theories, Kaldor (1967) stressed the
importance of the interaction between supply and demand in explaining the diﬀerences
between countries' growth rates. According to him, these diﬀerences are likely to be
endogenous and determined by the capacity of a country to transform the demand
stimulus in productivity growth. Although some changes in demand originate from
changes in supply, most frequently it is supply that responds to changes in demand.
Thus, countries' growth rates are primarily governed by the growth of eﬀective demand,
instead of being resource constrained, as suggested by the neoclassical and endogenous
growth models.
Kaldor (1970) also highlights the importance of exports in determining growth.
The primary source of autonomous demand is exports, and by means of the Hicks'
super-multiplier, this demand from abroad generates other sources of domestic de-
mand. Hence, external demand is key to understanding why growth rates diﬀer across
countries.
Furthermore, a central point stressed in this approach is the role of increasing re-
turns to scale and its consequence for a cumulative causation process. The explanation
of why certain regions have become more industrialised is the cumulative advantages
accruing from industrial growth itself. Consequently, to understand divergence and
convergence among countries, speciﬁcities of the industrial sector must be taken into
account.
As can therefore be observed, the Kaldorian explanation for the diﬀerences in
economic growth is demand-driven, cumulative and related to sectoral speciﬁcities. In
contrast to the neoclassical and endogenous growth theories, this approach provides
a sectoral interpretation of diﬀerences in national growth rates, taking into account
not only the supply-side but also the demand-side of a growing process. Thereby, it is
more appropriate to the analysis in this work.
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1.4 Moving labour towards modern sectors: a short-
cut for growth
Since Lewis (1954) published his paper on the importance of inter-sectoral trans-
fer of labour to increase productivity, the possibility of achieving faster growth rates
in a short time through structural changes became an important issue in economic
theory. According to the author, by assuming an unlimited supply of labour, workers
can be transferred from traditional sectors to modern sectors, where productivity is
higher, and it increases overall productivity11. For Lewis, however, the existence of
an unlimited supply of labour is not restricted to underdeveloped economies where
most of population works in the agricultural sector. He argues that underutilisation
of labour applies for all services in which wages are lower than marginal productivity,
such as domestic services, and for those that marginal productivity is negligible, such
as the workers on the docks, the young man who rush forward asking to carry your
bag as you appear, the jobbing gardener, and the like. Essentially, in his approach,
the supply of labour is unlimited so long as it exceeds the demand at a given price.
Therefore, Lewis argues that labour is not a real bottleneck for expansion in the vast
majority of countries12. Hence promoting structural changes is an important source of
productivity growth for many economies.
Although Lewis's paper was originally published six decades ago, this issue is still
addressed by many authors nowadays. McMillan and Rodrick (2011) distinguish this
process of increasing productivity by promoting structural changes from the process
of productivity growth within a sector. According to them, productivity can growth
within economic sectors through capital accumulation, technological change or reduc-
tion of misallocation, or, alternatively, labour, can move from low-productivity sectors
to high-productivity sectors increasing the productivity of the economy as a whole.
The authors contrasted the successful case of Asia, where productivity grew around
4% per year between 1950 and 2005, to the cases of Latin America and Africa, where
productivity growth was around 1% per year. Although the within component of
productivity growth has played an important role in all cases (it explained around
2% in Africa and Latin America, and more than 3% in Asia), the structural change
11Denison (1967) incorporates inter-sectoral movements of labour into neoclassical models. He
shows that it reduces signiﬁcantly the Solow residual.
12Cornwall (1977) has extended Lewis' model to advanced economies. The author argues that once
demand for labour in high-productivity sectors is increasing faster than the rest of the economy, this
sector will face a perfectly labour supply. Thereby, labour is not a constraint for growth even in
developing economies.
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component has contributed positively only for Asia's productivity growth. In Latin
America and Africa, structural change contribution was negative, reducing the positive
impact of the within component. By splitting the result for Latin America in sub-
periods, McMillan and Rodrik veriﬁed that both components were equally important
in increasing productivity between 1950 and 1970, each one contributing by around
2% per year. Between 1990 and 2005, although the within component contributed by
the same amount of the former period, the structural change component contributed
negatively. Consequently, productivity grew only by around 1.5% per year on Latin
America.
Following McMillan and Rodrik's (2011) approach, total productivity growth is
split in these two components to analyse the contribution of each component and each
sector. Labour productivity growth rate can be expressed as:
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where Q and Qi are the labour productivity of the economy and of the sector
i, and
(
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N
)
is the share of labour of sector i. The term on the left, (i), presents
the contribution of changes in productivity within a sector to the productivity of the
economy as a whole. The term on the right, (ii) presents the direct contribution of
structural change for the growth of productivity.
Using the Groningen Growth Development Centre (GGDC) database for sectors
(Timmer et al., 2014), this analytical tool was employed to split countries' productivity
growth into these two components from 1995 to 2008. Table 1.2 presents these results
for the three largest developing countries where data is available.
This decomposition shows that structural changes are relatively important to ex-
plain productivity growth of the economy only in the Brazilian case, but in terms of
total contribution, this component is very limited for all countries. The direct impact
of structural change explained around 60% of Brazilian total productivity growth from
1995 to 2008. However, it contributed only by 0.46 p.p. to overall productivity growth.
For China and especially for South Korea, the structural change component is relat-
ively irrelevant. This component explains 1.50 p.p. of the Chinese total productivity
growth per year, whilst the within component explains 12.66 p.p. In the case of South
Korea, the structural change component has a virtually null impact both in relative
and absolute terms.
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Table 1.2: Sectoral decomposition of overall productivity growth into within and
structural change components, % annual growth (1995-2010)
Brazil China South Korea
Within Str.ch. Within Str.ch. Within Str.ch.
Total 0.33% 0.46% 12.66% 1.50% 2.96% 0.03%
Agriculture 0.31% -0.19% 1.25% -0.60% 0.23% -0.21%
Mining 0.09% -0.03% 1.10% -0.33% 0.01% -0.02%
Manufacturing 0.17% 0.01% 3.94% 0.97% 2.23% -0.92%
Utilities 0.09% -0.05% 0.47% 0.08% 0.14% 0.01%
Construction -0.08% 0.09% 0.69% 0.22% 0.08% -0.16%
Trade, restaurants and hotels 0.07% 0.09% 1.34% 0.43% 0.42% -0.10%
Transport, storage and comm. -0.20% 0.13% 1.15% 0.22% 0.35% 0.12%
Financial and business services 0.01% 0.21% 1.04% 0.18% -0.20% 0.44%
Government services -0.10% 0.16% 1.35% 0.19% 0.00% 0.00%
Social and personal services -0.03% 0.06% 0.32% 0.15% -0.31% 0.87%
Within: contribution of changes in productivity within a sector to the productivity of the economy;
Str.ch.: contribution of structural change for the growth of productivity. Total is calculated as the
summation of sectoral contributions for each component (within and structural change). The summation
of the components gives the annual productivity growth in the period.
Author's elaboration based on GGDC.
Some sectors are especially relevant to explain productivity growth in these coun-
tries. The importance of agriculture is ambiguous once it has contributed positively
through within eﬀects, but negatively due to structural changes. Because this sector
presents the lowest level of productivity and the share of this sector in total employ-
ment reduced in all countries, the second component was expected to be negative. The
explanation for the within eﬀect in this sector is more complex and controversial. This
eﬀect tends to be positive in less developed economies because this sector is composed
of traditional activities, such as subsistence, and modern activities. The migration of
labour from traditional agriculture to other sectors reduces the relative importance
of subsistence activities, and, consequently, the share of modern agriculture increases
and the productivity of the sector itself increases. Thereby, the within component in
agriculture is explained by intra-sectoral structural changes13.
Manufacturing, on the other hand, presented positive contribution in both com-
ponents for China and Brazil, and negative contribution in the structural change com-
ponent in Korea. In Brazil and China, the share of employment in this sector has
increased, and, because the sector has one of the highest productivities14, overall pro-
13This analysis, however, goes beyond the scope of this work.
14Manufacturing does not have the highest productivity among all sectors because it is usually
higher in mining and in utilities. However, because the share of employment of these sectors is almost
zero (it is less than 2% in China and less than 1% in Brazil and Korea), manufacturing is the sector
with the highest potential to promote productivity growth through this mechanism.
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ductivity has increased. This fact explains why in China, where the share of this sector
in employment grew from 15.4% to 18.7%, the structural change component contrib-
uted by 0.97 p.p. to overall productivity growth. In Korea, however, the share of
employment in this sector decreased by 6.0 p.p., and thus manufacturing contributed
negatively by 0.92 p.p. to overall productivity growth due to the structural change
eﬀect.
Nevertheless, the contribution of manufacturing goes beyond the structural change
eﬀect. In all cases, the increase of productivity within this sector is among the most
important explanation for overall productivity growth between 1995 and 2010. Pro-
ductivity has grown signiﬁcantly in the manufacturing sector and, because the share
of this sector in the total employment is very signiﬁcant, its impact on overall pro-
ductivity was very important. Manufacturing contributed in absolute terms for China
and Korea by 3.94 p.p. and 2.93 p.p., respectively. In relative terms, it contributed
signiﬁcantly for all three cases. This component explains around 20% of Brazilian
overall productivity growth, as well as 28% of Chinese and 75% of Korean increase in
productivity.
The understanding of productivity growth within sectors, with special regards to
manufacturing sector, is the focus of this work. The basic explanations for this are
the increase in capital-labour ratio and technological changes (even though these two
components cannot be dissociated), as will be discussed later. However, as presented in
the second section, before starting to discuss these aspects, it is important to consider
that intra-sectoral structural changes can also explain why productivity has grown
within sectors.
The same analytical tool can be used to split the sectoral productivity growth
into the impact of productivity growth within individual industries and the impact of
inter-industrial structural changes15, such as the impact of moving from a low- to a
high-tech sector inside the manufacturing sector. As discussed in the second section,
it is not only structural changes to industry that are relevant to explain growth, but
also intra-sectoral structural changes, once individual industries inside manufacturing
present diﬀerent characteristics and thus diﬀerent potentials to boost economic growth.
Table 1.3 presents the results of the decomposition of productivity growth within
manufacturing for the same countries analysed before16.
15Inter-industrial structural changes refer to the movements of labour from individual industries
inside a sector to other industries, such as movements from the textile industry to the metals industry.
16The database used in this estimation is diﬀerent to the one used before. Hence, total manufac-
turing productivity growth may diverge.
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Table 1.3: Industrial decomposition of manufacturing productivity growth into
within and structural change components, % annual growth (1995-2007)
Brazil China South Korea
(1996-2007) (1995-2007) (1995-2006)
Within Str.ch. Within Str.ch. Within Str.ch.
Manufacturing (total)* -1.48% 0.02% 14.1% -0.31% 2.10% 0.27%
Food, Beverages and Tobacco -0.27% 0.07% 2.04% -0.03% 0.19% -0.06%
Textiles and footwear -0.14% -0.03% 1.32% 0.35% 0.35% -0.49%
Wood and Cork -0.01% -0.01% 0.15% 0.05% 0.01% -0.03%
Pulp, Paper and Publishing -0.03% -0.17% 0.61% 0.02% 0.14% 0.01%
Coke and Reﬁned Petroleum 0.39% 0.00% 0.40% -0.02% 0.08% -0.08%
Chemicals -0.46% -0.14% 1.92% -0.19% 0.05% -0.09%
Rubber and Plastics -0.14% 0.01% 0.42% 0.11% 0.02% 0.21%
Other Non-Metallic Mineral -0.04% -0.01% 1.30% -0.60% 0.15% -0.15%
Basic and Fabricated Metals -0.63% 0.10% 2.01% 0.02% 0.00% 0.41%
Machinery and Electrical Eq. -0.15% 0.08% 2.23% 0.01% 0.42% 0.19%
Transport Equipment 0.01% 0.11% 1.33% -0.05% 0.62% 0.38%
Manufacturing, Nec. -0.02% -0.01% 0.36% 0.04% 0.08% -0.04%
Within: contribution of changes in productivity within a sector to the productivity of the economy;
Str.ch.: contribution of structural change for the growth of productivity. Manufacturing (Total) is cal-
culated as the summation of sectoral contributions for each component (within and structural change).
The summation of the components for Manufacturing (Total) gives the annual productivity growth in
the period.
Author's elaboration based on INDSTAT-UNIDO and WIOD.
From this table it is clear that the within eﬀect is the most important to explain why
productivity grew in Korea and China, and why it decreased in Brazil. The impact of
moving from industries with low productivity towards industries with high productivity
has a limited contribution for manufacturing productivity growth, as presented by the
structural change component. In the case of China and Korea, although manufactur-
ing productivity has grown at high rates, it was only due to the eﬀects of productivity
growth within industries, once the structural change eﬀect contributed negatively for
China and its eﬀects on Korean productivity was virtually zero. In the Brazilian case,
on the other hand, manufacturing productivity decreased. However, it was exclus-
ively due to the eﬀects of productivity growth within individual industries, once the
impact of inter-industrial structural changes was very limited. Thereby, these results
show that productivity growth within individual industries is the main explanation
for productivity growth in manufacturing, rather than inter-industrial movements of
labour.
According to Rodrik (2013a), these structural change and within components of
productivity growth can be interpreted, respectively, as the results of structural trans-
formations and improvements in the fundamentals. He argues that the former eﬀect
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is a consequence of moving towards modern sectors, based on Lewis's (1954) approach,
and the latter is obtained by accumulating skills and broad institutional capabilities.
In this vein, it would be reasonable to conclude that the main explanation for Chinese
and Korean productivity growth is improvements in these fundamentals, because the
within component is the most important component of productivity growth.
Nevertheless, although Kaldor (1966) argued that the direct impact of the struc-
tural change component is important for less mature economies, the author went fur-
ther than this static analysis, where structural changes only promotes growth through
the transfers of labour towards high-productivity sectors. In his view, the growth of
productivity through the within component is also explained by structural changes
toward modern sectors (in his analysis, manufacturing). According to Verdoorn's law,
the faster output growth in manufacturing is, the faster labour productivity will grow
due to the existence of static and dynamic increasing returns to scale. Consequently,
an explanation for the within component of manufacturing productivity growth relies
on promoting structural changes towards this sector.
The relationship between structural changes and faster growth of productivity
within sectors does not stop here. Many authors, based on diﬀerent approaches (includ-
ing Rodrik himself), argue for diﬀerent potential among sectors to promote catching
up in productivity. While in some sectors catching up to frontier technologies is a diﬃ-
cult process, in others, it happens faster, which makes it easy to increase productivity
within sectors. Thereby, especially regarding developing economies, the within com-
ponent of productivity growth can be also explained by specialisation in these sectors
where technological catching-up is an easier process.
These diﬀerent approaches for the relation between the sectoral productivity growth
and structural changes bring some features to the debate that go further than the
explanation given by the fundamentals. These sectoral approaches for the within
component of productivity, with special regards to manufacturing, will be the object
of study in the next sections.
1.5 Technological diﬀusion and catch-up: sectoral ap-
proaches
Based on diﬀerent approaches, many authors have addressed the fact that countries
on a lower technological level have the possibility of growing faster by imitating coun-
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tries on the innovation frontier. Both in theoretical and empirical investigations, the
notion that the higher the technological gap is, the higher the opportunity for growth
has proved to be an important explanation for the diﬀerential in productivity growth
within sectors.
The idea that technological gap is a relevant explanation for growth in the condi-
tional convergence approach has been developed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997).
Combining the excludability of technology, which is the basis of endogenous growth
models, with the notion of imitation, they argue that technological gap is relevant to
explain convergence among countries. In this model, the relatively low costs of imita-
tion compared to the costs of discovering new technologies enable developing economies
to grow faster than the advanced ones. In the long run, growth depends on the rate
of discovery in advanced economies. However, because imitation is typically cheaper
than innovation, most countries prefer to copy rather than invent. Consequently, the
relatively low cost of imitation implies convergence, as followers grow relatively faster
and tend to catch up to the leaders.
Although Barro and Sala-i-Martin's approach is not sector-speciﬁc, it enables one
of the conditions of convergence to be analysed sectorally. In some speciﬁc sectors, such
as manufacturing, productivity tends to rise rapidly towards the technological frontier,
characterising what Rodrik (2013b) has called unconditional convergence, in contrast
to the conditional convergence that characterises the rest of the economy. According
to Rodrik, there are some sectors that can be considered as escalator activities, once
specialisation in these sectors enables countries below the technological frontier to grow
faster.
Neo-Schumpeterian authors also address the importance of technological gap to
the process of catching-up, even though they emphasise that it is not an automatic
process. According to Fagerberg (1994) and Fagerberg and Verspagen (2002), one of
the basic assumptions of neoclassical models is that technology is a public good, and,
thus, technological gap cannot explain countries' productivity diﬀerences. However,
rather than a global public good, it is clear that there are large technological diﬀerences
(or gaps) between countries, and that engaging in technological catch-up (narrowing
the technology gap) is perhaps a promising avenue that poor countries can follow for
achieving long-term growth. These authors argue that technology (or know-how) is
not an international commodity, such as presented by the neoclassicals, because it is
not accessible for everybody free of charge. Despite having some characteristics of a
public good, technology is embodied in organisational structures. Therefore, although
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it is possible for countries facing a technological gap to promote a faster growth of
productivity by imitating, closing technological gaps is not an automatic but rather a
challenging process. Technological catch-up depends on continually transforming tech-
nological, economic and institutional structures. Therefore, country-speciﬁc factors,
such as national systems of innovation, play a crucial role in the process of technological
catch-up (Fagerberg, 1994).
In the same vein, Malerba (2002) highlights the importance of sectoral systems of
innovation and production. He argues that sectoral systems have a speciﬁc knowledge
base, technologies, inputs and demand. Thus, focusing on these systems is essential to
understanding the learning, innovation and production processes, as well as the trans-
formation of sectors and the factors that determine countries' diﬀerential performance
in a sector. Therefore, the importance of sectoral technological infrastructure must to
be taken into account to understand catching-up processes.
Cornwall and Cornwall (2002) stress that, in the literature on catching-up, the
prime determinant of growth is the size of the technology gap, with the most back-
ward economies growing faster, leading to convergence. When it is possible to borrow
technology from advanced economies, a backwardness is an advantage, once there is
a growth bonus of late industrialisation. According to them, the magnitude of invest-
ment cannot show the quality of new capital, and it is particularly interesting for the
catching-up idea, as investment embodies the most advanced technologies. Hence,
for two economies with equal investment to GDP ratio, the more backward of the two
will have the faster productivity growth.
However, the existence of technological gap is not suﬃcient to ensure catching-
up. The size of catch-up growth bonus, besides depending on the ability to absorb
new technologies, such as stressed by Fagerberg (1994), depends on a very important
component of demand: the investment. According to Cornwall and Cornwall, the
higher a country's investment rate is, the greater its share of capital that embodies the
latest technological advances. Therefore, technological gap growth bonus is not only
constrained by technological infrastructure supply, but it is also demand driven, once
investment is ultimately determined by demand growth.
Many studies have addressed this issue empirically with the aim of identifying those
sectors with the highest potential to promote catching-up. Bernard and Jones (1996)
is one of the most cited papers in this topic, somewhat because they found a contro-
versial result. By analysing the role of sectors in aggregate convergence for OECD
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countries, they found that manufacturing shows little evidence of productivity conver-
gence, whilst other sectors, especially services, are driving the aggregate convergence.
Although the β and σ convergence17 coeﬃcients found by the author for manufacturing
is greater in absolute terms than the one found in services, indicating that convergence
in the former sector is higher, the standard deviation in manufacturing is greater as
well, and only services have coeﬃcients statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerent from zero at
5% signiﬁcance level. It was Sorensen (2001), however, who presented the main cri-
tique of this study. The author has shown that the result obtained by Bernard and
Jones is not robust to the choice of base year. Sorensen estimated the convergence
using diﬀerent base-years and found that aggregate PPPs are not suitable conversion
factors for manufacturing, because it presents strong (and statistically signiﬁcant) con-
vergence if the base years are 1985, 1990 or 1993. Thereby, the results obtained by
Bernard and Jones should not be considered conclusive. More recently, Le Gallo and
Dall'erba (2008) used spatial lags as controls to estimate convergence among sectors
and regions in Europe. The authors found that labour productivity converges to the
same productivity level in manufacturing, in market services and at the aggregate level,
whilst in agriculture, construction and non-market services, productivity in peripheral
regions and core regions converges to diﬀerent levels.
Besides these sectoral analysis, some authors have focused on convergence at the in-
dividual industry level, such as Dollar and Wolﬀ (1988, 1993), Carree et al. (2000) and
Van Biesenbroeck (2009). Dollar and Wolﬀ (1988), for example, analysed inter-sectoral
convergence for 13 industrialised economies and found positive results in virtually every
manufacturing industry, even though convergence was found to be stronger for heavy
and high technological industries, such as chemical, machinery and transport equip-
ment, than for low-tech activities. Moreover, they found that convergence is stronger
for all manufacturing than at an individual industry level. Carree et al. (2000) found
large inter-industry diﬀerences in the extent of divergence. In contrast to Dollar and
Wolﬀ's ﬁndings, they show that industries with a high level of productivity have a
low rate of convergence, which is in line with high knowledge or capital barriers pre-
venting quick catch-up. Sorensen and Schjerning (2003), however, have argued that
these studies provide misleading results because they use aggregate PPP conversion
factors to measure sectoral productivity, and these results are sensitive to the base
year. They show that manufacturing industries do not present convergence in early
base years, whereas they do for later base years. Nevertheless, in contrast to previ-
17The β convergence indicates the tendency of countries with relatively high initial levels of output
per worker to grow relatively slowly, and the σ convergence indicates the reduction in cross-sectional
variance of output per worker.
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ous studies, Van Biesenbroeck (2009) estimated convergence for a group of 14 OECD
countries from 1970 to 1999 using sector-speciﬁc PPP estimations. The author con-
structed these sectoral conversion factors and found signiﬁcant robust β convergence
for total manufacturing independent of the base year (1985 and 1996), as well as for
most individual industries18.
Taking advantage of having a large dataset, Rodrik (2013b) analysed the β con-
vergence for manufacturing industries among 118 countries in diﬀerent stages of de-
velopment. By combining the UNIDO-INDSTAT database, which presents data for
manufacturing individual industries, with the Penn World Table, which has data for
other sectors, the author found that productivity in manufacturing industries exhib-
its strong unconditional convergence, while non-manufacturing activities do not. He
argues that, in contrast to the overall economy, where convergence is conditional to
geography, policies, institutions and other country-speciﬁc circumstances, it occurs
unconditionally in the modern parts of the economy. According to Rodrik, in contrast
to traditional agriculture and many non-tradable services, modern industries produce
tradable goods and they can easily be integrated into global production networks,
which facilitates technology transfer and absorption.
Even though results are inconclusive at the individual industry level, these stud-
ies show that it is important to highlight the role of promoting sectors with higher
convergence characteristics, such as manufacturing, to boost aggregate productivity
growth. The process of structural change to these sectors is a relevant source of pro-
ductivity growth for developing economies not only because they present higher levels
of productivity than traditional sectors, such as discussed in Section 3, but mainly be-
cause productivity within these sectors rise faster than in others due to their intrinsic
characteristics.
1.6 Scale economies in a sector-speciﬁc demand-driven
approach
One of the most important explanations for the productivity growth within sectors
is the existence of scale economies (or increasing returns to scale). This concept is
deﬁnitely not a cutting-edge idea in economic theory. In 1776, using a pin factory as
an example, Adam Smith suggested that inventions are stimulated by internal division
18The only exceptions are Food, beverages and tobacco and Machinery and equipment using base
year 1985 and Mining and quarrying, Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and Transport equipment for
both base years (1985 and 1996).
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of labour, which, in turn, depends upon the market extension. Many authors have
extended this concept for beyond ﬁrms' limits. Alfred Marshall, for example, has
distinguished internal from external scale economies. Rather than remaining internal
to individual ﬁrms, scale economies are found at the regional level due to economies
of localisation. Based on Smith's approach, Young (1928) advocated that division
of labour is constrained by the extent of markets, but the main source of market
extension is the division of labour itself. According to him, an increase in the supply
of commodities enlarges markets when demand is elastic. Nevertheless, this process
cannot be seen at the industrial level, because an increase in the supply of a commodity
increases demand for other commodities. Consequently, the demand generated by
an increase in supply does not take place in the same industry, but in the overall
economy, and thus the forces of economic progress are endogenous due to the existence
of increasing returns at the macroeconomic level.
Young's approach for increasing returns is at the root of Kaldor's (1966) explan-
ation for productivity growth within manufacturing. The author stressed two main
points regarding Young's view. Firstly, he argued that instead of a static relation
between increase in demand and increase in productivity, scale economies must be
seen as a dynamic process. The main sources of technological progress are not related
to the size of ﬁrms and markets, but to the growth rate of these markets. This process,
which is called dynamic increasing returns to scale, is related to Arrow's (1962) no-
tion of learning by doing19, and it implies that a faster productivity growth is strictly
associated with a faster output growth, enhancing a process of cumulative causation20.
The second point stressed by him is that increasing returns to scale are intrinsic
to processing or transformation activities, and thus it is a sector-speciﬁc factor. An
empirical relationship between the growth of manufacturing output and the growth of
productivity, known as Verdoorn's law21, is presented by Kaldor to argue that dynamic
increasing returns to scale is not a generalised process, but restricted to processing
activities. The author, however, went further and stablished a causal relationship to
Verdoorn's law in which the growth of manufacturing output is the determinant of
19McCombie (2002) shows how dynamic increasing returns to scale can be derived from Arrow's
notion of learning by doing.
20Myrdal (1957) presents a similar approach that he called the principle of circular cumulative
causation, which was developed together with Kaldor. The authors criticise the notion of stable
equilibrium, arguing that there is no tendency for self-stabilisation. According to Myrdal, changes
in institution may lead to further changes in institutions and, because this circular causation tends
to become cumulative, changes may "gather speed at an accelerating rate". Thereby, cumulative
causation is seen as a process of acceleration of countries' growth rates (rather than only a process
of increasing divergence in income levels).
21In recognition of Verdoorn's (1949) investigations into that.
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productivity growth. According to him, the alternative causality, in which productiv-
ity induces a faster growth of demand via cost and price reduction, is ﬂawed because it
does not give an explanation for productivity growth diﬀerential among countries. The
remaining explanation has to be given by autonomous progress in science and tech-
nology, but how does this explanation account for veriﬁed large sectoral productivity
growth rates diﬀerential?
Furthermore, an important distinction has to be made from the Kaldorian approach
for increasing returns to the one presented by the new growth theorists. Although in
both cases productivity growth is determined by output growth, in the former view
the ultimate determinant of output is demand. Hence, despite being a phenomenon
induced by the supply-side, technological change is demand-driven. In the new growth
theory approach, on the other hand, output is ultimately determined by factors of
production, which are exogenously given22. Hence, in these models, despite being
endogenous to output due to the existence of increasing returns to scale, technological
changes are supply-constrained.
Kaldor (1972) argues that diﬀerent from competitive markets, such as those for
most primary products, manufactures face an imperfect competition where producers
adjust stocks and production, instead of prices, in response to changes in sales. An
increase in demand stimulates output growth, which, in turn, induces investment.
Consequently, capital accumulation is endogenous to demand rather than to savings.
In this sense, besides being sector-speciﬁc due to the characteristics of manufacturing
production process increasing returns to scale is demand-driven due to characteristics
of manufacturing market structure.
Since Verdoorn (1949) published his paper on the relation between manufacturing
output growth and productivity growth, a large number of studies addressed this issue
through diﬀerent perspectives with very controversial results23. These diﬀerent results
were found because studies vary in terms of the econometric technique employed, the
unit of analysis (cross-country, cross-region, cross-industry or single countries) and due
to diﬀerent methods employed to control productivity growth for capital deepening,
such as estimating multifactor productivity rather than labour productivity. Moreover,
22Dutt (2006) argues that, in these models, economy is always in full employment and thus all
savings are invested. The market mechanisms solve the problems of unemployment and aggregate
demand does not deviate from aggregate supply in the long run. Hence, investment, in the long run,
is not determined by aggregate demand, but exclusively by savings.
23McCombie et al. (2002) presented a survey on many of these studies, focusing on the results and
techniques employed.
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another important diﬀerence is the approach these studies are based on. Some of them
address this law from a demand-side perspective, based on the Kaldorian approach,
and others from a supply-side perspective.
Among these various studies Angeriz et al. (2008) is especially interesting because
it presents a technique to estimate the supply and demand versions of Verdoorn's law
separately. Based on the idea that in the supply approach inputs are exogenous and
in the demand approach output is exogenous, the authors estimate these two versions
of Verdoorn's law. They conclude that manufacturing presents a signiﬁcant degree
of dynamic increasing returns if demand is considered as exogenous, such as assumed
by Kaldor, and it is not signiﬁcant when inputs are considered as exogenous, such
as assumed by the new growth theory, suggesting constant returns to scale. Angeriz
et al. (2009) expand their later study to evaluate whether these results also hold for
more disaggregated industrial data, and concluded that all industries are subject to
increasing returns. However, similar to what has been found in early studies, such
as McCombie (1985), there is a signiﬁcant variation in the degree of increasing re-
turns among sectors: the lowest coeﬃcient was found in Textiles and the largest in
Electronics.
These results suggest that once it is assumed that output is induced by demand
through capital accumulation, the existence of dynamic increasing returns to scale can
be an important explanation for productivity growth within sectors. Furthermore,
it suggests that it is a phenomenon intrinsic to manufacturing activities and it is
especially relevant in some industries, such as found by McCombie (1985) and, more
recently, by Angeriz et al. (2009).
Araujo (2013) took this concept of increasing returns varying across sectors to
understand how a cumulative process takes place in a Pasinettian framework (Pasin-
etti, 1981; 1993). In Pasinetti's Structural Economic Dynamics (SED), sectors grow
at diﬀerent rates because income elasticities of demand are diﬀerent. His approach,
however, cannot take into account cumulative causation because it considers sectoral
technological progress as exogenous. By considering technological progress induced by
output rather than exogenous, Araujo explains the Kaldorian process of cumulative
causation in a multi-sectoral framework based on Verdoorn's law and the SED ap-
proach. A faster growth of output induces productivity growth according to sectoral
degree of increasing returns, which increases income. A faster growth of income, in
turn, induces output according to sectoral income elasticities of demand, and thus it
perpetuates a process of cumulative causation. The higher the specialization in sectors
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with high degree of increasing returns and high income elasticities of demand is, the
greater countries' growth rates are.
1.7 Export-led and balance-of-payments constrained
growth models
The demand-driven approach for dynamic increasing returns is at the root of the
Export-Led Cumulative Causation (ELCC) model developed by Kaldor (1970) and
formalised by Dixon and Thirlwall (1975). According to the model, any exogenous
shock in the autonomous demand will set up multiplier and accelerator eﬀects24 in
local production triggering a process of cumulative causation due to the existence of
increasing returns to scale. From the point of view of any particular region, exports are
the major component of autonomous demand. Hence, a faster growth of exports will
stimulate output growth, and, due to Verdoorn's law, productivity will grow faster.
In the ELCC model, competitiveness in external markets is essentially a function of
eﬃciency wages, which is determined by wages and productivity. A relatively faster
growth of productivity promotes movements of eﬃciency wages in favour of the region,
and thus region's share in world market increases. Consequently, a faster productiv-
ity growth stimulates exports, which, in turn, stimulates output and productivity,
characterising a circular and cumulative process.
The ELCC model is very elusive in terms of showing how a cumulative process
takes place in an open economy. However, it is important to note that it has some
drawbacks. Firstly, although Kaldor has stressed the importance of manufacturing
as the sector where dynamic increasing returns occur and the sector where growth in
demand reﬂects in output growth, the model does not consider explicitly a multisectoral
approach. Although it is implicitly considered because this cumulative process only
takes place in industrialised economies, by considering diﬀerent sectors explicitly (such
as Araujo (2013) presented for a closed economy25) is relevant to explain how structural
changes towards sectors with the highest increasing returns stimulates a process of
cumulative causation.
Another important issue is the fact that the mechanism behind cumulative caus-
ation in this model is price-competitiveness. Nevertheless, there is a large body of
24The author refers to Hicks's super-multiplier to account for the eﬀects on induced investment.
This eﬀect goes beyond the income-eﬀect given by the traditional Keynesian multiplier.
25As we will see later, Araujo considers his model in the context of an open economy. However,
due to his assumptions, the model loses virtually all its cumulative causation characteristic.
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literature arguing that non-price competitiveness is the most important determinant
of long-term growth of exports (Kaldor, 1978; Fagerberg, 1988; McCombie and Thirl-
wall, 1994). Technological factors, quality of products, reliability and speed of delivery
are considered as more important by far to explain export growth in the long run rather
than costs. Kaldor (1978), for example, found that the countries that had the greatest
increase in their market share were those that experienced the greatest growth rates
in prices, in contrast to what is predicted by the ELCC model. The Kaldor Para-
dox, as it is known, is explained because the increase in prices is not the cause, but
the consequence of changes in non-price competitiveness, such as improvements in the
quality of goods.
One of the main critiques of this model, however, is based on another strong as-
sumption made by Kaldor (1970). According to the model, both the level and the
growth of imports will adjust to accommodate the growth of exports. This assump-
tion implies that a faster growth of exports will increase imports at the rate of exports
through multiplier eﬀects, and hence countries' capacity to import is not a constraint.
However, it ignores the fact that income elasticities of demand for imports might be
diﬀerent from the unity, and thus a faster growth of output might increase imports at
a faster rate than exports, leading countries to a balance-of-payments crisis.
By relaxing this strong assumption, important changes in this model have to be
made, once output growth will not be determined only by export growth, but by the
growth rate that avoids this balance-of-payments crisis. Thirlwall (1979) formalised
this approach considering that exports and imports have to grow at the same rate to
avoid balance-of-payments constraints. Based on the assumption that, measured in
the same currency, prices cannot grow at diﬀerent rates in the long run, the growth
rate of a given country is determined by the growth rate of world income multiplied
by the income elasticities ratio26  both exogenously given27.
The balance-of-payment-constrained growth (BPCG) model, also known as Thirl-
wall's law, despite its simplicity, provides an interesting explanation for countries'
26Elasticity of demand for imports in relation to the country income divided by the elasticity of
demand for exports in relation to world income. As discussed in McCombie and Thirlwall (1994),
these elasticities reﬂects non-price competitiveness.
27Krugman (1989) provides a very similar model, called by him as 45-degree rule, but assuming
these elasticities endogenous to productivity. A similar approach was adopted by Palley (2003), but
based on a Kaldorian view. The author stressed that productivity, determined by Verdoorn's law,
aﬀects the income elasticities of demand, and the elasticities respond passively to changes in the
natural rate of growth. A brief review of Krugman and Palley's approach, as well as a critique can
be found in McCombie (2011).
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growth rate divergence. Firstly, a large number of studies tested this law empiric-
ally and most of them have conﬁrmed its importance in explaining countries' growth
rates28. Secondly, because of its simplicity, this model enables an incredible number
of extensions to explain why countries' growth rates diverge. Thirlwall and Hussain
(1982), for example, extended the model to allow for capital inﬂows and found it to
be very relevant to explain developing countries' long-term growth rates.
Some speciﬁc extensions of this model are especially interesting for the analysis
of this work. Araujo and Lima (2007) extended Thirlwall's model to a multisectoral
framework to understand how sectoral changes in the composition of imports and ex-
ports explains countries' growth rates. The multisectoral version of Thirlwall's law,
as the authors named it, asserts that sectors present diﬀerent income elasticities of
demand for imports and exports and countries' BPCG rates are given by the weighted
income elasticities ratio. Although sectoral elasticities are exogenous, promoting struc-
tural changes towards sectors with high elasticities increases countries growth rates in
the long run. This approach is especially interesting because it brings back the debate
on the importance of structural change, which cannot be seen explicitly in Thirlwall's
original model.
Gouvea and Lima (2010; 2013), Romero et al. (2011) and Tharnpanish and Mc-
Combie (2013) tested empirically this multisectoral version from diﬀerent econometric
approaches and found that manufacturing products, with special regards to high-tech
and capital goods products, present higher income elasticities than primary products.
Moreover, Gouvea and Lima (2010) argued that, unlike South American countries,
Asian countries have managed to change the composition of their exports and imports
in a way that increased the weighted income elasticities. Hence, the diﬀerence between
growth rates in Asian and Latin American economies can rely on the composition of
exports and imports.
Both the original and the multisectoral Thirlwall's law made important contribu-
tions for growth theory, but they do not incorporate an important aspect of the Kal-
dorian approach exhaustively discussed before: the existence of increasing returns to
scale in manufacturing and its importance for a cumulative causation process. Araujo
(2013) attempted to reconcile the multisectoral version of Thirlwall's law with his Pas-
inettian approach for cumulative causation. Nevertheless, the author considers that
dynamic increasing returns to scale aﬀects only price competitiveness, and, because the
main determinant of international competitiveness is non-price factors, the mechan-
28Thirlwall (2011) presents a systematisation of many of these studies.
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ism from which cumulative causation is presented in Araujo's model plays very limited
role in the multisectoral version of Thirlwall's law. In Araujo's model, countries' long-
term growth rates are virtually determined only by the exogenous weighted income
elasticities, whilst endogenous technological change plays a limited role29.
In order to incorporate cumulative causation in the BPCG models, Setterﬁeld
(2011) extends Thirlwall's original model to consider that output growth promotes
productivity improvements due to Verdoorn's law, but, rather than reducing prices, it
increases the quality of products30. Because income elasticities of demand for imports
and exports measure non-price competitiveness, there is a clear causal relationship
from output growth to these elasticities. The higher output growth rates are (in re-
lation to world output growth), the faster the income elasticities ratio increases. An
increase in the elasticity ratio, in turn, aﬀects positively output growth due to Thirl-
wall's law, and, consequently, a process of cumulative causation through a Kaldorian
mechanism takes place. Thereby, Setterﬁeld's approach is capable of explaining cu-
mulative causation even in a BPCG model. However, because it does not consider
a multisectoral approach, divergence in countries' growth rates are explained by past
growth rates rather than by the sectoral structure of production and trade.
Fiorillo (2001) presents an export-led model with cumulative causation in a multi-
sectoral framework. The author considers a feedback eﬀect from output growth to
exports in order to explain the coevolution of structural change and growth. Based
on sectoral Verdoorn's law and its eﬀects on income elasticities, Fiorillo shows that
a cumulative process takes place because sectoral specialisation determines aggregate
growth, while the latter modiﬁes sectoral specialisation. Nevertheless, although con-
structed based on Thirlwall's law, his model does not take into account an explicit
multisectoral BPCG framework31. Consequently, Fiorillo's model does not show ex-
plicitly to what extent the interaction between diﬀerent income elasticities of demand
and increasing returns to scale among sectors explains growth in open economies.
In this vein, a model that combines diﬀerent sectoral degrees of increasing returns,
29In Araujo (2013), cumulative causation emerges from the fact that countries have diﬀerent sectoral
elasticities of demand according to their income per capita. As countries grow, the demand shifts
towards products with higher income elasticities, and it has an impact on the BPCG rate.
30Although the BPCG model explains why countries' growth rates are diﬀerent (and hence why
their income levels diverge), Setterﬁeld considers cumulative causation as the process of acceleration
of countries' growth rate divergence.
31Furthermore, Fiorillo's model is based on the notion that growth in mark-up is the main source of
technological change. However, as shown by Kaldor's paradox, countries' market share is positively
related to prices, but not due to a reduction in the wage share, such as in this model. In fact, unit
labour costs are also positively related to market share, following the same trend of prices.
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diﬀerent sectoral income elasticities of demand for imports and exports, and the no-
tion of cumulative causation, such as presented by Setterﬁeld (2011), is fundamental
to understanding the dynamics of countries' growth rates divergence and its origins
through a sectoral perspective, such as stressed by Kaldor.
1.8 Concluding remarks
There is clear evidence that countries' long-term economic growth is strictly related
to structural changes. The reason for that, on the other hand, is much less clear. An
important explanation for overall productivity growth is the impact of transferring
labour from sectors with low levels of productivity to high-productivity sectors. How-
ever, the scope for increasing productivity through this process showed to be relevant
only for countries in the early stages of development. For middle-income countries,
such as China and Brazil, the main source of productivity growth relies on productivity
growth within sectors.
In contrast with the traditional approach that explains the productivity growth
within sectors through fundamentals, some alternative approaches advocate that struc-
tural changes are also an important source of sectoral productivity growth. Firstly,
because some sectors have higher potential to promote catching-up than others, they
can play as escalator activities. Specialisation in these sectors allows developing
countries to grow faster by imitating countries on the technological frontier. Secondly,
some sectors present higher degrees of increasing returns than others, and thus by pro-
moting structural changes towards these them is an important source of productivity
growth within sectors. Finally, sectors present diﬀerent income elasticities of demand
for imports and exports. For an open economy, promoting exports of sectors with
high-income elasticities of exports and reducing imports of sectors with high-income
elasticities of imports is essential to avoid balance-of-payments constraints.
For all explanations presented before, manufacturing, with special regards to high-
tech industries, is the sector more favourable for promoting faster growth. This sector
has the highest potential to promote catching-up, the highest degree of increasing re-
turns and the highest income elasticities of demand for exports and imports. Moreover,
because this sector presents all these characteristics, it is expected that specialisation
in manufacturing will promote a cumulative process of growth. A faster output growth
in manufacturing increases productivity, which, in turn, increases overall growth, re-
inforcing the initial stimulus.
36
Kaldor exhaustively stressed a cumulative process in these lines. However, model-
ling it from a multisectoral perspective is not a simple task and it was not made ex-
plicitly by any Kaldorian model for open economies. Some models, such as Setterﬁeld
(2011), take into account balance-of-payments constraints and cumulative causation,
but not in a multisectoral framework. Others, such as Araujo (2013) and Fiorillo
(2001), consider cumulative causation in a multisectoral framework, but not balance-
of-payments constraints. A third group, where Araujo and Lima (2007) are included,
considers balance-of-payments constraints in a multisectoral framework, but cumulat-
ive causation does not emerge from sectoral specialisation.
The following chapters of this thesis will address these issues. The ﬁrst part of
the thesis aims to analyse how specialisation in sectors with high income elasticities
of demand for imports and a high degree of dynamic increasing returns can trigger a
process of cumulative causation, where countries' growth rates diverge in the long run.
The second part analyses some developing economies to contrast diﬀerent patterns of
sectoral specialisation and its consequences for growth in the long term.
37
Chapter 2
Structural changes in the world
demand: impacts of a faster growth of
developing countries on
natural-resource exporters
2.1 Introduction
The world's structure of production has deeply changed in terms of localisation
since the 1990s. Although the worldwide annual growth rate fell from 4.1% between
1960 and 1990 to 2.7% from then on, this change diﬀers signiﬁcantly when high-income
countries are compared to low and middle-income countries. According to the WB-
WDI, the annual growth rate in the group of high-income countries fell from 4.1% to
2.1%, while low and middle-income countries experienced an increase in their annual
growth rates from 4.5% to 5.0% over the same period. Considering the 2000s alone,
the diﬀerences are even greater: the annual growth rate in the high income countries
dropped to 1.6%, while that among low and middle-income countries rose to 6.0%, as
can be seen in Table 2.1:
Thereby, since the 1990s, developing countries growth rates have been increasing
whereas developed countries growth rates have been decreasing. Because countries
have diﬀerent demand structures (according to their income level), the faster growth
of developing countries has promoted a structural change in world demand as a whole.
As the demand for some products were boosted over others, countries exporting such
demand growing products tended to be positively aﬀected. One could expect, for
example, that an acceleration of the Chinese growth relatively to the US will stimulate
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Table 2.1: Annual growth rate per countries' income level (1960-2010)
High income Low and middle income World
1960s 5.3% 5.1% 5.3%
1970s 3.6% 5.3% 3.8%
1980s 3.3% 3.1% 3.2%
1990s 2.7% 3.8% 2.9%
2000s 1.6% 6.0% 2.5%
1960-1990 4.1% 4.5% 4.1%
1990-2010 2.1% 4.9% 2.7%
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
the demand for minerals and food over the demand for electronic appliances. Hence,
countries that export minerals and food predominantly are beneﬁted, whilst those
exporting electronics might face a smaller impact. In sum, the dynamics of a country
exports essentially depends on its sectoral structure together with the diﬀerence among
trading partners growth rates.
Based on a Kaldorian approach, in which exports' dynamics play a crucial role
to understanding the diﬀerence in growth rates across countries, this chapter wishes
to explain countries' growth rates taking into account that non-homogeneous growth
across diﬀerent groups of countries has been an important issue since the 1990s, such
as discussed before. The aim of the chapter is to render these changes in the structure
of world demand as endogenous in a BPCG model. As discussed in the ﬁrst chapter,
this model explains countries' growth rates through income elasticities of demand
for imports and exports, and thus taking into account diﬀerent income elasticities
according to commercial partners is a possible source of explanation for the impact of
these structural changes.
According to the BPCGmodel, economic growth is constrained by countries' capab-
ility to export, and its long-term growth rate is given by the ratio between the growth
of exports and the elasticity of imports (Thirlwall, 1979; McCombie and Thirlwall,
1994). Further on, more complex versions of Thirlwall's model have tried to provide
more precise interpretations on this phenomenon by analysing countries' growth from
various perspectives and by incorporating other factors such as capital inﬂows and
interest payments. Two direct extensions of Thirlwall's model developed in the 2000s
are speciﬁcally related to the model developed in this chapter. First, based on the
theoretical model developed by McCombie (1993), Nell (2003) presents a multilateral
BPCG model to explain how trading partners can aﬀect the exports of a country.
Moreover, Araujo and Lima (2007) develop a multisectoral version of this model in
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order to explain how changes in the sectoral structure of exports and imports aﬀect
countries' long-term growth rates. However, these models are not able to take account
of the impacts of structural changes in the world demand on countries' long-term
growth rates.
With the aim of rendering the impacts of (structural) changes in world demand as
endogenous, this chapter develops a version of the BPCG model that is both multisect-
oral and multilateral. This approach is capable of considering the diﬀerence among
trade partners' growth rates on countries' exports. Being multilateral, the model
regards the eﬀect of diﬀerent growth rates among countries in diﬀerent stages of devel-
opment. Moreover, a multisectoral model is needed because, once these partners are
growing at diﬀerent paces, it aﬀects the sectoral structure of the world demand and,
consequently, the sectoral structure of countries' exports.
After presenting the model theoretically, it is applied to South American and Asian
economies. This empirical analysis enables us to compare the recent growth pattern
of two distinct groups of countries: one that is mainly a natural-resource exporter
(South America) and the other that exports manufactured goods mostly (Asia). This
purpose of this investigation is to discusses whether the impact of these changes in
world demand have had structural and permanent eﬀects on countries' growth rates or,
alternatively, whether they are only conjectural and not sustainable in the long-run.
South American countries' growth in the 2000s was directly related to the growth in the
demand for natural resources. The acceleration of the developing countries' growth
rates, particularly in Asia, has increased the world demand for food and minerals,
which has relaxed the balance-of-payments constraints of natural-resource exporters.
As a result, one of the most important restrictions on South American economic growth
in the last two decades may have been signiﬁcantly reduced. From this perspective, the
model developed here considers the impact of a faster growth of developing econom-
ies on countries' exports to explain why natural resource exporters have been lately
achieving higher growth rates. Furthermore, the model is also used to evaluate the
sustainability of these higher growth rates in the long run.
This chapter is divided into ﬁve sections. After this introduction, Section 2.2
presents the ﬁrst BPCG model developed by Thirlwall (1979) and some extensions
related to this work. The third section discusses why these models are not able to
explain completely the impacts of such worldwide structural changes and an extension
to BPCG models is presented with the aim of rendering the impact of these changes in
world demand as endogenous. In the fourth section, the model is applied to Brazilian
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data in order to investigate the impact of that structural change on its long-term
growth, as well as to other developing economies with the aim of comparing the results.
Finally, the last section discusses the importance of the model to explain the diﬀerences
on countries' growth rates, as well as its limitations.
2.2 Thirlwall's model and some extensions
From a Post-Keynesian perspective, the growth rate of a given region is demand-
driven. This point of view, which will be considered along this work, implies that
diﬀerences of growth between countries are not explained by the supply factors, such
as in neoclassical and new growth models, but they are mainly explained by the sources
of demand. Essentially, in the case of open economies, the primary autonomous source
of demand is external demand. Exports increase the income growth through their
multiplier eﬀects on the other sources of demand. Furthermore, as exports are the
only component of aggregate demand able to generate foreign currency, they allow the
growth of other sources of demand without generating balance-of-payments constraint.
Thirlwall (1979) developed the ﬁrst balance-of-payments constrained growth (BPCG)
model. In his paper, he argues that the diﬀerences between countries' growth rates
are better explained by the Keynesian approach, which stresses the constraints on
demand, than the neoclassical approach, which is based on supply factors (Thirlwall,
1979; McCombie and Thirlwall, 2004). He also argues that in the case of open econom-
ies, the balance-of-payments is the dominant constraint on demand growth. Therefore,
a country's long-term growth rate (where the balance-of-payments equilibrium must
be maintained) is given by its ability to increase the growth of exports and reduce the
growth of imports. The Thirlwall's model was constructed as follow:
The balance-of-payments equilibrium on current account can be expressed as:
PdtXt = PftMtEt (2.1)
whereX andM are the exports and imports, respectively (both in constant prices),
Pd is the export prices in domestic currency, Pf is the import prices in foreign cur-
rency, E is the exchange rate (measured as domestic currency divided by the foreign
currency), and the subscript t is time.
Aiming to work with growth rates instead of absolute values this expression is
written in its growth form:
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pdt + xt = pft +mt + et (2.2)
where lower-case letters represent rate of changes.
Taking the standard demand theory, imports are expressed as a multiplicative
function of the price of imports in domestic prices, the price of import substitutes and
the level of domestic income. This expression can be linearised as:
mt = ψ(pft + et) + θpdt + piyt (2.3)
where ψ is the price-elasticity of imports, θ is the cross-elasticity of imports, pi is
the income elasticity of imports, and y is the domestic income growth.
Exports can also be expressed as a multiplicative function. Its arguments are the
price of demand for exports in foreign prices, the price of goods competitive with
exports and the level of world income. A linearised version of this expression is:
xt = η(pdt + et) + δpft + εzt (2.4)
where η is the price-elasticity of exports, δ is the cross-elasticity of exports, ε is
the income elasticity of exports, and z is the world income growth.
Substituting equations (2.3) and (2.4) into (2.2), and solving for yt, the balance-
of-payments constrained growth rate can be expressed as follow:
yBt =
pdt(1 + η − θ)− pft(1− δ + ψ) + ε(zt)
pi
(2.5)
Finally, assuming that the own price-elasticities of imports and exports are equal to
the cross-elasticities, as well as that the relative prices measured in a common currency
do not change in the long-run, the BPCG rate can be expressed as:
yBt =
ε
pi
zt (2.6)
This equation shows that the BPCG rate of a country is given by the ratio of the
income elasticities of demand for exports and imports multiplied by the rate of growth
of world income. This equation is widely known as Thirlwall's law. In his paper,
the author applied this equation to a group of several developed countries. Although
his econometric method was subsequently contested (McCombie, 1997), the author's
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results showed that this law is able to explain a signiﬁcant amount of the growth in
the analysed countries.
After Thirlwall's inaugural article, some new models were developed based on
his approach. While Thirlwall's model has been able to explain the diﬀerences in
growth rates among developed countries, some extensions were made to explain dif-
ferent factors that may aﬀect countries' growth rates. Thirlwall and Hussain (1982),
for example, extended the model to apply it to developing countries. According to
the authors, it must be recognized, though, that developing countries are often able
to build up ever-growing current account deﬁcits ﬁnanced by capital inﬂows. Thus,
Thirlwall's equation was modiﬁed to allow for capital ﬂows. The modiﬁed model was
applied to a group of developing countries, and capital ﬂows were shown to be relevant
in explaining some of their growth rates, e.g., Brazil, Tunisia, Pakistan and India.
Two direct extensions of Thirlwall's model developed in the 2000s are speciﬁcally
related to the proposed model that is developed here. First, based on the theoret-
ical model developed by McCombie (1993), Nell (2003) applied the BPCG models to
neighbouring regions. Although his model may be criticised, since it considers that
a country should have balance-of-payments equilibrium with all trading partners, it
provides relevant insights in terms of the importance of considering countries' multi-
lateral relations. The author considered the original model as a speciﬁc case where one
country has relations with the rest of the world. Then, he developed a generalised
version of this model where a country may have multilateral trade relations. He showed
that trading partners might aﬀect the exports of a country diﬀerently. According to
him, the main ﬁnding of the paper is that the policy implications of the `generalised'
BOP growth model present a diﬀerent perspective compared with the `speciﬁc' BOP
model. In Nell's model, the long-term growth rate of a country is explained by the
ratio of the weighted average of exports for each trading partner to the weighted av-
erage of income elasticities for imports from each trading partner. Although he has
propounded the model for two partners, it may be generalised for K partners:
yaBt =
∑K
j=1(y
j
tγ
j
t ε
j)∑K
j=1(φ
j
tpi
j)
(2.7)
where K is the number of trading partners and the index j is the each partner
(country or region), the index a is the home country, γ is the share of exports to each
partner as a percentage of total country's exports, and φ is the share of imports from
each partner as a percentage of total country's imports.
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Araujo and Lima (2007) proposed the other recent study related to the model
developed in this chapter. The authors extended Thirlwall's original model to explain
the importance of changes in the sectoral structure of exports and imports on the
long-run growth rate of a country. They used Pasinetti's structural economics dynamic
(SED) approach to derive a multisectoral version of Thirlwall's law. In Araujo and
Lima's model, the growth rate of a country is directly proportional to the sectoral
income elasticities of demand for exports and imports weighted by coeﬃcients that
measure the share of each sector in total exports and imports. According to the
authors, the main implication of this extension is that changes in composition of
demand or in the structure of production (. . . ) also matter for economic growth. The
multisectoral version of BPCG model can be expressed as follow32:
yBt =
∑N
i=1(γ
i
tε
i)∑N
i=1(φ
i
tpi
i)
zt (2.8)
where N is the number of sectors and the index i is each sector, ε and pi are the
income elasticity of demand for exports and imports of each sector, respectively, γ is
the share of exports of each sector, and φ is the share of imports of each sector.
2.3 Incorporating world structural changes into BPCG
models
Although the models developed by Nell (2003) and Araujo and Lima (2007) are
relevant in explaining certain issues related to the diﬀerences in countries' growth
rates, they have to be extended to evaluate the impacts of non-homogeneous growth
across countries on the structure of world imports. These models do not consider the
impacts of structural changes in world demand to be endogenous. On the one hand,
the multisectoral version of the BPCG model (Araujo and Lima, 2007) assumes that
elasticities are only aﬀected by changes in the composition of imports and exports,
and thus diﬀerences in growth rates between a country's trading partners do not aﬀect
growth. On the other hand, the multilateral BPCG model (Nell, 2003) do not consider
the eﬀect of non-homogeneous growth in the world economy on the sectoral structure
of world demand. The latter model considers the impact of diﬀerent growth rates
across trading partners, but not from a sectoral perspective. However, a relevant
consequence of diﬀerent growth across trading partners is that they aﬀect the sectoral
composition of world demand, and thus the sectoral income elasticities of demand.
As argued by Pasinetti (1981) and Cornwall (1977), income growth aﬀects demand
32Although the multisectoral version of BPCG was developed by Araujo and Lima (2007), this
expression is based on Setterﬁeld's (2011) version of their model.
44
because consumers move through a `commodity hierarchy' in which diﬀerent goods
have diﬀerent income elasticities of demand in diﬀerent levels of income.
Thereby, non-homogeneous growth across trading partners according to their in-
come levels may directly aﬀect a country's growth rate, once it aﬀects the world's
import structure (according to their income elasticities for imports) and thus this
country's exports. Consequently, a country's export growth rate (and thus the balance-
of-payments constrained growth rate) depends on the sectoral structure of exports, as
suggested by Araujo and Lima (2007), but it also depends on the diﬀerence between
the growth rates of its trading partners. Hence, a new model has to be developed
and studied in depth to understand the impact of global structural changes in the
2000s on countries' long-term growth rates. The multisectoral Thirlwall's law has to
be extended to a model that considers the impact of diﬀerent growing trajectories
across trading partners on countries' exports, and thus on their balance-of-payments
constraints.
Thereby, to model structural changes in world demand and their impact on exports
as endogenous, the two extensions of Thirlwall's model previously described will be
combined in the construction of this new model. Both the multisectoral model (Araujo
and Lima, 2007) and multilateral model (Nell, 2003) will be considered together with
the aim of investigating the impact of diﬀerent growth rates of trading partners on
countries' sectoral structure of exports and thus on their growth rates. In this new
model, the income elasticity of demand for exports is divided into the income elasti-
cities of demand for exports across sectors and trading partners. The export growth is
given by the weighted income elasticities multiplied by the growth rate of each trading
partner. This division enables the model to distinguish the impacts of the growth rates
of diﬀerent trading partners on a country's BPCG.
Let us start by considering 2 goods and 3 countries:
• Goods: (1) primary, and (2) secondary
• Countries: (a) home country, (d) developed, and (u) underdeveloped
The total imports of the country a can be written as:
Mat = M
1
atd+M
2
atd+M
1
atu+M
2
atu =
2∑
j=1
2∑
i=1
M ijat (2.9)
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where M is the imports of the home country (in the subscript) from its trading
partner (in the superscript). The indices i, j and t represent the goods, the trading
partners and each period, respectively.
Taking the standard demand theory, the import demand function of the home
country is given as follow33
M ijat =
(
P iatE
j
at
P ijt
)ψija
(Yat)
piija (2.10)
where P is the price of i in the country in the subscript (a or j), E is the exchange
rate between a and j, ψ is the price-elasticity of demand for imports, and pi is the
income elasticity of demand for imports.
Considering that relative prices measured in domestic currency do not change over
time, country a's import growth rate of each good i from each country j can be written
as:
mijat = pi
ij
a yat (2.11)
where lower cases mean growth rates.
The total import growth is the weighted average of the import growth of each
sector i from each country j in the period t:
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where γ is the share of imports of each sector i and country j in the total imports
of a in each period:
yijat =
M ijat
Mat
(2.13)
The import growth of the other countries can be obtained by analogy to (2.12):
33For simplicity, price-elasticities of substitution between goods is not taken into account. Although
it is not negligible, prices do not play any role in Thirlwall's model in the long run, and thus it does
not change the results.
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Note that imports growth of the countries d and u from the country a are equal
to the export growth of a to d and u, respectively. Thus, the export growth of the
domestic country can be written as the weighted average of the imports of the d and
u from a:
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where φ is the share of each sector i of each country j in the total exports of a in
each period:
φaijt =
Xajit
Xat
(2.17)
Finally, considering that income elasticity of demand for imports from country j to
a is equal to income elasticity of demand for exports from country a to j, the 2 goods
and 3 countries BPCG rate (Thirlwall's law) for the home country can be written as:
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where ε is the income elasticity of demand for exports.
The generalised model for N goods and K trading partners is given by:
yBat =
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Furthermore, if we consider the income elasticity of demand for imports (pi) of each
country to be independent from the country that they come from, which is reasonable
as the aim of this chapter is to analyse the impacts of structural changes in world
demand on countries' exports, a simpliﬁed model is given by:
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Alternatively, by deﬁning σjt as the growth rate of trading partner j over the world
growth rate34, the model can be rearranged as follow:
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Equation (2.21) shows explicitly how the non-homogeneous growth rates among
trading partners aﬀect the home country's long-term growth.
Thus, we have that the long-term growth rate (given by the BPCG rate) depends
on the country's structure of imports and exports, as suggested by Araujo and Lima's
model, but it also depends on the diﬀerence in growth rate among trading partners.
In their multisectoral model, a country may achieve a higher growth rate by increasing
exports of sectors with high income elasticities or by reducing their imports. In the
model developed here, a country may also grow faster due to an increase in trading
partners' growth rates. This second engine takes place when the partners that are
experiencing the faster growth demand relatively more of the goods exported by the
home country, resulting in a higher BPCG rate. Therefore, based on the model de-
veloped here, it is possible to evaluate whether, during the 2000s, the faster growth of
developing countries (relatively to developed countries) had structural and permanent
impacts on the growth rate of natural resources exporters.
2.4 Data, econometric method and empirical results
The aim of this section is to estimate the model presented in the last section using
developing countries data and to compare the results with those obtained by some
empirical application of multisectoral models, such as in Gouvea and Lima (2010).
However, before doing so, some initial explanations in terms of methods and data are
presented in the following subsection.
34σjt =
yjt
zt
, where zt is the world growth rate
48
2.4.1 Data sources and sectoral classiﬁcation
Once it was assumed that the main source of changes in world demand comes from
diﬀerences in growth rates among countries with diverse income levels, this section
divides the trading partners of each country under consideration into high income
level countries (HIC) and low and middle income level countries (LIC)35. Although
this division is a generalisation of a more complex process, it makes the model capable
of considering the above mentioned structural changes in world demand.
Regarding the sectoral division, two approaches are employed.
Firstly, the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classiﬁcation is used to analyse
the elasticities according to categories of demand. According to this classiﬁcation,
sectors of the Standard International Trade Classiﬁcation (SITC), Rev. 1 are grouped
into: large economic classes of commodities, distinguishing foods, industrial supplies,
capital equipment, consumer durables and consumer non-durables. As a matter of
simpliﬁcation, the following analysis aggregates these sectors in only three groups: (1)
Natural Resources (NR)  commodities, distinguishing foods and industrial suppliers;
(2) Consumption Goods (CG)  consumer durables and consumer non-durables goods;
and (3) Capital Goods (KG)  capital and transport equipment (including parts and
accessories).
Secondly, exports and imports are grouped into Primary Products (PR), Low-tech
manufacturing (LT) and High-tech manufacturing (HT). This classiﬁcation is based
on the UNIDO (2013:205) classiﬁcation for manufacturing activities (LT and HT), and
Primary Products encloses agriculture and mining.36
The analysis employed in this paper takes the largest economies of South American
and South and East Asian countries37. The South American countries are Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela. The South and East Asian countries
are Hong Kong, India, Korea, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore and Thailand38.
China and Indonesia were excluded from the analysis because data are not available
for the initial years. The source used for exports and imports data is the United
35Countries are classiﬁed according to World Bank division.
36Appendix A presents the classiﬁcation employed in this analysis.
37Because many countries in Central America and Mexico are not predominantly natural-resource
exporters, South American countries are considered instead of Latin American countries.
38Because the method employed in this work demands strongly balanced panels and some countries
do not have data for speciﬁc years, some adjustments were made in the database before conducting
the estimations: Indian imports in 1982, Peruvian exports and imports in 1981, Thai exports in 1988
and Venezuelan exports in 2007 were obtained by averaging previous and next years (in log).
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Nations Commodity Trade Statistics (COMTRADE) database. These data (in SITC,
Rev. 1 ) are available for several countries until 2014 but the initial year may diﬀer
among them. Hence, data before 1965 were not considered in the panel analysis39.
Furthermore, to avoid the impacts of the late 2000s international crisis, the income
elasticities of demand are estimated using data until 2007.
Data in the COMTRADE database are available in U.S. dollars at current prices.
Although other estimates of multisectoral Thirlwall's law did not take into account
change in relative prices across sectors40, this procedure is necessary here because
the functions of exports and imports in the model consider growth rates in constant
prices, so that changes in relative prices could bias its results. Exports and imports of
consumption goods and low-tech manufacturing were deﬂated using the price index of
household consumption, whilst the price index of capital formation was used to deﬂate
imports and exports of capital goods and high-tech manufacturing. Both indices are
available in the Penn World Table (Feenstra et al., 2013). Imports were deﬂated using
each country's price indices, and exports were deﬂated using the US price indices41.
Further, data on the exports and imports of natural resources and primary products
were deﬂated using the free market commodity price indices, available in the UNCTAD
Statistic Database (UNCTAD-Stat) 42.
Additionally, to obtain countries' and regions' GDP growth rates, the World De-
velopment Indicators (World Bank) is used. All series in this database may be used
without further modiﬁcations once they are available from 1960 to 2011 in U.S. dollars
at constant prices for all countries.
It is also important to note that although changes in exchange rates are not relevant
to explaining the growth rates of trade ﬂows in this model, it is desirable to use changes
in real exchange rates while estimating income elasticities (McCombie, 1997). In order
to do so, data from 1950 to 2010 for countries' GDP price indices are used. These
data are available in the Penn World Table (Feenstra et al., 2013).
Thereby, equations (2.22) and (2.23) are estimated to obtain the income elasticities
of demand for imports and exports, respectively:
39In the time-series analysis, data from 1962 to 2007 were applied, once this data is available for
Brazil.
40Gouvea and Lima (2010), Romero et al. (2011) and Tharnpanich and McCombie (2013) applied
aggregate deﬂators as price deﬂators for sub-sectors in their classiﬁcation are not available.
41The choice of the US price indices relies on the assumption that their import prices are a reference
to all other countries' export prices.
42Appendix A presents details on the correspondence used to deﬂate these data.
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ln(M iat) = pi
i
a ln(Yat) + ψ
i
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and
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a ln(Yjt) + η
ij
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where η is the price-elasticity of demand for exports, X is the exports from country
a to country j, and RER is country a's real exchange rate to the US.
As the index i stands for sectors, and j stands for low and middle-income counties
(LIC) and high-income countries (HIC), there will be nine speciﬁcations for each coun-
try under consideration: three of them coming from equation (2.22) and six of them
coming from equation (2.23).
2.4.2 Applying the model to Brazil
As discussed in McCombie (1997), some series used in this model might have been
generated by a non-stationary process, so that an estimation of these equations by
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) could be spurious. Therefore, the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) tests were used to investigate the presence
of unit roots, and for the non-stationary variables, a Johansen's co-integration test
was also conducted.
According to the tests results, two diﬀerent strategies were employed in order to es-
timate the elasticities of interest43. First, for the variables (log-linearized) that proved
themselves to be stationary, a basic OLS regression is applied. Then, in the cases
where the unit root tests have indicated non-stationary variables, but the series are
likely to co-integrate according to the Johansen test, an Error-Correction Mechanism
(ECM) is estimated45.
For the case in which the series are non-stationary and do not co-integrate, some
authors suggest the estimation of elasticities through the OLS method in ﬁrst diﬀer-
ences. However, according to McCombie (1997), this method is not useful because
long-term relationship between variables is lost. Nevertheless, according to Johansen's
test, all non-stationary variables proved to be co-integrated, showing that there is a
long-term relationship between income growth and imports and exports, as expected46.
4344
45Johansen's model and lags speciﬁcation is based on Schwartz-Bayesian Information Criteria
(SBIC), while the model and lags speciﬁcation for the ECM estimation is based on SBIC and Log-
Likelihood (LL).
46Appendix B contains the estimation results and the method employed for each series.
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Looking carefully into the estimated income elasticities of exports for Brazil (ﬁrst
two columns of Table 2) we see that the coeﬃcients associated with capital and con-
sumption goods are greater than the ones for natural resources regarding both groups
of trading partners (low/middle- and high-income countries)47. This result suggests
that for both groups of partners a more rapid growth accentuates more signiﬁcantly the
demand for non-resource based products. On the other hand, the diﬀerence between
the two groups of countries demonstrates that they have diﬀerent demand structures in
their trade relationship with Brazil. Although a marginal increase in the low/middle-
income countries' growth rate stimulates the demand for natural resources and capital
and consumption goods similarly (the diﬀerence between the elasticities is not stat-
istically signiﬁcant), a marginal increase in the high-income countries' growth rate
stimulates these demands diﬀerently: capital and consumption goods grow signiﬁc-
antly faster than natural resources (at the 1% level).
Furthermore, the last column of Table 2.2 shows that, for both consumption and
capital goods, the Brazilian income elasticity of demand for exports to high-income
countries is signiﬁcantly higher than to low/middle-income countries, whilst, for nat-
ural resources, the result is the converse.
Regarding natural resources exports, we have that if high-income countries' growth
rate increases by 1 p.p., Brazilian exports would increase by only 1.36%, but, if
low/middle income countries' growth rate increases by 1 p.p., Brazilian natural re-
source exports would increase by 2.19%. Thereby, once Brazil is predominantly an
exporter of these products, we shall conclude that the faster growth of low/middle-
income countries during the 2000s have signiﬁcantly contributed to its total exports
growth, and consequently to reducing the balance-of-payments constraints.
Taking the higher growth rate of low/middle-income countries as permanent, and
considering that this phenomena has resulted in an structural change in the world
demand in favour of natural resources, it is now investigated whether the increase in
the Brazilian growth rate during the 2000s is conjectural or due to this change in world
demand and, consequently, in Brazil's balance-of-payments dynamics. Notice that it
is now possible to input these estimated income elasticities for Brazil into equation
47Surprisingly, contradicting Engel's law, the import and export income elasticities of natural-
resources are greater than one. This result, which is the same found by other studies, such as Gouvea
and Lima (2010), is probably due to the period considered for estimation, when the share of trade
in GDP has grown in almost every country. If one estimates the demand elasticity rather than
import and export income elasticities, the elasticities will probably be lower than one. For this study,
however, it is important to highlight that even though these elasticities are greater than one, they
are lower than other sectors' elasticities.
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Table 2.2: Income elasticities of demand  Brazil (1962-2007)
εLIC εHIC pi εHIC − εLIC
Natural Resources (NR) 2.19*** 1.36*** 2.34*** -0.83***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.34) (0.17)
Consumption Goods (CG) 2.67*** 3.53*** 3.41*** 0.86*
(0.38) (0.28) (0.56) (0.47)
Capital Goods (KG) 2.70*** 4.77*** 3.51*** 2.07***
(0.18) (0.24) (0.66) (0.31)
CG − NR 0.48 2.17*** 1.06
(0.40) (0.31) (0.65)
KG − NR 0.51** 3.41*** 1.16
(0.22) (0.28) (0.74)
εLIC : Income elasticity of demand for exports to low/middle-income countries; εHIC :
income elasticity of demand for exports to high-income countries.
*: signiﬁcant at the 10% level; **: signiﬁcant at the 5% level; ***: signiﬁcant at the
1% level.
(2.20) in order to obtain Brazil's BPCG rate annually and its path over the period
1980-2011. This trajectory is plotted in Figure 1 together with actual GDP growth
rate (ﬁve years moving average).
Once the BPCG models intend to predict countries' growth rates in the long run,
the estimated BPCG rate path is expected not to predict the ﬂuctuation of the GDP
growth rate but to be a lot more stable. As we can see in Figure 1, during the 1980s
and 1990s Brazil's actual GDP growth rate ﬂoats around the estimated trajectory,
indicating that these short term ﬂuctuations are likely to be conjectural. In the 2000s,
however, the model was able to predict the actual growth rate's substantial increase
(from around 2.5% to a peak of 4.0% in 2007), so that both series rise together.
This outcome denotes that the faster growth in this last decade seems to be caused
by a structural change, rather than better short-term economic scenery. Based on
this work's approach, therefore, we may interpret such phenomena as a result of a
better balance-of-payments condition, as Brazil's export structure is based on natural
resources and LIC start growing faster during this same period.
Araujo and Lima (2007)'s multisectoral model (presented in Section 2.2) has also
been applied to several developing countries (including Brazil) by Gouvea and Lima
(2010). This empirical study has demonstrated that Araujo and Lima's model identiﬁes
the fall in Brazil's GDP growth rate during the 1990s as structural, explaining it by
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Figure 2.1: Brazil: actual and estimated BPCG rates (1980-2011)
Source: WDI-WB; author's elaboration.
a drop in the estimated BPCG rate. According to Gouvea and Lima (2010), this
downwards trajectory of the BPCG rate is because the weighted elasticity of imports
grew more than the weighted elasticity of exports over the period, which made for a
fall in the ratio of trade income elasticities. It is important to note that the model
developed here may also generate this same outcome, which arrives because both
models divide the income elasticities in sectors. This division enabled the growth of
high-tech imports (which have higher elasticities) during this decade to produce a drop
in the income elasticities ratio, and thus in the calculated BPCG rate.
However, the events behind this drop in the long-term growth rate during the
1990s are distinct from the ones that took place in the 2000s. While the ﬁrst struc-
tural change was mainly related to a change in the income elasticity of imports (due
to the commercial openness in the early 1990s), the structural change in the 2000s
was a consequence of the non-homogeneous growth among trading partners with dif-
ferent income elasticities. This second mechanism is not captured by Araujo and Lima
(2007)'s approach.
In order to consider the impacts of this structural change in world demand the
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present model has also divided the income elasticities of exports by trading partners.
By doing so, it is then possible to conclude that Brazil's growth in the 2000s was not
only a consequence of the wealth eﬀects of favourable terms of trade (such as identiﬁed
in Canuto et al. (2013)) but also caused by structural changes in the balance-of-
payments dynamics.
Furthermore, the model developed here is also capable of decomposing Brazil's
sources of growth into high-income countries' and low/middle-income countries' con-
tribution. Figure 2.2 shows the impact of the demand for Brazilian exports of each
group of countries on the BPCG rate. The contribution of each group of country is
obtained by considering equation (2.20) for two commercial partners, as follow:
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where the term in the left side presents the contribution of low/middle-income
countries for the Brazilian BPCG rate, and the term in the right side, presents the
high-income countries' contribution. Because all countries are included in these groups,
the BPCG rate is given by the sum of each contribution.
The ﬁgure shows that during the 2000s Brazil's BPCG rate has increased mainly
due to low/middle-income countries' demand growth. Looking at this decade, it is
possible to see a clear upward trend between 2002 and 2008 when low/middle-income
countries' stronger demand for Brazilian exports aﬀected Brazil's BPCG by 2.0 p.p.
(these countries' contribution rose from 1.2% to 3.2%). Such growth in the BPCG rate
was not even higher because high-income countries' contribution dropped from 1.3%
in 2002 to 1.0% in 2008.
Additionally, Figure 2.2 evinces the negative impact of the international ﬁnancial
crisis on the Brazilian BPCG rate. From 2007 on, the high-income countries' growth
rate has dropped signiﬁcantly, leading to a decrease in the estimated rate. Although
it does not mean that Brazil's actual growth rate is going to fall, the model indicates
that, if the country keeps growing at the same rate as before the crisis, it might have
diﬃculties in ﬁnancing its imports and, eventually, face a balance-of-payments crisis.
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Figure 2.2: Decomposition of Brazilian BPCG rate (1980-2011)
Source: WDI-WB; author's elaboration.
2.4.3 Applying the model to developing economies according
to categories of demand
We have seen in the last subsection that the Brazilian faster growth in the 2000s
was mainly due to a faster growth of low/middle-income countries. However, because
Brazil is a natural-resource exporter48, it is relatively more aﬀected by a faster growth
of these countries than economies that export manufactured products predominantly.
Thereby, as we are interested in the general impact of these structural changes on
economic growth, this same model has been applied to a larger set of developing
countries.
This empirical analysis is based on a 46 years (1962 to 2007) panel data for 13
countries (6 from South America and 7 from South & East Asia). Rather than estim-
ating the income elasticities for each country separately through a time-series model, a
long-panel data methodology is employed to estimate equations (2.22) and (2.23). This
48According to Canuto et al. (2013) [in the 2009-2011 period] the most important Brazilian exports
are minerals (25.2 percent), foodstuﬀs (13.8 percent), and vegetables (12.3 percent). Additionally,
Brazilian exports showed increased concentration for products in recent years. Commodity products
gained signiﬁcant relevance.
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technique is preferable to analyse panels where both cross-section and time dimensions
have a moderated size (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009:265-266), such as here.
Because in panels with a large number of periods the relationship between variables
might be spurious, nonstationarity deserves attention. Hence, it is ﬁrst desirable to
investigate whether the time-series are stationary, and, if not but they have the same
integration order, whether they are cointegrated.
Once distinct unit root and cointegration analysis are employed according to cross-
sections' dependence, we start by applying the Pesaran (2004)'s cross-section's de-
pendence test49 to all series but high- and low-income countries' GDP50. Nevertheless,
every series has shown to be cross-sectional dependent at the 1% signiﬁcance level,
and hence, in order verify the presence of unit roots, the Pesaran (2007) stationarity
test was employed to all. The Pesaran (2007) test considers cross-sectional dependence
through the inclusion of lagged diﬀerences in group-speciﬁc ADF regressions.
Because this test is very sensitive to number of lags and presence of trends, many
speciﬁcations were considered. All series proved to be nonstationary (the null hypo-
thesis of nonstationarity was not rejected) when trend is not included and at least one
lag is included. However, when trend is included, results are somewhat controversial:
the null hypothesis of nonstationarity was rejected for countries' GDP when three lags
or less are included, as well as for natural resources imports and consumption goods
exports to high-income countries when two lags or less are included. Thus, under a
conservative approach, all variables but imports of natural resources and exports of
consumption goods to high-income countries were considered to be nonstationary51.
Diﬀerent methodologies were employed depending on the result of the unit root test.
Firstly, for those series that do not present unit roots (imports of natural resources
and exports of consumption goods to high-income countries), income elasticities of
49The advantage of the Pesaran (2004)'s cross-sectional dependence test is that it can be performed
for single nonstationary series, whilst Friedman's Chi-Square distribution and Frees's Q-distribution
tests can only be used to analyse the residuals of stationary panel regressions.
50High- and low-income countries' GDP are not tested for CD because they are not country-
speciﬁc, and hence time-series analysis are employed rather than panel analysis. As presented in the
last subsection, high-income countries' GDP presents stationarity according to PP but not according
to ADF test, whilst low-income countries' GDP has shown to have one unit root according to both.
51To those series analysed through time-series methods, the choice between ADF and PP tests
was arbitrary depending on the series that is regressed to obtain the elasticity. In the case of the
income elasticity of demand for CG exports, high-income countries' GDP was considered as stationary
(following the PP test), whilst in the case of the income elasticities of demand for NR and KG exports,
high-income countries' GDP was considered as nonstationary (following the ADF test).
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demand can be straightforward estimated through a stationary long panel GLS method
assuming individual ﬁxed eﬀects and a panel speciﬁc AR(1) autoregressive structure.
This technique was chosen over a traditional panel estimation because the requirements
regarding the error's structure can be lessened, namely: (1) the error terms in the
model may be correlated over countries and over time; and (2) the error do not need
to be homoscedastic nor cross-sectional independent.
Secondly, for all others series, which were considered as nonstationary, multiple
error correction based cointegration tests (Westerlund, 2007) were performed ﬁrst.
The Westerlund's cointegration tests allow for heterogeneity and dependence across
the cross-sectional units. As the null hypothesis of non-cointegration was rejected
to all variables on at least one of Westerlund's tests, the possibility of a long-term
relationship between exports or imports and income should be considered. Thus, the
elasticities of import and export (the long-term relationship between these variables
and income) were obtained through Panel Dynamic OLS (Kao and Chang, 2000) with
lags and leads determined by Wald Chi-Squared Statistics. The advantage of this
estimation method in comparison to the fully modiﬁed OLS (FMOLS) is that, for
ﬁnite samples, the estimator's bias is reduced (Baltagi, 2013).
Table 2.3 presents the results for income elasticities of demand for exports52, con-
sidering both the South American and the South & East Asian countries separately,
and the whole sample.
Table 2.3: Income elasticities of exports according to categories of demand*
South America S&E Asia All sample
εLIC εHIC εLIC εHIC εLIC εHIC
Natural Resources (NR) 2.06 1.45 2.95 2.02 2.63 1.73
(0.17) (0.19) (0.26) (0.31) (0.18) (0.19)
Consumption Goods (CG) 2.89 3.29 3.08 3.95 2.92 3.56
(0.36) (0.30) (0.36) (0.15) (0.25) (0.14)
Capital Goods (KG) 2.59 3.38 4.61 6.00 3.93 4.81
(0.28) (0.31) (0.40) (0.71) (0.34) (0.50)
εLIC : Income elasticity of demand for exports to low/middle-income countries; εHIC : in-
come elasticity of demand for exports to high-income countries.
(*): All results are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
As is clear from Table 2.3, for South American and South and East Asian countries
the income elasticities of exports tend to be higher in capital goods, and lower in
52Appendix B presents these results and the models' speciﬁcation.
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natural resource products. The income elasticities of demand range from 1.45 to
2.95 for natural resource exports, from 2.89 to 3.85 for consumption goods exports,
and from 2.59 to 6.00 for capital goods exports. Thereby, an increase of the share
of capital goods exports boosts these countries' BPCG rate. Moreover, similarly to
the results obtained for Brazil (although in a lower scale), Table 3 shows that in
both regions the income elasticities of natural resources is greater regarding exports
to low/middle-income countries than to high-income countries. It means that the
demand for these products would expand relatively more in face of a faster growth of
low/middle-income countries than in face of a faster growth of high-income countries.
In other words, although an increase in low/middle-income countries' growth rate
accentuates the demand for capital goods relatively more than the demand for natural
resources, if high-income countries experience this same growth the accentuation in
the demand for capital goods is even higher than the demand for natural resources.
Considering the weight of these sectors in total exports, we verify some diﬀerences
between the weighted income elasticities of these two groups when comparing them
in terms of the exports' destination. Asian countries present higher elasticities in
their exports to high-income countries because they export capital and consumption
goods predominantly. Therefore, their exports increase relatively more if high-income
countries are growing faster than low/middle-income countries. On the other hand, the
opposite is valid in the case of South American countries. Because they export natural
resources predominantly, their weighted income elasticities are higher to low/middle-
than to high-income countries53.
Furthermore, as low-income countries are growing faster than high-income coun-
tries since the early 2000s, this diﬀerence suggests that South American countries are
beneﬁting from lower balance-of-payments constraints in the recent period. As South
American countries export predominantly natural resources, and the elasticities of
these goods are higher to low/middle- than to high-income countries, a faster growth
of the former group compared to latter increases relatively more the demand for these
goods. However, if low/middle-income countries' growth rates drop, South American
countries shall be the most aﬀected economies.
Finally, by analysing the estimated income elasticities of demand for imports some
relevant issues also emerge. Such results are shown in Table 2.4. We may notice that
the elasticities of demand are higher for capital goods than for natural resource imports
53In 2012, 66.1% of South American countries' exports were NR (on average), whilst they were
only 15.6% of South & East Asian countries' exports.
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in both groups of countries, meaning that, on average, a faster growth of an Asian
economy or of a South American economy, both increase the demand for capital goods
most rapidly. This result corroborates Gouvea and Lima (2010)'s ﬁndings, where the
authors conclude that when the values of the income elasticities are compared among
sectors of the same country, it is seen that the technology sectors have higher income
elasticities than the resource-based sectors.
Table 2.4: Income elasticities of imports according to categories of demand*
South America S&E Asia All sample
Natural Resources (NR) 1.65 1.46 1.47
(0.11) (0.04) (0.04)
Consumption Goods (CG) 1.84 0.63 1.19
(0.30) (0.20) (0.17)
Capital Goods (KG) 1.36 1.19 1.73
(0.18) (0.18) (0.13)
(*): All results are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Moreover, Asian countries' income elasticities for imports are lower than South
American countries' elasticities, especially regarding capital and consumption goods.
Hence, South American countries' BPCG rates tend to be lower than the Asian coun-
tries' rates, because the accentuation of demand for imports due to countries' faster
growth is greater in South American economies than in Asian economies. Thereby, in
order to boost their growth rate in the long run, South American countries must change
their imports' structure (by reducing the share of capital and consumption goods) or,
otherwise, they will need to rely on the high demand for their natural resources (which
depends on low/middle-income countries' relatively fast growth) to compensate their
high income elasticities of imports.
2.4.4 Applying the model to developing economies according
to technologic intensity
The same methodology presented in the last subsection was employed here to es-
timate the income elasticities of demand for imports and exports according to sectors'
technological intensity. First, series were tested for the presence of cross-sectional
dependence. According to Pesaran (2004)'s test, all series present cross-sectional de-
pendence, and thus they were tested for the presence of unit roots through the Pesaran
(2007)'s test. According to this test, only primary products and low-tech exports to
high-income countries were pointed out as nonstationary. Hence, income elasticities
of demand for primary products and low-tech exports to high-income countries were
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estimated through a GLS ﬁxed eﬀects panel model, in which a panel speciﬁc AR(1)
autoregressive structure was assumed, as well as heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional
dependence. For the remaining series, the Westerlund (2007) error correction based
cointegration tests were performed, and, again, the null hypothesis of non-cointegration
was rejected by at least one of the Westerlund's tests in all cases. Thereby, all income
elasticities of demand for imports were estimated through a Panel Dynamic OLS, as
well as the income elasticities of demand for exports to low/middle-income countries
and the income elasticity of demand for high-income exports to high-income countries.
Table 2.5 presents the results of these estimations. Similarly to what has been found
for natural resources, the results for primary products show higher income elasticities
of demand for exports to low/middle-income countries than to high-income countries in
all samples54. This outcome reinforces the relevance of the low/middle-income coun-
tries' faster growth to explaining the increase in South American countries' growth
rates during the 2000s. Because South America exports primary goods predomin-
antly55, a faster growth of low/middle-income countries relatively to high-income ones
positively impacts South American countries' weighted income elasticity and, con-
sequently, their BPCG rates.
Table 2.5: Income elasticities according to technologic intensity*
South America S&E Asia All sample
εLIC εHIC pi εLIC εHIC pi εLIC εHIC pi
Primary 2.11 1.35 1.71 2.26 2.00 1.42 2.15 1.51 1.54
(0.26) (0.14) (0.16) (0.30) (0.15) (0.12) (0.20) (0.09) (0.10)
Low-tech 1.72 0.83 1.32 2.26 2.09 1.64 2.04 1.44 1.20
(0.16) (0.14) (0.16) (0.25) (0.12) (0.09) (0.16) (0.09) (0.08)
High-tech 2.64 3.14 1.61 4.21 5.22 1.69 3.52 4.28 1.69
(0.24) (0.33) (0.21) (0.34) (0.59) (0.12) (0.26) (0.42) (0.11)
εLIC : Income elasticity of demand for exports to low/middle-income countries; εHIC : income
elasticity of demand for exports to high-income countries; pi: income elasticity of demand for
imports.
(*): All results are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
The income elasticities of demand for high-tech exports and imports are greater
than the income elasticities for low-tech in all cases56, showing the importance of
raising the share of high-tech in total exports and reducing the share of high-tech
54Only for South & East Asia, this diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
55Primary goods represented 54.9% of the South American countries' total exports (on average) in
2012 (UN-COMTRADE).
56Only for South American import elasticities, this diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant at the
5% level.
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in total imports in order to increase BPCG rates. When elasticities of demand for
high-tech are compared to elasticities of demand for primary products, similar res-
ults are found: all income elasticities of demand for high-tech are higher than for
primary products, except regarding South America's imports57. Therefore, one may
conclude that increasing the technological intensity of exports is crucial to reducing
countries' balance-of-payments constraints, and, consequently, to guaranteeing high
and sustained growth rates in the long run.
2.5 Concluding remarks
As we have seen along the chapter, the world is facing important changes in terms
of its structure of production, and it implies in a structural change in world demand.
Although the worldwide growth rate has been shrinking since the 1990s, it is not a
homogeneous fall. While high-income countries' growth rates have been decreasing,
low and middle-income countries are experiencing a faster increase in their growth
rates, particularly from the 2000s on. This non-homogeneous process of growing has
relevant implications on the world structure of demand, and thus in the trade ﬂows,
because the demand of each of these groups of countries is diﬀerent.
In this context, the multisectoral version of Thirlwall's model (Araujo and Lima,
2007) is combined with Thirlwall's multilateral version (Nell, 2003) in order to render
the impacts of these structural changes in world demand as endogenous. The good
predictability of the multisectoral BPCG model (Araujo and Lima, 2007) is diﬃcult
to be refuted, once it is very eﬃcient at treating structural changes inside countries as
endogenous. These model, however, were not able to capture the previously treated
changes, once these changes aﬀect both the importance of each trading partner in
growing and the sectoral structure of exports. Whence, the model developed in this
paper render these changes as endogenous by dividing the income elasticities of demand
for exports between diﬀerent trading partners and sectors. By doing so, the non-
homogeneous growth rates across countries with diﬀerent structures of demand are
incorporated in the model, and thus the impacts of structural changes in world demand
on countries' BPCG rates can be calculated explicitly.
Further, the central thesis that income elasticities of demand vary according to
trading partners' income levels and that such diﬀerence is relevant in explaining coun-
tries' growth rates is corroborated by an empirical investigation for Brazil. Although
the impact of a faster growth of low and middle-income countries on Brazilian cap-
57Even though this diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
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ital and consumption goods exports has shown to be lower to the impact of a faster
growth of high-income countries, it increases the demand for Brazilian natural-resource
products 60% more. This fact helps understanding why natural-resource exporters,
such as Brazil, have been experiencing lower balance-of-payments constraints since
the 2000s (when low/middle income countries start growing by 6.0% per year). This
analysis, thus, suggests that these countries' higher growth rates in the last decade are
not only due to a wealth eﬀect caused by an increase in its terms-of-trade, but also
due to a faster growth of low/middle-income countries' demand for natural resources.
When other developing economies are considered, however, the outcomes show that
an increase of growth rates based on natural-resource exports might be unsustainable
in the long run, once the income elasticities of demand for imports and for exports are
higher for more technological advanced sectors. Because of that, structural changes in
the composition of exports and imports turn into important determinants of the BPCG
rate. This fact emerges because, although a country can achieve higher growth rates
without facing balance-of-payments constraints if their trading partners are growing
faster (such as Brazil during the 2000s), the share of capital and consumption goods
exports must increase (or the share of the imports of these goods must decrease) in
order to boost its growth rate in the long term without relying on its trading partners'
growth.
As a ﬁnal remark, it is highlighted that the contribution of this study on the
importance of rendering structural changes in the world demand as endogenous in
BPCG models does not deplete the subject. Hence, further studies are needed in order
to fully understand the complexity of such changes and to what extent they are relevant
in the long run. For example, if high-income countries' growth rates start increasing (or
low/middle-income countries' growth rates start decreasing), these structural changes
will no longer be an issue, once the world growth would be homogeneous.
Likewise, as low/middle-income are growing by 6.0% per year, their income elast-
icities are approaching high-income countries as their income level increases, which
tends to lower the relevance of non-homogeneous growth among countries. Thereby,
in the present economic scenery, natural resource exporters could take advantage from
lower balance-of-payments constrains (caused by the faster growth of developing coun-
tries) by shifting their structure of production towards more technological sectors. This
is due to the fact that the increase of high-tech exports (and the decrease of high-tech
imports) is the ultimately determinant of a country's growth rate in the long run.
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Chapter 3
Estimating Verdoorn's law across
countries in diﬀerent stages of
development
3.1 Introduction
One of the main explanations for diﬀerences in countries' growth rates relies on
the existence of static and dynamic increasing returns to scale. The centrality of this
explanation is at the root of both the new growth theory and the Kaldorian approach.
New growth models criticised the neoclassical/Solow model by assuming that pro-
ductivity growth is determined endogenously. They argued that although ﬁrms may be
faced with constant returns to scale, regions and countries present increasing returns
due to externalities generated by capital accumulation (Romer, 1986) or by allocation
in speciﬁc activities, such as R&D and education (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990). This as-
sumption has shifted the focus of the neoclassical models from exogenous technological
changes to the externalities generated by the growth process itself.
These models, however, have paid little attention to sectoral speciﬁcities to ex-
plaining diﬀerences in countries' growth rates, as well as neglecting the importance of
demand growth. As discussed in the ﬁrst chapter, although these models emphasise the
importance of some activities, such as R&D, increasing returns are not associated with
the size of one speciﬁc sector, such as manufacturing, agriculture or services (Palma,
2005). Furthermore, productivity is ultimately constrained by the accumulation of
production factors and, in these models, these factors are determined exogenously
rather than induced by demand growth (McCombie, 2002; Dutt, 2006).
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In contrast with the new growth theory, the Kaldorian approach stresses the exist-
ence of increasing returns to scale in some sectors and the importance of demand as an
ultimately source of growth. Diﬀerent from the endogenous growth theories, Kaldor
(1966; 1972) stressed that sectors have diﬀerent degrees of increasing returns, and
thus countries may grow at diﬀerent rates due to their sectoral structure of production.
Moreover, because capital is a produced means of production and investment responds
to demand, output growth determines the rate of capital accumulation. Hence, endo-
genous technological change is induced by demand growth instead of constrained by
the supply of production factors, such as in the new growth models.
The ﬁrst chapter emphasised some reasons why sectoral growth rates might explain
countries' growth rate diﬀerences. This chapter focuses on Kaldor's second growth law
(also known as Verdoorn's law), which argues that manufacturing growth promotes a
faster growth of productivity of the sector itself. Verdoorn (1949) has emphasised
a long-term association between faster output growth and growth of productivity in
manufacturing, and showed such empirical relation for a cross-section of countries.
Kaldor (1966) went further and argued for a causal relationship. According to him, a
faster output growth causes a faster growth of productivity (McCombie and Thirlwall,
1994: 168) due to static and dynamic increasing returns. This statement is at the
heart of the cumulative causation models. As production grows due to the increase
of the extent of markets, the scope for specialisation increases, and it stimulates the
growth of productivity (due to division of labour). Thereby, in a circular process that
involves both the supply and demand sides, productivity growth increases output via
market extension, which, in turn, stimulates productivity growth (McCombie, 2002).
Although in his 1966 lecture Kaldor argued that the UK (a developed economy
with no surplus labour in non-manufacturing activities) was de-industrialising because
it was suﬀering from premature maturity, which has exhausted its potential for fast
growth, he extended this argument for countries in diﬀerent stages of development
(Kaldor, 1966; 1967). Nevertheless, this extension depends on the consideration that
diﬀerent industries inside manufacturing, such as capital goods, might have diﬀerent
degrees of increasing returns and income elasticities according to countries' stages of
development58. Because individual industries take diﬀerent advantages of production
and demand factors, such as market extension, skilled labour and innovation, one
58After the early stage of development, where agriculture investment is the major important source
of industrial growth, Kaldor (1966, 1967) deﬁne four stages of development based on foreign demand.
First, a country has to promote import-substitution of consumption goods; second, promote exports
of these goods; third, promote import-substitution of capital goods; and, in the most advanced stage,
promote exports of capital goods.
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cannot expect that these industries have the same characteristics in developing and
developed countries.
Therefore, this chapter analyses industries inside manufacturing in terms of their
dynamic increasing returns to scale (Verdoorn's law) across countries controlling for
their income per capita. The aim is to identify those industries that present a higher
degree of increasing returns and thus which are able to boost economic growth both for
developing and developed countries. This analysis aims to demonstrate the importance
of the sectoral structure to productivity growth and thus how specialisation in some
industries can boost economic growth in the long run according to countries' stages of
development.
Several studies have analysed the existence of increasing returns across manufac-
turing industries, for example: McCombie and De Ridder (1984), McCombie (1985),
and, more recently, Angeriz et al. (2009). Essentially, they found evidence of high
increasing returns to scale at the industry level, especially when the speciﬁcation at-
tempts for dynamic increasing returns. However, once they consider a speciﬁc country
or a group of developed countries (e.g., states of the USA or regions of the European
Union), they cannot infer any conclusion about the importance of these industries
according to countries' stages of development. In this vein, although these studies are
used for comparison, this chapter goes further and analyses the degree of increasing re-
turn for both developed and developing countries at the industry level. Verdoorn's law
is estimated across a range of countries, including those with high-income levels and
low and middle-income levels, in order to contrast the results and provide an explan-
ation for the convergence (or divergence) in countries' productivity through sectoral
speciﬁcities.
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section presents the debate on Ver-
doorn's law diﬀerent speciﬁcations, focusing on the supply- and demand-approaches
for the existence of increasing returns to scale, the static-dynamic Verdoorn's law para-
dox and the distinction between Verdoorn's law and Okun's law. Section 3 presents a
method to estimate Verdoorn's law from the supply- and demand-side approaches, con-
trasting its assumptions. Moreover, it incorporates human capital and technological
gaps into the speciﬁcation of Verdoorn's law. Section 4 estimates this law contrast-
ing the degree of increasing returns obtained through the supply- and demand-side
speciﬁcations. Section 5 presents the results of the estimation according to countries'
stages of development for each individual industry, as well as according to technolo-
gical intensity and categories of demand. Section 6 discusses the consequence of this
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chapter's ﬁndings for the growth literature and provides the concluding remarks.
3.2 Verdoorn's law speciﬁcations and interpretations
Based on countries' data for two long periods (between 1870-1914 and 1914-1930),
Verdoorn (1949) established a long-term relationship between industrial output growth
and productivity growth, by estimating the following equation:
q = λ+ by (3.1)
where q is industrial productivity growth, y is industrial output growth, λ is the
rate of technical progress not explained by output growth and b is the elasticity of
productivity with respect to output, known as the Verdoorn coeﬃcient.
Verdoorn found a coeﬃcient of approximately 0.45 (with limits of 0.41 and 0.57) for
the elasticity of productivity with respect to output. Despite suggesting that one could
have expected these results a priori because division of labour depends upon the volume
of production, which, in turn, creates scope for rationalisation and productivity growth,
Verdoorn did not establish a clear causal relationship between these two variables. The
author emphasised an association between output and productivity growth, but he
did not discuss the mechanism behind this process. Kaldor (1966), on the other hand,
argued for a one-side causal relationship between these two variables. He stressed
that Verdoorn's ﬁndings reﬂect a dynamic rather than static relationship between
output and productivity growth primarily because technological progress enters into
it. According to him, faster growth rates of output induce faster productivity growth
due to the existence of dynamic increasing returns to scale in manufacturing59.
3.2.1 Supply- and demand-side speciﬁcations
In a series of papers, Rowthorn (1975a; 1975b) and Kaldor (1975) discussed about
the most adequate speciﬁcation of this law based on theoretical and empirical issues.
According to Rowthorn (1975a), this law should have estimated explicitly the elasticity
of productivity in relation to employment in order to verify to what extent productiv-
ity growth is constrained by labour force, which Kaldor assume for the UK. Hence,
59Some authors argued that this relationship could be seen from productivity growth to output
growth because increases in productivity reduce prices, and it might increase the growth rate of
demand (Salter, 1966). Nevertheless, according to Kaldor, in this view productivity is mainly to be
explained by autonomous technical progress, but if this is true, how can we explain large gaps in
productivity growth across diﬀerent countries for such long periods? Hence, Kaldor argues that this
relation can only have one direction of causality: from output to productivity.
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equation (3.2) should be estimated, rather than (3.1), as follows:
q = −λ+ dl (3.2)
where l is employment growth and d = (1 − b) is the elasticity of output to em-
ployment. By doing so, Rowthorn found that there is a positive Verdoorn coeﬃcient,
but it depends on the inclusion of Japan in the analysis60.
Kaldor (1975) replied arguing that Rowthorn's estimation is correct only if one con-
siders the factors of production as exogenous to output. However, output, rather than
the labour or capital, is the exogenous variable. According to him, capital required
for industrial production is self-generated by output growth once investment responds
to demand growth, and labour is absorbed by manufacturing during the process of
industrialisation because it has no true opportunity cost in agriculture and services.
In this sense, Kaldor argued that the original speciﬁcation was the most appropriate
way to estimate Verdoorn's law, once output, which is exogenous, is the explanatory
variable61.
The main conclusions this discussion brought to the debate are twofold.
Firstly, the results of estimation for the existence of increasing returns to scale
depends on the variables considered as exogenous. On the one hand, the demand-side
speciﬁcation assumes output as exogenous, which implies that causation runs from
growth of demand to productivity growth. The supply-side speciﬁcation, on the other
hand, assumes supply of factors as exogenous and, thus, causation running from the
availability of factors to productivity.
Secondly, because output, employment and productivity are conjunctly determ-
ined, Verdoorn's law has to be estimated through instrumental variables to prevent
the estimation from the simultaneous equation bias. Both Kaldor's and Rowthorn's
speciﬁcations rely on the assumption that the explanatory variable is exogenous. How-
ever, due to the notion of cumulative causation, productivity growth is endogenous to
output growth (Verdoorn's law), but output growth is, in turn, endogenous to pro-
ductivity growth, once productivity aﬀects countries' or regions' price-competitiveness
60Kaldor estimated Verdoorn's equation, ﬁnding a coeﬃcient of 0.484 for the elasticity of manufac-
turing productivity to output, which is very similar to the one found by Verdoorn. Moreover, he also
estimated the relationship between employment and output growth, ﬁnding a coeﬃcient of 0.516 for
the elasticity of employment to output growth, which has conﬁrmed Verdoorn's law.
61Kaldor (1975) suggested, alternatively, to regress output on employment, rather than on pro-
ductivity. In this approach, the Verdoorn coeﬃcient is given by one minus the estimated coeﬃcient.
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and thus their exports. Hence, these variables are simultaneously determined, and one
should instrumentalise the explanatory variable to estimate this law correctly62.
According to Angeriz et al. (2008), the distinction between supply- and demand-
side speciﬁcations is relevant ﬁrstly because estimating Verdoorn's law from diﬀerent
approaches produces diﬀerent results. Moreover, it is necessary to consider these dif-
ferent views because it depends on a priori theoretical arguments. Neoclassical and
endogenous growth approaches assume that savings determine investment, and, con-
sequently, the estimations produced by the supply-side speciﬁcation are more appro-
priate to estimate the degree of increasing returns. On the other hand, the Kaldorian
approach sees investment as being determined by the acceleration mechanism rather
than by savings and, consequently, the demand-side speciﬁcation is the most appro-
priate.
Based on this distinction between supply- and demand-side speciﬁcations, many
authors attempted to estimate Verdoorn's law from these two approaches. McCombie
and de Ridder (1984), for example, constructed series of capital stock with the aim of
control for the growth of non-labour inputs, and estimated this law for total manufac-
turing for 49 states of the US. Their results show that both speciﬁcations corroborate
the presence of increasing returns to scale in manufacturing, even though it is greater
if one assumes demand-side speciﬁcation. While supply-side speciﬁcation with growth
of employment as a regressor gives a value of 1.33, Kaldor's speciﬁcation with growth
of output as a regressor gives a value of 1.45. Moreover, following Kennedy and Fo-
ley's (1978) suggestion, the authors also estimate this law based on total factor inputs
rather than employment. The results for both speciﬁcations were slightly larger than
the traditional approach, corroborating for the existence of increasing returns to scale
in manufacturing.
More recently, Angeriz et al. (2008) estimated this law based on demand- and
supply-side speciﬁcations for EU regional data by controlling for spatial correlation.
The authors found values for the degree of increasing returns statistically diﬀerent
from the unity when output is the regressor. However, diﬀerent from the results
obtained in the former study, they found non-signiﬁcant results when factor inputs are
the regressor, indicating that manufacturing may be subject to diminishing returns
to scale. These results brought back the importance of distinguishing the supply and
demand approaches. They show that if one assumes that output is exogenous to
62See McCombie (2002:95-96) for a detailed discussion about simultaneous equation bias in both
estimations.
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productivity, such as predicted by the demand-side version, manufacturing is subject
to increasing returns, but if one assumes capital and labour as exogenous, such as
predicted by the supply-side view, the existence of increasing returns is not found.
3.2.2 The static-dynamic Verdoorn's law paradox
Verdoorn's law asserts that a faster growth of productivity is positively related to
a faster growth of output. In this sense, it is related to dynamic rather than static
increasing returns to scale. This dynamic relationship, however, can be derived from
a static production function, such as shown by Black (1962). Thereby, estimating the
degree of increasing returns using a production function with variables expressed in
logarithm should give the same results as estimating it directly through Verdoorn's
original speciﬁcation.
However, McCombie (1982) shows that estimating this law through these two dif-
ferent methods gives diﬀerent results. According to him, the Verdoorn's law obtained
by exponential growth rates (which reﬂects Verdoorn's original approach) gives sup-
port for the existence of increasing returns to scale, whilst estimations based on log-
level values suggest constant returns to scale. This controversial result is known as
static-dynamic Verdoorn's law paradox, and it was found in many other studies.
Theoretically, despite having diﬀerent meanings, the distinction between dynamic and
static returns to scale is irrelevant for estimation purposes. Nevertheless, empirical
results are diﬀerent when it is estimated using log-level values (the static approach)
and exponential growth rates (the dynamic approach).
McCombie and Roberts (2007) argue that if Verdoorn's law is correctly speciﬁed,
the paradox can be attributed to spatial aggregation bias. According to them, when
data are aggregated to regional level (for example, countries and states), the relation-
ship between the variables come to be between their averages rather than individual
values. This bias occurs when Verdoorn's law is estimated through log-level values,
and thus the dynamic law is the correct speciﬁcation. By using a dataset construc-
ted for simulation, the authors estimated Verdoorn's law from both speciﬁcations.
Although the data was constructed assuming increasing returns, they show that the
Verdoorn coeﬃcient was statistically diﬀerent from zero in the estimation based on the
dynamic version, such as expected, but it was not when Verdoorn's law was estimated
through the static version. Based on this, they argued that regardless the true degree
of increasing returns to scale, the static speciﬁcation estimated using cross-sectional
aggregate regional data always indicates the existence of constant returns, once all
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productivity growth is captured by the intercept. They show mathematically that due
to the aggregation of data, the estimated degree of increasing returns is (statistically)
equal to the unity and thus Verdoorn coeﬃcient is equal to zero independently of its
true value.
By using aggregate time-series data, on the other hand, McCombie and Roberts
show that the static-dynamic Verdoorn's law paradox does not arise. In contrast to
cross-sectional data, in this speciﬁcation, both the static and the dynamic Verdoorn's
law give relatively unbiased estimates of the degree of increasing returns. When one
estimates this law through panel data, the same problem of cross-sectional data is
obtained if random eﬀects are assumed, but the paradox does not arise when one-way or
two-way ﬁxed eﬀects are assumed. Thereby, estimating Verdoorn's law through cross-
sectional log-level values or random eﬀects panel data provides biased estimations for
the degree of increasing returns. The correct speciﬁcation should consider exponential
growth rates or, alternatively, it must be obtained by means of aggregate time-series
or ﬁxed eﬀects panel data techniques.
3.2.3 Verdoorn's law and Okun's law: long- and short-term
relationships
An important issue that arises when Verdoorn's law is being estimated is that it is
a long-term relationship between output and productivity growth rather than a short-
term relationship. This law is an attempt to provide an explanation for technological
changes by assuming that they are induced by output growth. Essentially, productivity
increases due to technological changes and thus there is a positive relationship between
output growth and productivity growth.
Notwithstanding, Okun's law addresses the same relationship. According to this
law, output is negatively related to unemployment. The impact of an increase (or
decrease) in output is not completely absorbed by changes in employment in the short-
term, and thus employment reacts more slowly to output ﬂuctuations. Consequently,
there is a procyclical relationship between productivity and output growth. Because a
faster growth of output increases employment but at a lower rate, productivity reacts
positively to output growth. Thereby, in the upwards cycle productivity increases,
whilst it decreases in the downwards.
The diﬀerence between Okun's law and Verdoorn's law is that the latter emphasises
a long-term relationship between these two variables, whilst the former attempts to
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analyse a short-term relationship. In Verdoorn's law, changes in productivity are not
a response to ﬂuctuations in the capacity utilisation, but a response to technological
improvements. Hence, the correct speciﬁcation of this law must take account of this
possible source of bias. If one estimates this law based on exponential growth rates it
is important to consider time units long enough to avoid estimating cyclic ﬂuctuations.
Moreover, when it is estimated by log-level values, series must be long enough to obtain
the long-term relationship between variables rather than the impact of shocks63.
Thereby, a distinction has to be made between these two approaches when one
estimates Verdoorn's law. Although a positive relationship between output growth
and productivity growth can be due to short-term ﬂuctuations or to technological
changes, these approaches suggest very diﬀerent conclusions about economic systems.
If a short-term relationship is veriﬁed, it means that employment is more rigid than
output and thus productivity is procyclic, such as predicted by Okun's law. On the
other hand, if the long-term relationship is veriﬁed, it means that technological change
is induced by output growth, such as suggested by Verdoorn's law.
3.3 Methods and data
3.3.1 Estimating Verdoorn's law: supply- and demand-side spe-
ciﬁcations
Section 3.2 discussed the problems of estimating the long-term relationship between
faster growth of production and growth of productivity through equations (3.1), such
as Verdoorn (1949) did. Because it is not explicit in his approach whether demand or
factors inputs are exogenous, applying equation (3.1) to estimate Verdoorn's law only
shows the relationship between these two variables, instead of presenting an economic
explanation for productivity growth.
Furthermore, although Verdoorn's law addresses the importance of technological
change to promote growth, if we assume that investment is induced by demand growth,
a faster growth of output has two impacts on labour productivity. On the one hand,
an increase of output increases capital-labour ratio, which has a direct impact on
productivity due to the increase of the same kind of capital to the production process.
On the other hand, output stimulates investment in new technologies and thus labour
productivity increases through technological change, which is Kaldor's explanation for
63Alternatively, some studies have adjusted output growth for changes in the capacity utilisation
to estimate Verdoorn's law, such as Harris and Liu (1999).
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Verdoorn's law. In this sense, to estimate Verdoorn's law from a Kaldorian perspective,
it is necessary to include controls for the growth capital stock induced by demand64.
Hence, the regressions presented in Section 3.2 are unable to estimate correctly the
degree of increasing returns, as well as to diﬀerentiate between these two causal rela-
tionships. A more appropriate speciﬁcation must consider explicitly the direct impact
of adding more of the same capital and the impact of technological changes stimulated
by the induced investment through an aggregate technical progress function65.
It is now well established that aggregate production functions are merely picking
up an accounting identity, and data will suggest constant returns to scale regardless
of the actual degree of increasing returns (Felipe and McCombie, 2013). However,
Verdoorn's law derived from a production function can still be interpreted as showing
increasing returns to scale, although not within the conventional framework. Accord-
ing to McCombie and Spreaﬁco (2015), theoretically, an aggregate production function
does not exist, and thus one cannot interpret the intercept as the separate contribution
of exogenous technological change to growth, as well as the Verdoorn coeﬃcient should
not be interpreted as a measure of increasing returns to scale per se. All that can be
said is that a faster growth of output leads to a faster growth of productivity due to
many factors, such as induced technological change and greater eﬃciency in the use
of resources. Hence, once the coeﬃcients are not interpreted as the marginal contri-
bution of the various factors that determine growth, such as in neoclassical approach,
Verdoorn's law can be estimated based on this approach. Thereby, this methodology
is applied here for expositional reasons66.
Based on McCombie (2002), it is assumed that ﬁrms' output growth is determined
by growth of capital, labour and technical progress, as follows:
yi = λ+ aki + (1− a)li (3.3)
where λ is the rate of technical progress, y, k, and l are the growth rates of output,
capital and labour of ﬁrm i, and a and (1 − a) are the output elasticities of capital
64Under the assumption of constant capital-output ratio, a stylised fact shown by Kaldor (1961)
for the long term, Verdoorn's law can be reduced to equation (3.1). However, it is not assumed
here because short-term variations in capital-output ratio can aﬀect the estimation of Verdoorn's
coeﬃcient.
65McCombie and Spreaﬁco (2015) show that Kaldor's aggregate technical production function can
be derived from an aggregate production function, although these two functions have diﬀerent inter-
pretations
66McCombie (2002) presents a detailed discussion about problems and advantages of this theoretical
approach.
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and labour.
According to the Kaldorian view of Verdoorn's law, the rate of technical progress is
determined endogenously by the output growth. Hence, the rate of technical progress
at the industry level is given by:
λ = λ¯+ ζy (3.4)
where λ¯ is the exogenous technical progress, and ζ is the elasticity of induced
technical progress in respect to the industry output. Although many authors have
emphasised the existence of induced technical progress in diﬀerent forms, such as
Arrow (1962), who stressed the importance of learning-by-doing at the ﬁrm level, and
Young (1928), who focused on increasing returns on the macro level, here induced
technical progress is due to the existence of localisation economies, once it is seen at
the industrial level67.
Replacing (3.4) in (3.3), and assuming that capital-output ratio and labour output
ratio are identical between ﬁrms in the same industry, we have:
y = ν[λ¯+ ak + (1− a)l] (3.5)
where ν = 1
1−ζ is the degree of increasing returns. In this equation, the importance
of factor accumulation for economic growth is explicit. In contrast to equation (3.2)
and (3.3), where one only can see explicitly the direct impact of factors accumulation
on output growth, here it is possible to see that accumulation of capital and labour
increases output growth by stimulating endogenous technical progress if the degree of
increasing returns, ν, is greater than one.
Re-arranging equation (3.5) it is possible to present Verdoorn's technological pro-
gress function augmented for capital accumulation as follows:
q =
λ¯
a
+
νa− 1
νa
y +
ν(1− a)
νa
k (3.6)
67There are many explanations for the existence of increasing returns to scale. Krugman (1991;
1998), for example, emphasises the eﬀects of external economies of scale. According to him, the geo-
graphical clustering of activities can result in localisation economies. Clustering facilitates research
and innovation in an industry, as well as the exchange of ideas and knowledge between ﬁrms. Fur-
thermore, the author also stresses the importance of Marshallian sources of external economies, such
as market-size eﬀects (backward and forward linkages), a thick local labour market, especially for
specialised skills, and information spillovers.
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According to the demand-led approach for Verdoorn's law, capital accumulation
is not determined exogenously by savings. Instead, it is induced by demand growth.
Hence, equation (3.6) can be rearranged to present a technological production function
where the impact of change in capital-output ratio on productivity is explicit, rather
than capital accumulation itself:
q =
λ¯
a
+
ν − 1
νa
y +
1− a
a
(k − y) (3.7)
In this equation, productivity is explained by the impact of exogenous technolo-
gical change, output growth and the increase in capital-output ratio. The Verdoorn
coeﬃcient can be obtained directly from this equation assuming ex-ante that capital
and output grow at the same rate in the long run, such presented by Kaldor (1961).
By doing this, equation (3.7) can be reduced to equation (3.1), which is the original
Verdoorn's law. Alternatively, changes in capital-output ratio can be used as a con-
trol for the direct impact of output growth on productivity. In this approach, this
law is presented enabling for changes in capital-output ratio, and, if one assumes that
these changes are not induced by output growth, the Verdoorn coeﬃcient, which is the
long-term impact of output growth on productivity, can be expressed as68
b =
ν − 1
νa
(3.8)
This methodology is important because it considers explicitly output growth as
exogenous to the growth of labour productivity, and thus it implies that demand
factors are the main drivers of the accumulation process. Essentially, estimating equa-
tion (3.8), we obtain the degree of dynamic increasing returns under the assumption
that output is exogenous (determined by demand for local products) and the factors
of production (capital and labour) are endogenous, such as it is established by the
demand-side version (or Kaldorian version) of Verdoorn's law.
Another possibility of estimating the degree of increasing returns is by re-arranging
equation (3.5) to consider explicitly the impact of factor accumulation on labour pro-
ductivity, as follows:
68Many studies, such as Angeriz et al. (2008, 2009), estimate the Verdoorn coeﬃcient regressing
output on total factor productivity. The advantage of this approach is that there is no need to
assume capital-output ratio as exogenous to output growth to obtain the Verdoorn coeﬃcient, such
as assumed in this work. Nevertheless, to obtain the total factor productivity it is necessary to assume
a value a priori for a, which, following the neoclassical tradition, is usually obtained as the share of
wages in total income.
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q = λ¯+ (νa− 1)l + ν(1− a)k (3.9)
Similar to equation (3.7), in equation (3.9) the direct and indirect impacts of capital
accumulation on productivity are explicit. Essentially, both approaches consider that
if capital embodies technological advances and generates external economies, we can
explain at least part of technological change by capital accumulation (if v is greater
than the unity). The diﬀerence between (3.7) and (3.9) is that in (3.9) the growth
of production factors (inputs) is considered to be exogenous, so it is the supply-side
speciﬁcation of Verdoorn's law (Rowthorn's version assuming multiple inputs rather
than only employment), whilst in (3.7) output growth is the exogenous variable, which
characterises the demand-side speciﬁcation of Verdoorn's law.
3.3.2 Human capital augmented speciﬁcation
Because Verdoorn's law is estimated for countries in diﬀerent stages of develop-
ment, it is important to consider that the educational level diﬀers signiﬁcantly across
countries, and thus labour is not homogenous. Mankiw et al. (1992), for example,
show that Solow's model augmented with human capital can explain more precisely
countries' growth paths during the post-war period. In this view, the growth of labour
in a production function must be adjusted for the schooling in order to account for the
growth of human capital. In an alternative approach, Amable (1993) argues that a
higher level of schooling enhances the rate of technical progress. According to him, the
technical competence of labour force is essential for borrowing external technologies
and for developing one's own. Hence, the level of education (not simply its growth
rate) accelerates the pace of technological progress.
Therefore, in order to consider that labour diﬀers among countries, our speciﬁcation
needs to control for each country's level of schooling. Assuming technological change
as determined by an exogenous factor, λ¯, and endogenously by output growth, such
as before, but also by human capital, equation (3.4) is replaced by:
λ = λ¯+ ζy + ρH (3.10)
where H is the level of schooling, and ρ measures the impact of schooling on
technological change. Thereby, if one assumes educational level as exogenous, output
growth will be given by equation (3.11), instead of (3.4):
y = ν[λ¯+ al + (1− a)k + ρH] (3.11)
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Thus, we can proceed exactly as before, but instead of estimating (3.7) or (3.9),
we estimate (3.12) for the demand-side version and (3.13) for the supply-side version
of Verdoorn's law, as follows:
q =
λ¯
a
+
ν − 1
νa
y +
1− a
a
(k − y) + ρ
a
H (3.12)
and
q = λ¯+ (νa− 1)l + ν(1− a)k + ρH (3.13)
3.3.3 Increasing returns to scale and technological gap
The estimation of Verdoorn's law also needs to consider that technological gap may
aﬀect productivity growth. As discussed in the ﬁrst chapter, the fact that countries on
a lower technological level than countries on the innovation frontier have the possibility
of imitating and thus growing faster was presented by many authors based on diﬀerent
approaches.
In the neoclassical approach, the idea that technological gap is a relevant explan-
ation for productivity growth is presented, for example, by Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1997). They argue that although there are costs of imitation, if they are lower than
innovation costs, technological gap is relevant to explain convergence. According to
Rodrick (2013), manufacturing is the sector for which imitation is the easiest, and thus
specialising in manufacturing is an important source of catching-up.
Cornwall and Cornwall (2002) argue that in the literature on catching-up, the
prime determinant of growth is the size of the technology gap, with the most back-
ward economies growing faster. From a Kaldorian perspective, the authors argue that
investment embodies the most advanced technologies and thus for two countries with
the same investment rate, the higher the backwardness is, the higher the growth bonus
is.
The importance of technological gap to explain productivity is also addressed from
a Neo-Schumpeterian perspective. According to Fagerberg (1994) and Fagerberg and
Verspagen (2002), neoclassical models assumes technology as a public good, and thus
countries' productivity diﬀerence cannot be explained by technological gap. However,
technology, rather than a global public good, is embodied in organisational structures,
such as ﬁrms and regions. Hence, engaging in technological catch-up (narrowing the
technology gap) is an important source of productivity growth.
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Thereby, technological gap must be taken into account to estimate correctly Ver-
doorn's law, and thus the growth rate of an individual industry, rather than (3.11), is
given by:
y = ν[λ¯+ ak + (1− a)l + ρH] + ξG (3.14)
where G is the technological gap, and ξ measures the impact of the technological
gap on productivity growth.
Based on this, equation (3.12) can be re-speciﬁed as (3.15), which is the demand-
side version of Verdoorn's law augmented for technological gap, and equation (3.13)
can be re-speciﬁed as (3.16), which is its supply-side version:
q =
λ¯
a
+
ν − 1
νa
y +
1− a
a
(k − y) + ρ
a
H +
ξ
a
G (3.15)
and
q = λ¯+ (νa− 1)l + ν(1− a)k + ρH + ξG (3.16)
3.3.4 Data and sectoral aggregation
Verdoorn's law is estimated through a panel dataset for 70 countries between 1963
and 2009. Data for employees and value added are available in the UNIDO Industrial
Statistics Database at the 2-digit level of the International Standard Industrial Clas-
siﬁcation (ISIC), Rev. 3 (UNIDO-INDUSTAT2). Data for output and value added,
however, are only available in nominal prices (US current prices or the various national
currencies), and it is therefore necessary to deﬂate them before conducting the eco-
nometric tests. Although countries' price indices by sector should be used to deﬂate
the output data, these indices are not available for most of the analysed countries.
Therefore, in the absence of the ideal deﬂator, it is replaced with the GDP deﬂator
for each country. These deﬂators are available in the Penn World Table (PWT) 7.1
(Helson et al., 2012).
Another relevant issue is that data on ﬁxed capital stocks are not available. This
variable is estimated using data on gross ﬁxed capital formation (GFCF), also avail-
able in the UNIDO database, across countries and sectors at the ISIC 2-digit level.
Following the approach adopted in Angeriz et al. (2008), GFCF data is combined with
approximations of probable average asset lives to estimate gross ﬁxed capital stocks.
Investment deﬂators, also available at PWT 7.1, for each country are applied to deﬂate
this data.
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The main issue with this data, however, is that they are not available for all
countries in the same years and do not employ a single sectoral division. Therefore,
before performing the estimates, each country is analysed separately with the aim
of identifying those countries that will be used and those that will be discarded, as
well as the sectoral aggregation that minimises the missing values. Although data
on employees, output or value added and gross ﬁxed capital formation is available
between 1963 and 2009 for 38 countries, most of these are developed countries, and
thus exclusively using these countries will generate a relevant bias. As a result, data
on other countries has to be analysed (and in some cases calculated by interpolation)
prior to conducting the econometric tests.
In terms of the sectoral aggregation, sectors originally classiﬁed at 2-digit level
of the International Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (ISIC) are grouped to make it
possible to extend the analysis for the longest time series. The sectors considered
are the following: food, beverages and tobacco products [Food]; textiles, wearing ap-
parel and leather products [Textiles]; wood and paper [Paper]; fuels [Fuels]; chem-
icals, rubber and plastic [Chemicals]; non-metallic mineral products [Non-metallic];
basic and fabricated metals [Metals]; machinery, equipment, oﬃce and computing
machinery [Machinery]; electrical machinery, communication, medical, precision and
optical equipment [Electrical]; motor vehicles and other transport equipment [Trans-
port]; and furniture and other manufacturing products [Others].
Finally, these sectors are grouped according to their technological intensity and
categories of demand. Regarding the technological intensity aggregation, sectors are
grouped based on UNIDO (2013:205) classiﬁcation for manufacturing activities. Food,
Textiles, Paper, Fuels, Non-metallic, Metals and Others are grouped as low-tech man-
ufacturing industries [LT] and Chemical, Machinery, Electrical and Transport as high-
tech manufacturing industries [HT]. In terms of the categories of demand, Food, Paper,
Fuels, Non-metallic and Metals are grouped as natural resource based manufacturing
[NR], Textiles and Others as consumption goods chains [CG] and Machinery, Electrical
and Transport as capital goods chains [KG]. Because Chemicals cannot be considered
as either capital or consumption goods, this sector is not classiﬁed in any of these
groups.
The analysis also uses data for level of schooling to estimate Verdoorn's law, as
well as technological gap. Regarding the level of schooling, H, data on the average
years of total schooling (for the population aged 15 and over) are obtained from Barro
and Lee (2012) dataset.
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Technological gap is deﬁned as the complexity of countries' sectoral exports in re-
lation to the US. Following Haussmann et al. (2007), a proxy for the technological
complexity of sectoral exports is obtained based on the income per capita of the coun-
tries that exports similar goods. First, using the UN-COMTRADE database (SITC
Rev.1), the weighted average of the income per capita of the countries that export
each good is calculated, as follows:
PRODYk =
∑
j
(
Xjk/Xj∑
j Xjk/Xj
GDPpcj
)
(3.17)
where GDPpc is the GDP per capita (obtained at PWT 8.0), X are exports, j
stands for the country and k stands for the product.
Then, the technological complexity of exports for the sector i, EXPY , is calculated
by the weighted average of each good PRODY , as follows:
EXPYji =
∑
k
(
Xjk
Xji
PRODYk
)
(3.18)
where k stands for all products classiﬁed inside sector i.
Finally, for each sector i, the variable technological gap, G, is deﬁned as the ratio
between the sectoral EXPY of the country under consideration for the current year
divided by the US's EXPY for the same sector in the same year.
3.4 Verdoorn's law: diﬀerent speciﬁcation, diﬀerent
result
3.4.1 Demand-side version
As discussed in sub-section 3.2.1, diﬀerent approaches can be adopted to estimate
the relationship between productivity growth and output growth according to the
variables assumed as exogenous. In the demand-side version, output is exogenous to
the growth of inputs (capital and labour), once demand is the ultimately determinant
of output growth. Thereby, in order to obtain the degree of increasing returns from
this approach, equations (3.7), (3.13) and (3.16) are estimated.
The estimation technique employed here, as well as those employed in all other
estimations of this work, is the System GMM estimator (Brundel and Bond, 1998).
This estimator was developed based on the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator
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(AB estimator), which considers two sources of persistence over time: autocorrela-
tion due to the inclusion of lagged variables, and individual eﬀects, controlling for
the heterogeneity among individuals. In these estimators, the orthogonality between
lagged variables and the disturbances generates additional instruments. The diﬀer-
ence between AB and System GMM estimators is that the latter is estimated without
exogenous regressors. Essentially, System GMM estimator uses lagged diﬀerences as
instruments for equations in levels and lagged levels as instruments for equations in
ﬁrst diﬀerence. Hence, there is no need to ﬁnd exogenous regressors as instruments
for output growth.
Such as discussed in sub-section 3.2.3, because Verdoorn's law is a long-term re-
lationship between output and productivity growth, the causal relationship between
these variables should be obtained considering growth rates during periods long enough
to avoid estimating the cyclical relationship between output and productivity. This
approach is important to distinguish Verdoorn's law from Okun's law, which can be
expressed as the short-term relationship between these variables. Thus, rather using
yearly growth rates, growth rates for each seven years are calculated. Firstly, data is
aggregated in periods of seven years (from 1967 to 1973, from 1974 to 1980, and so
on)69, and then growth rates between these periods are obtained.
Moreover, because output growth aﬀects productivity through capital accumula-
tion, it is important to consider that this impact cannot be constrained to the exact
period the investment was made. As argued by Setterﬁeld (1997), the realisation of
induced technological progress through Verdoorn's law may require accumulation of
speciﬁc new capital, and it enhances productivity in future periods. Hence, a lag for
output growth is included, and the Verdoorn coeﬃcient is estimated based on equations
(3.19)-(3.22), as follows:
qj,t = β0 + δqj,t−1 + β1yj,t + β2yj,t−1 + β3(kj,t − yj,t) + µj,t (3.19)
qj,t = β0 + δqj,t−1 + β1yj,t + β2yj,t−1 + β3(kj,t − yj,t) + β4Hj,t + µj,t (3.20)
qj,t = β0 + δqj,t−1 + β1yj,t + β2yj,t−1 + β3(kj,t − yj,t) + β4Gj,t + µj,t (3.21)
69Data from 1963 to 1966 is not used in periods aggregation because it is necessary to have at least
ﬁve years to estimate the stock of capital.
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qj,t = β0 + δqj,t−1 + β1yj,t + β2yj,t−1 + β3(kj,t − yj,t) + β4Gj,t + β5Hj,t + µj,t (3.22)
where the subscript j represents each country, µ(j, t) is the error component, which
includes panel-speciﬁc error terms for years and countries.
Based on these equations, the demand-side estimated Verdoorn coeﬃcient (the
long-term impact of output growth on productivity growth) is given by:
b =
β1 + β2
1− δ (3.23)
Table 3.1 presents the Verdoorn coeﬃcients estimated from equations (3.19)-(3.22)
based on System GMM estimator for individual industries, sectoral aggregations and
total manufacturing70. From the results, it is clear that most of the industries present
a signiﬁcant positive Verdoorn coeﬃcient, which indicates that, from the demand-led
perspective, they are subject to dynamic increasing returns to scale.
It is clear from the table that some sectors present Verdoorn coeﬃcients higher than
others, independently of the employed estimation. Food, Chemicals and Metals present
Verdoorn coeﬃcients higher than 0.6 with low standard deviations in all estimations,
which indicates that they are highly subject to increasing returns to scale. Textiles
and Electrical, on the other hand, present Verdoorn coeﬃcients lower than 0.4 but
statistically signiﬁcant, which indicates that although subject to increasing returns to
scale, productivity is less stimulated by output growth than in other industries. The
only industry that did not present a statistically signiﬁcant Verdoorn coeﬃcient was
Others, which indicates that it is subject to constant returns to scale.
Regarding the aggregate results, consumption goods is the category of demand
where the Verdoorn coeﬃcient is the lowest for all estimation (the Verdoorn coeﬃcient
of consumption goods is not statistically signiﬁcant), whilst this value is the highest
for capital goods and natural resource based manufacturing. The comparison between
capital goods and natural resources based manufacturing shows that although the
value is higher in the latter category of demand, this diﬀerence is not statistically
signiﬁcant at the 10% level71. Finally, with regards to technological intensity, both
70Appendix C presents the complete results.
71Hypothesis tests comparing these results were constructed based on the estimated coeﬃcient
and standard deviations presented in Table 3.1. The t-statistic comparing capital goods and natural
resource based manufacturing for equations (3.19)-(3.22) are, respectively, 0.91, 0.79, 0.82 and 0.79,
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Table 3.1: Verdoorn coeﬃcient (demand-side speciﬁcation estimation), by industries
and aggregates
No controls Schooling Gap School.+Gap
Food 0.674*** 0.695*** 0.766*** 0.768***
(0.136) (0.139) (0.137) (0.134)
Textiles 0.334** 0.369** 0.369*** 0.408***
(0.140) (0.145) (0.132) (0.128)
Paper 0.466*** 0.471*** 0.47*** 0.474***
(0.062) (0.064) (0.081) (0.083)
Fuels 1.027** 1.027** 1.025** 1.025**
(0.466) (0.474) (0.451) (0.435)
Chemicals 0.687*** 0.706*** 0.696*** 0.714***
(0.110) (0.095) (0.105) (0.103)
Non-metallic 0.579*** 0.566*** 0.555*** 0.532***
(0.193) (0.212) (0.204) (0.202)
Metals 0.670*** 0.696*** 0.673*** 0.686***
(0.136) (0.138) (0.120) (0.131)
Machinery 0.483*** 0.492*** 0.483*** 0.491***
(0.132) (0.136) (0.136) (0.137)
Electrical 0.338** 0.350** 0.371*** 0.366***
(0.158) (0.157) (0.136) (0.138)
Transport 0.467*** 0.474*** 0.484*** 0.489***
(0.12) (0.117) (0.124) (0.121)
Others 0.208 0.226 0.209 0.210
(0.372) (0.360) (0.375) (0.361)
Consumption Goods (CG) -0.089 0.020 0.163 0.233
(0.138) (0.14) (0.15) (0.143)
Capital Goods (KG) 0.473*** 0.49*** 0.484*** 0.496***
(0.149) (0.156) (0.176) (0.174)
NR based manuf. (NR) 0.645*** 0.642*** 0.661*** 0.662***
(0.116) (0.113) (0.126) (0.12)
Low-tech manuf. (LT) 0.462** 0.478** 0.466** 0.482**
(0.209) (0.197) (0.227) (0.208)
High-tech manuf. (HT) 0.519*** 0.493*** 0.503*** 0.502***
(0.173) (0.149) (0.171) (0.168)
Manufacturing 0.527*** 0.571*** 0.548*** 0.572***
(0.162) (0.159) (0.152) (0.153)
Verdoorn coeﬃcient estimated through System GMM for 70 countries and data ranging from
1967 to 2009 (unbalanced) based on seven years growth rates.
Controls - Schooling: controlled by human capital; Gap: controlled by technological gap;
School.+Gap: controlled by human capital and technological gap.
*: signiﬁcant at the 10% level; **: signiﬁcant at the 5% level; ***: signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
See Appendix C for complete results.
indicating that the null hypothesis that they present diﬀerent Verdoorn coeﬃcients cannot be rejected
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high- and low-tech products presents Verdoorn coeﬃcients statistically higher than
zero, indicating that they are subject to dynamic increasing returns. Moreover, even
though the value is higher for high-tech than low-tech products, the diﬀerence between
these categories is not statically signiﬁcant diﬀerent at the 10% level72. Thereby, one
cannot conclude that they have diﬀerent degrees of increasing returns to scale.
Another interesting issue that emerges from these results is that the degree of
increasing returns is not necessarily higher at the individual industrial level than in
the manufacturing level. As discussed in Chapter 1, according to Young, increasing
returns is a macroeconomic phenomenon. The author argues that Verdoorn's law is
not restricted to ﬁrms or industries, but it is derived from inter-industry division of
labour and specialisation, and thus increasing returns to scale have to be found in
the total manufacturing level. However, contrary to these arguments, some studies,
such as McCombie (1985) and Angeriz et al. (2009), have found signiﬁcant Verdoorn
coeﬃcients at the industrial level73. These results corroborate the Marshallian notion
of increasing returns to scale, which stresses the importance of localisation economies
(resulting from the geographical concentration of ﬁrms in the same industry). Accord-
ing to this view, geographical clustering of industrial activities facilitates research and
innovation in a speciﬁc industry, the exchange of ideas and knowledge between ﬁrms,
as well as stimulating the concentration of a pool of workers with speciﬁc skills in this
country or region.
As can be seen from Table 3.1, the Verdoorn coeﬃcient in Manufacturing is higher
than some sectors, such as Textiles, Electrical and Others, but it is lower than the
one obtained for other sectors, such as Food, Chemicals and Metals. Hence, both
approaches for the existence of increasing returns to scale can be considered valid:
the Marshallian notion of localisation economies is important to explain the higher
Verdoorn coeﬃcient obtained in Food, Chemicals and Metals, whilst Young's notion
of increasing returns as a macroeconomic phenomenon is important to explain the high
value obtained for Manufacturing.
It is important to note, however, that, even considering only the Marshallian no-
tion of localisation economies to explain increasing returns to scale, it does not mean
that cumulative causation cannot take place in the Kaldorian sense. Instead, if the
sectors that present the highest degree of increasing returns are the same as those that
72The t-statistic comparing high-tech and low-tech products for equations (3.17)-(3.20) are, re-
spectively, 0.21, 0.06, 0.13 and 0.07.
73The authors found higher increasing returns for all sub-sectors than for manufacturing, with the
only exception of Textiles.
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present the highest income elasticities, such as presented by Araujo (2013) for a closed
economy and Fiorillo (2001) for an export-led economy, specialisation in these sectors
will reinforce a cumulative process of increasing growth rates.
3.4.2 Supply-side version
The assumption that factor inputs are exogenous to output growth implies that
long-term economic growth is not determined by demand growth, such as stressed by
Kaldor (1966; 1970). Instead, it is determined by the capability of a country to increase
savings by reducing consumption or by the allocation of this saving for activities that
present the highest positive externalities, such as R&D and education. This notion, as
discussed in ﬁrst chapter, is at the root of neoclassical and endogenous growth models.
The estimation of increasing returns assuming factor inputs as exogenous (rather than
endogenous, such as in demand-side version) must consider these factors as regressors
instead of output growth, such as presented by Kaldor-Rowthorn controversy. Thereby,
instead of estimating equations (3.7), (3.13) and (3.16), equations (3.9), (3.14) and
(3.17) are estimated to obtain the degree of increasing returns based on the supply-
side approach.
Similar to the estimation for the demand-side approach, it is necessary to consider
that the relation between productivity growth and output growth is a long-term rela-
tionship. Hence, the same method to calculate seven years growth rates rather than
yearly growth rates is applied. Moreover, lags are also considered in the estimation to
account for the impact of investments in former periods. The following equations are
thus estimated through a System GMM:
qj,t = β0 + δqj,t−1 + β1lj,t + β2lj,t−1 + β3kj,t + β4kj,t−1 + µj,t (3.24)
qj,t = β0 + δqj,t−1 + β1lj,t + β2lj,t−1 + β3kj,t + β4kj,t−1 + β5Hj,t + µj,t (3.25)
qj,t = β0 + δqj,t−1 + β1lj,t + β2lj,t−1 + β3kj,t + β4kj,t−1 + β5Gj,t + µj,t (3.26)
qj,t = β0 + δqj,t−1 + β1lj,t + β2lj,t−1 + β3kj,t + β4kj,t−1 + β5Gj,t + β6Hj,t + µj,t (3.27)
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where the subscript j represents each country, µj,t is the error component, which
includes panel-speciﬁc error terms for years and countries.
From these estimations, the Verdoorn coeﬃcient is obtained as follows:
b =
β1 + β2 + β3 + β4
(1− δ)(1 + β1 + β2) (3.28)
Table 3.2 presents the supply-side Verdoorn coeﬃcient (Rowthorn's speciﬁcation
considering multiple factors of production) for individual industries, sectoral aggreg-
ates and total manufacturing. From these results, it is clear that industries are not
subject to increasing returns. In all speciﬁcations for all sectors, an increase in factor
inputs has an insigniﬁcant impact on labour productivity (at the 5% level), which
means that accumulation of capital and labour increases output but at constant rates.
These results corroborate the ﬁndings of Angeriz et al. (2008) for total manu-
facturing and the ﬁndings of Angeriz et al. (2009) for manufacturing industries. In
their works, they show that in the demand-side speciﬁcation (where it is assumed that
capital and labour responds endogenously to the growth of demand) manufacturing
and its industries are subject to increasing returns, whilst in the supply-side speciﬁca-
tion (where factor inputs are exogenous to demand growth) they are not. Here, these
ﬁndings are extended based on countries in diﬀerent stages of development, but the
results remain the same. Although some industries, such as Non-metallic, Metals and
Machinery present higher degrees of increasing returns, the values are never signiﬁcant
at the 5% level, which indicates that, independently of the industry, if one assumes
that labour and capital are not induced by demand growth, neither manufacturing nor
its industries are subject to increasing returns to scale.
The comparison between the demand-side and supply-side speciﬁcation results
shows that assumptions a priori about the determinants of investment and labour
mobility are very relevant to explain cumulative causation and countries' growth rates
divergence. The assumption behind the neoclassical and endogenous growth models
is that investment is determined by savings rather than by demand. Based on this
assumption, one can conclude that productivity is not induced by output growth once
industries are not subject to increasing returns. On the other hand, the assumption
behind the Kaldorian approach is that a faster growth of demand induces investment
and thus production factors are endogenous to demand. Based on this view, one
can conclude that productivity responds positively to output growth, once sectors are
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Table 3.2: Verdoorn coeﬃcient (supply-side speciﬁcation estimation), by industries
and aggregates
No controls Schooling Gap School.+Gap
Food 0.115 0.072 0.136 0.115
(0.279) (0.287) (0.302) (0.302)
Textiles -0.157 -0.152 -0.085 -0.042
(0.796) (0.741) (0.598) (0.591)
Paper 0.085 0.079 0.059 0.054
(0.278) (0.287) (0.286) (0.294)
Fuels 5.381 8.853 3.479 3.988
(5.053) (9.222) (2.923) (3.586)
Chemicals 0.022 0.062 0.170 0.174
(0.442) (0.474) (0.496) (0.495)
Non-metallic 0.337 0.293 0.224 0.278
(0.416) (0.55) (0.765) (0.736)
Metals -0.613 -0.472 -0.413 -0.377
(0.759) (0.506) (0.507) (0.472)
Machinery 0.094 0.094 0.140 0.135
(0.348) (0.353) (0.326) (0.326)
Electrical -0.172 -0.244 -0.116 -0.155
(0.513) (0.541) (0.356) (0.359)
Transport -0.414* -0.385 -0.309 -0.307
(0.244) (0.244) (0.286) (0.284)
Others -0.633 -0.664 -0.635 -0.744
(0.86) (0.884) (0.886) (0.94)
Consumption Goods (CG) -0.502 -0.557 -0.327 -0.344
(0.471) (0.471) (0.467) (0.475)
Capital Goods (KG) -0.490 -0.473 -0.022 -0.026
(0.604) (0.608) (0.442) (0.441)
NR based manuf. (NR) 0.075 0.018 -0.088 -0.077
(0.449) (0.372) (0.425) (0.421)
Low-tech manuf. (LT) -0.272 -0.251 -0.437 -0.419
(0.420) (0.336) (0.391) (0.388)
High-tech manuf. (HT) 0.045 0.042 0.145 0.147
(0.451) (0.446) (0.403) (0.398)
Manufacturing -0.356 -0.352 -0.326 -0.289
(1.035) (1.02) (1.015) (0.988)
Verdoorn coeﬃcient estimated through System GMM for 70 countries and data ranging from
1967 to 2009 (unbalanced) based on seven years growth rates.
Controls - Schooling: controlled by human capital; Gap: controlled by technological gap;
School.+Gap: controlled by human capital and technological gap.
*: signiﬁcant at the 10% level; **: signiﬁcant at the 5% level; ***: signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
See Appendix C for complete results.
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subject to increasing returns to scale.
Therefore, once it is assumed that growth is demand-driven rather than supply
constrained, one can infer that technological progress is induced by output growth, and
thus high and sustained growth rates depends on the specialisation in those sectors
with the highest degree of increasing returns to scale, such as natural resources and
capital goods.
3.5 Verdoorn's law according to countries' stage of
development
One of the basic assumptions behind the estimation of the Verdoorn's law through
panel models using countries as the cross-section is that the Verdoorn coeﬃcient does
not vary according to countries' characteristics. The Verdoorn coeﬃcient is a para-
meter that determines the slope of the curve that relates output growth, on one axis,
and productivity growth, on the other.
However, there are enough theoretical reasons for believing that the degree of
increasing returns is not constant for countries in diﬀerent stages of development, es-
pecially when it is estimated at the individual industry level. Skilled workers, for
example, might be more important for some activities than others according to coun-
tries' stage of development. One could expect that more complex activities, which
demand more qualiﬁed workers, present higher increasing returns to scale in more ad-
vanced economies than in developing countries. On the other hand, a greater pool
of less qualiﬁed workers is important for labour-intensive activities, once the activity
growth would not be constrained by labour availability. Hence, these activities might
have higher increasing returns in less developed economies.
Taking advantage of having a dataset with countries in diﬀerent stages of develop-
ment, output growth can be interacted with countries' income per capita in order to
obtain the Verdoorn coeﬃcient according to countries' stage of development. Based
on this interaction, Verdoorn's law is estimated allowing for changes in the coeﬃcient
according to countries' income per capita (as a proxy for their stage of development),
through heterogeneous regressions74. This estimation may bring some important is-
sues for the debate on the importance of sectoral structure for countries development,
74See Agung (2014:278-285) for a detailed presentation of this method and prior applications.
Woodridge (2002:170-171) presents an example of this method for a panel data model.
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once diﬀerent industries can present diﬀerent degrees of increasing returns according
to countries' income.
Instead of estimating equations (3.19)-(3.22), a modiﬁed version of the demand
approach for Verdoorn's law is estimated as follows:
qj,t = β0 + δqj,t−1 + β1yj,t + β2yj,t−1 + β3yj,t ln(GDPpcj,t¯)+
+β4yj,t−1 ln(GDPpcj,t¯) + β5(kj,t − yj,t) + µj,t (3.29)
qj,t = β0 + δqj,t−1 + β1yj,t + β2yj,t−1 + β3yj,t ln(GDPpcj,t¯)+
+β3yj,t−1 ln(GDPpcj,t¯) + β5(kj,t − yj,t) + β6Hj,t + µj,t (3.30)
qj,t = β0 + δqj,t−1 + β1yj,t + β2yj,t−1 + β3yj,t ln(GDPpcj,t¯)+
+β4yj,t−1 ln(GDPpcj,t¯) + β5(kj,t − yj,t) + β6Gj,t + µj,t (3.31)
qj,t = β0 + δqj,t−1 + β1yj,t + β2yj,t−1 + β3yj,t ln(GDPpcj,t¯)+
+β4yj,t−1 ln(GDPpcj,t¯) + β5(kj,t − yj,t) + β6Gj,t + β7Hj,t + µj,t (3.32)
where GDPpcj,tˆ is country j's GDP per capita in a ﬁxed period (here, 2005).
The Verdoorn coeﬃcient provided by these estimations is not obtained directly by
β1 and β2, such as in (3.23). Instead, it is obtained by the interaction of output with
countries' income, which means that it is not a parameter, but a function of countries'
income. Thus, rather than one value, an estimation for the Verdoorn coeﬃcient that
depends on countries' GDP per capita is obtained, as follows:
b =
β1 + β2 + (β3 + β4) ln(GDPpcj,t¯)
1− δ (3.33)
3.5.1 Verdoorn's law at the industry level
Tables 3.3-3.6 and Figures 3.1-3.4 presents the results for the Verdoorn coeﬃcient
according to countries' GDP per capita estimated based System GMM. As can be seen
in Table 3.3, which presents the results for estimations that do not control the techno-
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logical gap (equations 3.26 and 3.27), most sectors have positive Verdoorn coeﬃcients
independent of country's income per capita. The only case in which this value is negat-
ive is Textiles for high-income countries, indicating diminishing returns to scale. In all
other cases, the Verdoorn coeﬃcient indicates that production is subject to dynamic
increasing returns to scale.
Table 3.3: Verdoorn coeﬃcient according to countries' income level
(not controlling for technological gap), by industries
No controls Controls: Schooling
Low- Middle- High- Low- Middle- High-
income income income income income income
Food 0.75 0.65 0.55 0.81 0.67 0.53
Textiles 0.63 0.12 -0.38 0.63 0.21 -0.22
Paper 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.47 0.45 0.44
Fuels 1.10 0.93 0.76 1.10 0.93 0.76
Chemicals 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.82 0.76 0.69
Non-metallic 0.63 0.58 0.53 0.65 0.57 0.48
Metals 0.75 0.68 0.60 0.85 0.71 0.56
Machinery 0.59 0.48 0.37 0.64 0.51 0.37
Electrical 0.24 0.28 0.31 0.27 0.28 0.30
Transport 0.54 0.42 0.30 0.56 0.43 0.30
Others 0.31 0.28 0.24 0.36 0.29 0.22
Manufacturing 0.66 0.49 0.32 0.73 0.53 0.32
Verdoorn coeﬃcient estimated through System GMM for 70 countries and data ranging
from 1967 to 2009 (unbalanced) based on seven years growth rates. Low-income: GDPpc
= US$ 2,500 in 2005; Middle-income: GDPpc = US$ 10,000 in 2005; High-income: GDPpc
= US$ 40,000 in 2005.
See Appendix C for complete results and signiﬁcance.
From Table 3.3 is also possible to verify that for the majority of sectors, the Ver-
doorn coeﬃcient is higher for low-income countries than for high-income countries.
The fourth and the last column present the impact of the increase in countries' income
on the Verdoorn coeﬃcient, and it shows that the coeﬃcient drops as countries reach
higher levels of development. Besides Textiles, which has negative values for high-
income countries, this drop in the Verdoorn coeﬃcient is also veriﬁed in Food, Fuels,
Metals, Machinery and Transport, as well as for total manufacturing. In Electrical,
on the other hand, the Verdoorn coeﬃcient increases as countries' GDP per capita in-
creases. Not controlling for level of schooling, the long-term impact of output growth
on productivity for Electrical is 0.24 for low-income countries (US$ 2,500 per capita),
and 0.31 for high-income countries (US$ 40,000 per capita).
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Table 3.4 presents the estimation for the Verdoorn coeﬃcient estimated through
equations (3.28) and (3.29), which controls for technological gap. These results do not
diﬀer substantially from those presented in Table 3.2. Although technological gap can
partially explain productivity growth, such as discussed in the Subsection 3.3.3, it does
not interfere on the estimation of the degree of increasing returns at the individual
industry level. The main diﬀerence between these results is that rather than positively
related to countries' GDP per capita, the Verdoorn coeﬃcient in Electrical is constant
when controlled by the gap. Moreover, the Verdoorn coeﬃcient of Non-metallic is
positively related to countries' GDP per capita when the impact of technological gap
is used as control.
Table 3.4: Verdoorn coeﬃcient according to countries' income level
(controlling for technological gap) , by industries
Controls: Gap Controls: Schooling and Gap
Low- Middle- High- Low- Middle- High-
income income income income income income
Food 0.87 0.72 0.56 0.88 0.72 0.56
Textiles 0.66 0.17 -0.32 0.65 0.24 -0.16
Paper 0.52 0.48 0.45 0.54 0.49 0.44
Fuels 1.07 0.92 0.78 1.08 0.92 0.77
Chemicals 0.81 0.75 0.69 0.84 0.77 0.69
Non-metallic 0.57 0.61 0.65 0.53 0.57 0.61
Metals 0.79 0.67 0.55 0.85 0.70 0.54
Machinery 0.58 0.48 0.39 0.62 0.50 0.38
Electrical 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.32
Transport 0.61 0.44 0.28 0.62 0.45 0.29
Others 0.34 0.27 0.19 0.36 0.28 0.20
Manufacturing 0.72 0.51 0.30 0.73 0.53 0.33
Verdoorn coeﬃcient estimated through System GMM for 70 countries and data ranging from
1967 to 2009 (unbalanced) based on seven years growth rates. Low-income: GDPpc = US$
2,500 in 2005; Middle-income: GDPpc = US$ 10,000 in 2005; High-income: GDPpc = US$
40,000 in 2005.
See Appendix C for complete results and signiﬁcance.
This analysis shows that almost every sector presents high degrees of increasing re-
turns for countries in the early stages of development, but in most sectors, as countries'
incomes grow, the Verdoorn coeﬃcient decreases. Thus, only a few sectors present high
Verdoorn coeﬃcients for countries in the later stages of development.
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3.5.2 Technologic Intensity
One of the main sources of dynamic increasing returns at the industry level is tech-
nological search and knowledge diﬀusion. According to Fagiolo and Dosi (2003:239),
technological advances are endogenously generated through resource-expansive search
undertaken by multiple agents. Thereby, one can expect a higher degree of increasing
returns in sectors with higher technological intensity, once expenses in research and
technological diﬀusion are the main drivers of productivity growth in these sectors.
Moreover, it is also plausible to expect higher a Verdoorn coeﬃcient as countries' in-
comes increase, once the level of GDP per capita is strictly related to expenditures on
R&D and innovation activities.
In order to evaluate the degree of increasing returns among sectors with diﬀerent
technologic intensity, industries were aggregated according to technological intensity
into high- and low-tech manufacturing. The same methodology used before to estimate
the Verdoorn coeﬃcient according to countries' GDP per capita is applied here and
the results are present in Table 3.5 and Figures 3.1-3.2.
Table 3.5: Verdoorn coeﬃcient according to countries' income level
(not controlling for technological gap), by technological intensity
No controls Controls: Schooling
Low- Middle- High- Low- Middle- High-
income income income income income income
Low-tech 0.49 0.45 0.41 0.65 0.50 0.35
High-tech 0.49 0.53 0.58 0.53 0.55 0.57
Manufacturing 0.72 0.51 0.30 0.73 0.53 0.33
Verdoorn coeﬃcient estimated through System GMM for 70 countries and data ranging
from 1967 to 2009 (unbalanced) based on seven years growth rates. Low-income: GDPpc
= US$ 2,500 in 2005; Middle-income: GDPpc = US$ 10,000 in 2005; High-income:
GDPpc = US$ 40,000 in 2005.
See Appendix C for complete results and signiﬁcance.
The results of the ﬁrst estimation (equation 3.26) show that low-tech industries
present the same Verdoorn coeﬃcient as high-tech for low levels of income (US$ 2,500
per capita). However, as GDP per capita increases the Verdoorn coeﬃcient of high-
tech industries increases and the Verdoorn coeﬃcient of low-tech industries decreases.
Hence, the degree of increasing returns is higher in high-tech than in low-tech for
middle- and high-income countries. It means that specialisation in low-tech industries
increases the productivity of the sector itself only for low-income countries. Conversely,
for middle- and for high-income countries, industries with high technological intensity
92
are those capable to boost productivity growth the most, once they present the highest
Verdoorn coeﬃcient.
The results do not change substantially when estimation controls for the level of
schooling (estimation based on equation 3.27). The main diﬀerence is that low-tech
industries present the highest degree of increasing returns for low-income countries,
which indicates that specialisation in low-tech manufacturing is an important source
of scale economies for those countries in the early stages of development. However,
as countries' incomes grow, it is important to promote structural changes towards
industries with higher technologic intensity in order to increase productivity, once the
Verdoorn coeﬃcient in low-tech industries drops from 0.65 in low-income countries
(US$ 2,500 per capita) to 0.35 in countries where GDP per capita is high (US$ 40,000
per capita).
The results for the Verdoorn coeﬃcient controlled for technological gap also show
the importance of promoting high-tech sectors to beneﬁt from scale economies when
countries reach high stages of development. As can be seen from Figure 3.1, despite
presenting the highest Verdoorn coeﬃcient for low-income countries, low-tech manufac-
turing industries present the lowest Verdoorn coeﬃcient for medium- and high-income
countries. The faster growth of output aﬀects positively productivity growth by a
coeﬃcient of 0.6 (which indicates that a faster growth of output by 1.0 p.p. increases
productivity growth by 0.6 p.p.) for countries that income per capita is US$ 2,500,
but this impact drops to around 0.4 in the case of high-income countries. In high-tech
sectors, on the other hand, the Verdoorn coeﬃcient is greater than 0.5 independent of
countries' stages of development.
The estimation of Verdoorn coeﬃcient controlling for both technological gap and
level of schooling corroborates these ﬁndings. As presented in Figure 3.2, specialisa-
tion in low-tech industries might beneﬁt countries in the early stages of development.
However, to take advantage of this important source of productivity growth, countries
in advanced stages of development need to migrate to high-tech industries, once these
industries present the highest Verdoorn coeﬃcients.
The main diﬀerence between the results controlling for the level of schooling is
that the Verdoorn coeﬃcient for low-tech sectors is even higher for countries in the
early stages of development and even lower for advanced countries. The coeﬃcient for
low-tech industries is around 0.7 for countries that income is US$ 2,500, and it falls
to less than 0.35 for countries that income is greater than US$ 40,000. Thereby, the
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Figure 3.1: Verdoorn coeﬃcient according to countries' income level (controlling for
technological gap), by technological intensity
estimation controlling for technological gap and level of schooling clearly shows that
countries must promote high-tech industries when they reach high levels of income,
otherwise they will not beneﬁt from dynamic increasing returns to scale.
3.5.3 Categories of demand
An alternative approach that can be adopted to understand the diﬀerences in the
degree of dynamic increasing returns among industries is based on the categories of
demand. Lundvall (1988) argued that capital goods industries, when associated with
users, are responsible for most of innovations in the economy, and they are central
in the process of technological diﬀusion. Therefore, one can argue that productivity
growth in capital goods industries is mainly driven by the increase of production in the
industry itself (when it is associated with users), whilst the increase of productivity in
consumption goods is mainly driven by the increase of production in other industries
in the economy.
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Figure 3.2: Verdoorn coeﬃcient according to countries' income level (controlling for
technological gap and human capital), by technological intensity
Verdoorn coeﬃcient estimated through System GMM for 70 countries and data ranging from 1963
to 2009 (unbalanced) based on seven years growth rates.
Furthermore, as stressed by Kaldor (1966, 1967), capital investment is an important
source of demand for countries in the most advanced stages of development, because
manufacturing generates demand for its own products. He argues that countries have
to promote the import-substitution and exports of capital goods, because this sector
will provide the goods on which capital expenditure is spent. Thus, the very estab-
lishment of a capital goods sector is an important source of increasing returns to scale
from the demand side. Productivity growth will extend this sector's market size, and
thus this sector will display a self-generating demand for capital goods, which is a
central element of cumulative causation. On the other hand, if this sector is not inter-
nalised, although increases in output can increase productivity, it will not be able to
promote an increase in its market, and thus it will be a constraint for the continuity
of a cumulative process.
In order to estimate the degree of dynamic increasing returns according to categor-
ies of demand, industries are grouped into three categories: natural resource based
manufacturing [NR], consumption goods chains [CG] and capital goods chains [KG].
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Verdoorn's law is estimated based on the same methodology employed before. Table
3.4 and Figures 3.3-3.4 present the results for each of these categories according to
countries' income per capita based on an estimation of equations (3.26)-(3.29).
As presented in Table 3.4, production of consumption goods boosts productivity
of the industry itself only for low-income countries. As countries reach high stages of
development, the Verdoorn coeﬃcient in these industries drop and output growth stops
stimulating productivity growth (for middle- and high-income countries this value is
negative). The production of capital goods and natural resource based manufacturing,
on the other hand, is an important source of dynamic increasing returns independent
of countries' stages of development.
Table 3.6: Verdoorn coeﬃcient according to countries' income level
(not controlling for technological gap), by categories of demand
No controls Controls: Schooling
Low- Middle- High- Low- Middle- High-
income income income income income income
Consumption Goods 0.12 -0.25 -0.61 0.28 -0.04 -0.35
Capital Goods 0.41 0.48 0.55 0.44 0.49 0.53
NR based manuf. 0.72 0.58 0.43 0.82 0.61 0.40
Manufacturing 0.72 0.51 0.30 0.73 0.53 0.33
Verdoorn coeﬃcient estimated through System GMM for 70 countries and data ranging from 1967
to 2009 (unbalanced) based on seven years growth rates. Low-income: GDPpc = US$ 2,500 in
2005; Middle-income: GDPpc = US$ 10,000 in 2005; High-income: GDPpc = US$ 40,000 in 2005.
See Appendix C for complete results and signiﬁcance.
Diﬀerent from the results obtained for the Verdoorn coeﬃcient at the individual
industry level, the relationship between the Verdoorn coeﬃcient and countries' GDP
per capita is positive only in the case of capital goods. The summation of β3 and β4 in
capital goods is equal to 0.05 in the estimation based on equation (3.26) and it is 0.03
in the estimation controlling for the level of schooling, which means that the higher
countries' income per capita, the higher is the beneﬁt of specialising in capital goods.
These results suggest that productivity growth in individual capital good industries
is related to a faster growth of other capital goods industries, especially for middle-
and high-income countries. Essentially, if a speciﬁc capital good industry, such as
Machinery or Transport, grows alone, the impact on productivity growth is lower
than if all these industries grow together. This fact corroborates Young's notion of
increasing returns to scale in the macroeconomic level, and it shows that it is especially
relevant for countries in advanced stages of development.
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In the estimation that controls for technological gap, the Verdoorn coeﬃcient of
consumption goods is higher, even though it is still lower than the coeﬃcient of capital
goods and natural resource based manufacturing. As can be seen from Figure 3.3, the
impact of a faster output growth on productivity growth is similar for consumption
and capital goods for low-income countries. However, the Verdoorn coeﬃcient of
consumption goods becomes negative for high-income countries, indicating that they
are subject to diminishing returns to scale.
Figure 3.3: Verdoorn coeﬃcient according to countries' income level (controlling for
technological gap), by categories of demand
Specialisation in natural resource based manufacturing and capital goods, on the
other hand, is an important source of productivity growth independent of countries'
stage of development. Even though the Verdoorn coeﬃcient of natural resource based
manufacturing is higher than the coeﬃcient of capital goods for low- and middle-
income countries and the coeﬃcient of capital goods is the highest for high-income
countries, both categories present coeﬃcients greater than 0.4 for countries in all stages
of development.
When the estimation is controlled by the level of schooling, results are similar to
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those presented before, as presented in Figure 3.4. Although natural resources present
high degree of increasing returns for low-income countries, as countries' income per
capita increases, the importance of these industries reduces relatively to capital goods.
The main diﬀerence from this estimation and the one not controlling for the level
of schooling is that consumption goods present high increasing returns for low-income
countries, and it is similar to the coeﬃcient found to capital goods. However, the Ver-
doorn coeﬃcient of consumption goods falls from around 0.4 for low-income countries
to close to zero for high-income countries, whilst capital goods' coeﬃcient increases
from 0.45 to more than 0.5. Consequently, even though the impact of faster output
growth on productivity is similar in capital and consumption goods for low-income
countries, for middle-income countries capital goods, the Verdoorn coeﬃcient is signi-
ﬁcantly greater than coeﬃcient for consumption goods, and, for high-income countries,
it is greater than the coeﬃcient of natural resource based manufacturing.
Figure 3.4: Verdoorn coeﬃcient according to countries' income level (controlling for
technological gap and human capital), by categories of demand
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3.6 Concluding remarks
There is an important debate on economic theory about why some developing
countries were able to achieve sustained high-growth rates and their income per capita
have converged towards developed ones, and why others were not. This chapter tried to
assess this issue from a Kaldorian approach, which stress the importance of increasing
returns to scale in some sectors. More speciﬁcally, the degree of increasing returns
was estimated according to countries' stages of development through heterogeneous
regressions.
The ﬁrst result corroborates the ﬁndings of previous studies, which has stressed
that increasing returns to scale is a demand-led (rather than supply constrained) phe-
nomenon. By estimating Verdoorn's law assuming demand as exogenous, signiﬁcant
results were found; whilst the results obtained through the supply-side version of this
law suggest that manufacturing and its industries are not subject to increasing re-
turns. In this sense, if one considers a priori a Kaldorian perspective, in which capital
accumulation and labour are induced by growth in demand, manufacturing industries
are subject to increasing returns to scale, which means that productivity growth is
demand-driven. Conversely, if one assumes that factor inputs are exogenous in re-
spect to demand in the long run, such as in the neoclassical or endogenous growth
models, manufacturing industries are subject to constant returns to scale, and thus
productivity growth is not induced by output growth, such as predicted by Verdoorn's
law.
Similar to the ﬁndings of previous studies, which have found that individual indus-
tries present high increasing returns, this chapter has presented evidence that there
are many sectors where the degree of increasing returns is lower than for total man-
ufacturing. This result suggests that although localisation economies is an important
explanation for the endogeneity of technological progress, once total manufacturing
presents a high Verdoorn coeﬃcient, dynamic increasing returns to scale is also a
macroeconomic phenomenon, such as suggested by Young.
Furthermore, it was found that the Verdoorn coeﬃcient in most of manufacturing
individual industries drops as countries' GDP per capita increases, suggesting that
countries have to specialise in manufacturing to take advantage of dynamic increasing
returns especially in the early stages of development. In contrast to these ﬁndings,
when sectors are grouped according to technological intensity and categories of de-
mand, it was found that countries in the early stages of development beneﬁt from
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specialising in low-tech manufacturing and consumption goods, because they present
relatively higher Verdoorn coeﬃcient for low-income countries. However, as countries
reach higher stages of development, it is important to promote structural changes in
favour of high-tech manufacturing sectors and capital goods. Although these indus-
tries present relatively low dynamic increasing returns for low-income countries, their
degree of increasing returns is the highest for high-income countries. Because tech-
nological search and knowledge diﬀusion are more important in these industries, and
countries in higher stages of development have better conditions to invest on these
factors, they can beneﬁt the most by specialising in these industries.
These ﬁndings can explain why industrial policies that promote changes from low-
tech manufacturing and consumption goods production to high-tech manufacturing
and capital goods industries are important to reduce countries' income gap. These
results are especially important for countries in the intermediate stages of develop-
ment. It shows that promoting manufacturing is important for countries in the early
stages of development, especially promoting labour-intensive activities, such as Tex-
tiles. However, when a country reaches an intermediate stage, specialising in manu-
facturing is not enough; it is necessary to promote structural changes towards capital
goods industries and industries with high technological intensity to boost productivity
growth.
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Chapter 4
Cumulative causation in open
economies: investigating the impact of
structural changes
4.1 Introduction
The process of structural change is crucial to understand countries' long-term
economic growth. Although there is no doubt that production and trade structures of
economies change over time, and, even more importantly, that these changes contribute
for countries' growth rates divergence, the vast majority of growth models neglect the
relevance of structural changes to promoting countries' growth. Most endogenous and
neo-Schumpeterian growth models focus on the importance of activities, such as R&D
and education, to understand the process of innovation and growth. However, with
some notable exceptions, they are sector-indiﬀerent75, which implies that structural
changes have no role in explaining long-term growth.
The aim of this chapter is to present a sectoral model to explain the importance of
structural change and countries' growth in the long term, as well as to apply this model
to identify those sectors able to guarantee the highest growth rates based on the res-
ults of the former chapters. This chapter shows that although Kaldor has stressed the
importance of structural change for growth, Kaldorian (and Post-Keynesian) growth
models do not fully incorporate this issue, and hence they are unable to present a
convincing explanation for the origin of cumulative causation processes in open eco-
75Palma (2004) presents a distinction between sector-speciﬁc and activity-speciﬁc models. Accord-
ing to the author, in endogenous growth models increasing returns may be generated by research-
intensive activities, but they are not explicitly associated with the size, depth or strength of one
speciﬁc sector.
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nomies.
Some Kaldorian models explain how a process of cumulative causation takes place
considering a one-sector model, such as the model presented by Setterﬁeld (2011).
However, these models do not explain the origin of this cumulative causation process.
Essentially, they explain countries' growth divergence based on past growth, but they
do not explain why past growth rates have diverged. In these models, the importance
of sectoral structure of production and trade is not explicit, and thus structural changes
in favour of industrial activities, for example, do not have any impact on countries'
growth rates.
On the production side, Kaldor (1966, 1967) argued that sectors have diﬀerent de-
grees of increasing returns to scale and it is important to explain a cumulative causation
process in which countries' growth rates accelerates due to internal forces. Although
some single-sector models incorporate the notion of increasing returns to scale, such
as Dixon and Thirlwall (1975) did in the context of an open economy, it takes many
years for this notion be incorporated into multisectoral demand-led models, and thus
applied to explain why cumulative causation depends on the sectoral structure of pro-
duction, such as presented by Fiorillo (2001). Fiorillo's model shows that countries'
growth rates depend on the sectoral specialisation, and sectoral specialisation depends,
in turn, on aggregate growth. Based on this, he explains cumulative causation as a
consequence of sectoral changes. His model, however, does not take into account that
economic growth in open economies is balance-of-payments constrained, and thus it
does not show how increasing returns impact on income elasticities (and vice versa)
to explain cumulative causation in open economies.
On the demand side, Pasinetti (1981, 1993) stressed the importance of sectoral
elasticities of demand to explain structural change and the relation to unbalanced eco-
nomic growth. Although his Structural Economic Dynamics (SED) model brings an
important issue into the debate on the importance of structural changes for economic
growth, it was only a quarter of a century later that Araujo and Lima (2007) ap-
plied the SED approach to understand a growth process in open economies (based on
Thirlwall's law). These authors, however, do not consider any impact of endogenous
technological progress in their models, and thus cumulative causation does not take
place either in Pasinetti's SED approach or in Araujo and Lima's multisectoral version
of Thirlwall's law. Araujo (2013) presents an alternative approach for this process. In
his model, technological progress is assumed as endogenous in a SED model, and the
balance-of-payments constraints emerge from the multisectoral Thirlwall's law. The
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author, however, considers that dynamic increasing returns to scale aﬀects only price
competitiveness, and, once the main determinant of international competitiveness is
non-price factors (as we will see Section 4.2), it has little role in explaining the diver-
gence in countries' growth divergence76.
These two aspects of structural change (the demand- and the supply-side), how-
ever, are rarely considered together in a multisectoral model. Divergence in countries'
growth rates in Kaldorian models are explained by diﬀerent degrees of increasing re-
turns among sectors on the supply-side or by diﬀerent income elasticities of exports
and imports on the demand-side. Nevertheless, it is not explained by both factors
together. In this vein, a model that combines diﬀerent sectoral degrees of increasing
returns and income elasticities of demand is fundamental to understanding the dy-
namics of growth rates divergence in open economies and the importance of structural
changes to trigger a cumulative causation process.
Furthermore, one aspect of crucial relevance to economic growth models is its policy
implications. The fact that neoclassical, endogenous, neo-Schumpeterian and Post-
Keynesian growth models do not fully incorporate the existence of diﬀerent sectors
with diﬀerent characteristics implies that policy interventions in favour of one sector
have limited impact on countries' long-term growth. In order to understand it, this
chapter analyses how a policy intervention promoting one sector to the detriment of
the others might promote acceleration (or de-acceleration) of countries' growth rates
in the long term through a process of cumulative causation.
Besides this introduction, this chapter is divided into ﬁve sections. Section 2 dis-
cusses cumulative causation in Kaldorian models and argues for the need for a sectoral
approach. Section 3 presents a model that combines the issues above mentioned to
explain cumulative causation in a multisectoral framework. Section 4 simulates the
model for the four extreme theoretical cases considering two sectors. Section 5 sim-
ulates the model for a case based on parameters estimated in the previous chapters
to evaluate what those sectors are that can trigger a cumulative causation process.
Finally, in the last section, the concluding remarks are presented.
76In his model, cumulative causation emerges from the fact that countries have diﬀerent sectoral
elasticities of demand according to their income per capita. As countries grow, the demand shifts
towards products with higher income elasticities, as well as production. Consequently, countries can
grow at higher growth rates.
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4.2 Cumulative causation in Kaldorian models
4.2.1 Cumulative causation and price competitiveness
Based on the Kaldorian approach, which stresses the existence of increasing re-
turns to scale in manufacturing activities, as well as the importance of exports as
an autonomous source of demand (Kaldor, 1966; 1970), Dixon and Thirlwall (1975)
developed the ﬁrst Export-Led Cumulative Causation (ELCC) model. The basis of
this model is Verdoorn's law, which states that more rapid growth in production in-
creases productivity growth. Dixon and Thirlwall's model assumed this law for regional
competition and argued that this productivity growth reduces production prices. As
countries become more internationally competitive due to increases in price compet-
itiveness, exports and production are stimulated, and thus a circular and cumulative
process takes place.
Setterﬁeld and Cornwall (2002) present a more complex version of this model. In
their model, productivity stimulates economic growth by a productivity regime, as
expressed by Dixon and Thirlwall (1975). Nevertheless, economic growth is also stim-
ulated by demand growth, which characterises a demand regime. In this formulation,
productivity growth and demand growth constitute a system of two linear equations,
and the resolution of this system yields a stable equilibrium demand77.
One of the limitations of these models is that both are considered inappropriate
to describe a stable long-run equilibrium in an open economy. According to Thirlwall
and Dixon (1979), the growth rate provided by the ELCC model is inconsistent with
balance-of-payments constraints (Thirlwall, 1979; McCombie and Thirlwall, 1994). As
this model does not consider this constraint, it is insuﬃcient to explain economic
growth in the long term. Thus, Thirlwall and Dixon (1979) modiﬁed the original
model to incorporate an import demand function, and hence a balance-of-payments
constraint on economic growth.
Blecker (2010) did the same for the model developed by Setterﬁeld and Cornwall
(2002). In Blecker's version, two equilibriums are obtained for a growing economy:
the balance-of-payments constrained growth (BPCG) solution and the ELCC solution.
The author then attempts to reconcile these two growth rates. According to him, if
a country is experiencing a virtuous cycle of export-led growth, the ELCC solution
prevails, but only in the medium term. However, in the long term, countries' growth
77Blecker (2010) notes that disequilibrium in this model implies ever-rising or ever-falling growth
rates, which is not plausible in the long term.
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rates are given by the BPCG solution.
Both the Thirlwall and Dixon (1979) and Blecker (2010) models are based on the
assumption that the natural rate of growth (given by productivity and labour force
growth) does not aﬀect the income elasticities for imports or exports78. Essentially, the
mechanism responsible for the cumulative process is price competitiveness. A faster
growth of output increases productivity growth, which, in turn, increases price com-
petitiveness because it reduces domestic inﬂation relatively to world inﬂation. Con-
sequently, exports are stimulated and, due to multiplier and accelerator eﬀects, output
grows faster, generating a cumulative process.
However, one of the assumptions of Thirlwall's law is that there are no relative price
eﬀects in the long run, and hence the mechanism from which cumulative causation is
presented in Dixon-Thirlwall's model does not play any role in BPCGmodels. Thereby,
due to the assumption that relative price changes have no eﬀects in the long term, the
natural rate of growth responds endogenously to BPCG, and thus increasing returns
to scale do not aﬀect growth rates in the long run. Countries' long-term growth rates
are uniquely determined by Thirlwall's law, and the ELCC growth is only a weak
attractor.
Nevertheless, it does not imply that cumulative causation does not happen in
BPCG models, even in a one-sector model. The existence of cumulative causation in
Thirlwall's law emerges from another perspective. Setterﬁeld (2011) shows that instead
of reducing prices, productivity growth (derived from Verdoorn's law) increases the
quality of the products. Because consumers value quality, the existence of increasing
returns to scale might positively aﬀect countries' income elasticities of demand for
imports and exports through non-price competitiveness.
4.2.2 Cumulative causation and non-price competitiveness
The most important determinant of long-run growth of exports and imports is
non-price factors, such as goods quality, reliability and speed of delivery. McCombie
and Roberts (2002:92) argue that countries' success in the world market is due to
product innovation rather than to reducing the prices of existing products. According
to McCombie and Thirlwall (1994:268), many studies show that non-price factors
diﬀer substantially between similar products, and that manufacturers face a downward
78Some studies, such as Vogel (2009), León-Ledesma and Lanzafame (2010), and Lanzafame (2011),
have investigated the relationship between these two growth rates and the actual growth rate and
found unidirectional causality from the BPCG rate to the natural growth rate.
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sloping curve. The evidence suggests that price competition is not of great importance
explaining exports (and imports).
Analysing some developed economies, Kaldor (1978) found that those countries
that have experienced the greatest growth rates in prices also have had the greatest
increase in their market share. This fact was known as Kaldor Paradox, because if
price-elasticities were relevant to explain the market shares, the most suitable result
should be the converse. Kaldor argued that the increase in prices is not the cause, but
a consequence of improvements in the quality of goods. These strong trends in market
shares, instead of capturing relative price changes, captured the eﬀects of changes in
non-price competitiveness.
In the same vein, Fagerberg (1988) discusses what is and what should be "in-
ternational competitiveness" in the economic literature. Although the most popular
approach focused on growth in relative unit labour costs and its determinants, several
studies indicate that its eﬀects on trade ﬂows are rather weak. Alternatively, tech-
nological factors (scope for imitation and technological competitiveness) and other
non-price factors, such as ability to deliver, are the main explanations for export and
import growth in the long term.
Thereby, the focus of cumulative causation models have to change from price to
non-price competition, once the latter is the main determinant of countries' exports
and imports. In order to show that cumulative causation exists even considering that
there are no price eﬀects in the long term, this chapter follows Setterﬁeld's (2011)
approach for Thirlwall's law with endogenous non-price elasticities. Setterﬁeld starts
by assuming that income elasticities are functions of domestic and foreign productivity
levels79, as follows:
ε = aQ (4.1)
and
pi = bQ∗ (4.2)
where Q and Q∗ are the domestic and world productivity levels, respectively.
Deﬁning the income elasticities ratio as κ = ε
pi
, and so, combining the expressions
above, we have:
79According to Fagerberg (1988), economic growth may inﬂuence technological competition through
demand-induced innovation, even though innovation activity seems to depend more on technological
opportunities and the resources devoted to innovation than on demand conditions.
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κ˙ = κ(q − q∗) (4.3)
Assuming that domestic and international growth rates present increasing returns
to scale following a typical Verdoorn form, equations (4.4) and (4.5) measure the
impact of output growth on productivity growth, and they show that it is strictly
related to the degree of increasing returns, as follows:
q = λ+ by (4.4)
and
q∗ = λ∗ + b∗z (4.5)
where b is Verdoorn coeﬃcient.
As λ∗ = λ and b∗ = b, as assumed in Setterﬁeld (1997), changes in the income
elasticities ratio can be expressed as:
κ˙ = κb(y − z) (4.6)
Finally, because in the long term y = κz (Thirlwall, 1979), it follows that:
κ˙ = κy(κ− 1)z (4.7)
This result shows that for κ = 1, the income elasticities ratio is stable. However,
for κ > 1 there will be an increase of income elasticities ratio, and for κ < 1 there
will be a decrease. It means that growth rates tend to diverge in the long term, which
characterises a cumulative causation process.
Although this simple model is able to show a possible mechanism behind the growth
rate divergence across countries, it does not show the origins of this divergence, because
it explains countries' growth rates based on past growth rates, but it does not explain
why past growth rates diverge. In this model, a faster economic growth initiates a
cumulative causation process independently of its sources, and it has no eﬀects on
production and trade structures. If a country is growing faster than the rest of the
world due to an increase in demand for natural resources, for example, a process of
ever-increasing growth rates will take place no matter if manufacturing is growing
relatively slower than the rest of the world.
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These results are obtained because this model ignores the consequences of structural
change in economic growth. Once the structure of the economy remains unchanged (or
these changes have no eﬀects on economic growth), the origin of cumulative causation is
not explicitly showed, and its positive and negative consequences are underestimated.
Nevertheless, as stressed by Pasinetti (1993), a simple observation of any series of
empirical data suggests, without any shadow of doubt, that countries present struc-
tural change in their development process, and it has undoubted consequences on their
growth rates. Thereby, even though to ignore structural changes is a good artiﬁce to fa-
cilitate the understanding of growth processes through economic models, it suppresses
the eﬀects of one of the most important aspects of economic development.
4.3 A sectoral cumulative causation model in a Kal-
dorian line
By promoting structural changes in the sectoral composition of production and
trade, a country can trigger a process of cumulative causation, and hence initiate a
process of increasing growth rates. The dynamic interaction between sectoral income
elasticities of demand and increasing returns to scale is capable of accelerating (or
reducing) countries' growth rates and determining their growth pattern in the long
term. The following model presents a possible channel through this process can occur.
Essentially, it shows that promoting sectors with high income elasticities of demand is
not enough to trigger a cumulative process. Once a cumulative causation process comes
from the interaction between these sectoral speciﬁcities, countries have to promote
those sectors with both characteristics to start a process of growth rate acceleration.
4.3.1 The dynamics of balance-of-payments constrained growth
rate
The starting point of the model is that in the long term, growth is balance-of-
payments constrained, and thus output growth depends on the weighted elasticities
ratio, such as presented by Araujo and Lima (2007) in the multisectoral version of
Thirlwall's law80:
yB =
∑
ωXiεi∑
ωMipii
z (4.8)
80This version of Araujo and Lima (2007)'s model is presented by Setterﬁeld (2011).
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where ωXi is the share of sector i's exports in the total exports, ωMi is the share of
sector i's imports in the total imports, and εi and pii are the sectoral income elasticities
of demand for exports and imports, respectively.
Based on the standard demand theory, which assumes multiplicative import and
export functions81, and by considering that relative prices do not present an ever-
increasing or ever-decreasing growth rates, such as assumed by Thirlwall (1979), the
growth rate of sectoral weight of exports and imports may be expressed as:
˙ωXi
ωXi
= xi − x = (εi − ωε)z (4.9)
and
˙ωMi
ωMi
= mi −m = (pii − ωpi)y (4.10)
where ωε =
∑
ωXiεi and ωpi =
∑
ωMipii are the weighted elasticities of demand for
imports and exports respectively.
Following Setterﬁeld (2011) and McCombie and Thirlwall (1994), who assume
that technical progress improves income elasticities of exports and imports because
it increases product diﬀerentiation and hence non-price competitiveness82, the sec-
toral elasticities of demand are assumed to be positively related to the productivity
growth diﬀerential between the country under consideration and the rest of the world.
Thereby, the growth rate of these elasticities may be written as a function of the dif-
ference between sectoral domestic and external productivity growth rates, as follows:
ε˙i
εi
= φi(qi − q∗i ) (4.11)
and
p˙ii
pii
= φi(q
∗
i − qi) (4.12)
where φi is a parameter to measure the impact of productivity growth diﬀerential
on income elasticities of demand for exports and imports.
As discussed in Chapter 3, once it is assumed that factor inputs respond to de-
mand growth, productivity is endogenously determined by output growth (according
to Verdoorn's law). Thereby, elasticities growth rates are determined by the diﬀerence
81These functions can have, for example, a multiplicative form: Xit =
(
P∗itEt
Pit
)ϕi
(Zt)
εi and Xit =(
Pit
P∗itEt
)ηi
(Zt)
pii .
82To the detriment of a technological progress that reduces costs, such as assumed by Dixon and
Thirlwall (1975) and Araujo (2013).
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between domestic and external output growth rates83, as well as by a factor, λ, which
measures the impact of exogenous technological changes, as follows:
ε˙i
εi
= φi[(λi − λ∗i ) + bi(yi − zi)] (4.13)
and
p˙ii
pii
= −φi[(λi − λ∗i ) + bi(yi − zi)] (4.14)
By assuming that sectoral exogenous technological change is the same domestically
and for the rest of the world (λi = λ
∗
i ), these equations show that the faster the growth
of sector i domestically compared to the rest of the world is, the faster the sectoral
income elasticity of exports will increase, and the faster income elasticity of imports will
decrease. Moreover, these equations also show that the higher the Verdoorn coeﬃcient
of sector i is, the higher the impact of a sectoral faster growth rate on the elasticities
is, and, consequently, the higher its impacts on export and import growth rates will
be.
A faster growth of sectoral exports and a de-acceleration of sectoral imports, how-
ever, do not imply that countries' BPCG rates will necessarily increase. From equation
(4.8), it is possible to see that if sector i presents high income elasticities of demand for
exports and low income elasticities of demand for imports, an increase in its weights
positively aﬀects the long-term growth rate, yB. However, if this sector presents low
income elasticities of demand for exports or high income elasticities of demand for
imports, the results may be the converse.
Thereby, with the aim of analysing the impact of a faster growth of sector i on
countries' long-term growth rates, the growth dynamics of countries' BPCG rates are
expressed as:
˙yB
yB
=
ω˙ε
ωε
− ω˙pi
ωpi
+
z˙
z
=
∑ ωXiεi
ωε
(
˙ωXi
ωXi
+
ε˙i
εi
)
−
∑ ωMipii
ωpi
(
˙ωMi
ωMi
+
p˙ii
pii
)
+
z˙
z
(4.15)
Finally, replacing equations (4.9), (4.10), (4.13) and (4.14) in (4.15), and remem-
bering from equation (4.8) that yB =
ωε
ωpi
z, the equation that presents changes in
countries' long-term growth rates (given by multisectoral Thirlwall's law) in terms of
83We assume that Verdoorn's coeﬃcients are sector-speciﬁc, but they are the same for the country
under consideration and the rest of the world.
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its sectoral structure is given by:
˙yB =
∑ ωXiεi
ωε
[(εi − ωε)z + φibi(yi − zi)]z−
−
∑ ωMipii
ωpi
[(pii − ωpi)z + φibi(yi − zi)]z + ωε
ωpi
z˙ (4.16)
This equation presents the dynamics of countries' BPCG rates from a sectoral
perspective. The ﬁrst term presents the dynamics of the weighted income elasticities
of demand for exports, and the second, the dynamics of the weighted income elasticities
of demand for imports. It is possible to see from this equation that sectoral growth
rates diﬀerential to the rest of the world plays an important role in this dynamics, and
its impact depends upon the sectoral Verdoorn coeﬃcient, as well as upon the sectoral
income elasticities of demand for exports and imports.
4.3.2 Impacts of structural changes on the BPCG rates
The impact of a faster growth rate of a given sector, yi, on countries' long-term
growth rate dynamics can be analysed from equation (4.16). A faster growth of a given
sector can be interpreted as a structural change in countries' sectoral compositions of
output if the other sectors growth rates are not aﬀected. Hence, by considering that
the world output growth is not aﬀected by changes in the growth rate of the country
under consideration, as well as the growth rates of others sectors are not aﬀected by a
faster growth rate of the given sector, this impact can be described as:
∂(( ˙yB)
∂(yi)
=
d( ˙yB)
d(yi)
+
d( ˙yB)
d(y)
d(y)
d(yi)
(4.17)
This equation shows that a faster growth of sector i has two impacts on countries'
long-term growth rates. Firstly, it has a direct impact (expressed by term in the
ﬁrst term), which shows the impact of a faster growth of the sector on the income
elasticities of demand for imports and exports, as well as on the weight of each sector
in exports and imports. Moreover, it has an indirect impact. A faster growth of a
sector (considering that other sectors growth rates remains constant) increases total
output growth rate, according to this sector weight in the economy.
Based on equation (4.16), the indirect impact can be described as
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d( ˙yB)
d(y)
d(y)
d(yi)
=
(
1−
∑ ωMipii
ωpi
pii
ωpi
)
ωiz (4.18)
where omegai is the weight of sector i's output in total output.
Because 1 −∑ ωMipii
ωpi
pii
ωpi
is approximately zero84, a faster growth of total output
does not accelerate the long-term countries' growth rates, and the impact of a faster
growth of sector i can be reduced to its direct impact, as follows:
d( ˙yB)
d(yi)
= φibi
(
ωXiεi + ωMipii
ωε
ωpi
)
z
ωpi
(4.19)
From this equation, it is possible to verify that the long-term growth rate of a
country accelerates when the sectors under consideration grow faster. However, this
acceleration in the BPCG rate depends on the sectoral Verdoorn coeﬃcient and the
sectoral income elasticities of demand for imports and exports. The higher the Ver-
doorn coeﬃcient and the income elasticities of the sector under consideration is, the
higher the impact on the BPCG rate is.
On the export side, a faster growth of the sector under consideration aﬀects pos-
itively its income elasticity, because it increases the non-price competitiveness of this
sector. Consequently, the weighted income elasticity of demand for exports will in-
crease, positively aﬀecting the country's long-term growth rate. On the import side,
a faster growth of the sector under consideration has a negative impact on its income
elasticity of demand for imports. Here, an increase on non-price competitiveness re-
duces its elasticity because the country will demand less of this product, once the
country is be able to produce it domestically. Consequently, the weighted income
elasticity of demand for imports will decrease, reducing the BPCG rate.
Until now, it has been considered that a faster growth of a given sector does not
aﬀect the growth rate of others sectors. However, if one considers, alternatively, that
a faster growth of one sector is compensated for by a reduction in another sector's
growth rate (that will be considered here as sector j) to keep the actual growth rate
of the country, y, constant, equation (4.17) has to be modiﬁed. The impact of sector
i's faster growth can be split into the direct impact, such as before, and the impact
through sector j's growth rate:
84If income elasticity of demand for imports is the same among sectors, piiωpi = 1 and thus the impact
of structural changes on the dynamics of countries' BPCG is null. Thus, the diﬀerence between the
income elasticities must be very high to the indirect impact have some signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
dynamics of countries' BPCG rates.
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∂( ˙yB)
∂(yi)
=
d( ˙yB)
d(yi)
+
d( ˙yB)
d(yj)
d(yj)
d(yi)
(4.20)
Taking into account the impact on others sectors' growth rates is important because
it shows that, in contrast to one-sector models, a multi-sectoral approach can explain
how a process of cumulative causation may take place even if the actual growth rate
of a country remains constant.
Considering that y = ωyi + ωjyj, where ωi and ωj are the weights of sector i and
j in output, the impact of a faster growth of sector i on the dynamics of countries'
BPCG rates is given by
∂( ˙yB)
∂(yi)
= φibi
(
ωXiεi + ωMipii
ωε
ωpi
)
z
ωpi
− ωi
ωj
φjbj
(
ωXjεj + ωMjpij
ωε
ωpi
)
z
ωpi
(4.21)
Equation (4.21) presents the two impacts of a faster growth of one sector to the
detriment of the other: one positive, due to a faster growth of sector i, and one
negative, due to a decrease in sector j output growth rate. The net impact depends
on the relative Verdoorn coeﬃcient and the relative elasticities. In the case of having
bi > bj and εi,pii > εj,pij, the impact of a faster growth of sector i will be an acceleration
in the country's growth rate. On the other hand, if bi < bj and εi,pii < εj,pij, the impact
of a faster growth of sector i will be negative, reducing the BPCG rate.
At this point, we reach the main contribution of a multi-sectoral model. In single-
sector models, a faster output growth is necessary to start a cumulative process. In
a multi-sectoral model, it is not necessary. A cumulative causation process can be
triggered by structural changes even if the growth rate of output is, at ﬁrst, not
aﬀected. Because sectors have diﬀerent income elasticities of demand for exports and
imports, and they present diﬀerent Verdoorn coeﬃcients, specialisation in some sectors
can boost the balance-of-payments constrained growth rates and, once it implies a
faster growth of output, a process of cumulative causation takes place.
Equation (4.21), however, does not show explicitly a cumulative causation process,
because it does not establish any link between the BPCG rate and the actual growth
rate. Only if the actual rate of growth is determined by the BPCG rate will this
intervention trigger a process of cumulative causation in which countries' growth rates
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can diverge in the long term.
4.3.3 Interrelatedness, lock-in and the limits for cumulative
causation
As discussed in the latter subsection, promoting a structural change towards sectors
with a Verdoorn coeﬃcient and income elasticities higher than the average is essential
to trigger a cumulative causation process and, thus, to accelerate countries' long-term
growth rates. However, there are some limits for this process, and equations (3.19)
and (3.21) have not taken into account these limits.
According to Setterﬁeld (1997), the Verdoorn coeﬃcient captures the impact of a
faster output growth on productivity via increasing returns to scale. However, be-
cause these increasing returns can be captured not only from intangible channels, but
also from accumulation of tangible ﬁxed capital and speciﬁc organisation forms, the
ability of a region to realise increasing returns may be impaired if it suﬀers from in-
terrelatedness. The author argues that interrelatedness  the interconnection between
components of production process  can lead to a region becoming locked-in to a
certain technique of production inherited from the past. Moreover, based on Frankel's
(1955) view, Setterﬁeld argues that interrelatedness (and, thus, the probability of a
region becoming locked-in) is higher the faster the growth is within the context of a
certain technique of production. According to him, a faster growth is a context of a
certain technique causing a faster proliferation of interrelatedness, and more likely it
becomes that a region will experience lock-in in to this technique. Thereby, previous
fast growth rates of output may have a negative eﬀect on productivity and countries'
competitiveness, rather than (only) a positive eﬀect, as predicted by Verdoorn's law.
McCombie and Roberts (2002) agree with Setterﬁeld and go further. According to
them, fast growth rates in previous period might make continuous adaptation diﬃcult
because they tend to encourage the lock-in of a production process. On the other hand,
low previous growth rates must have a positive impact as a poor performance give rise
to a sense of dissatisfaction and thus to pressure for reform of economy's production
structure.
Thereby, formally speaking, specifying competitiveness as a negative function of
previous growth rates is not a suﬃcient condition for having a historical growth model.
According to McCombie and Roberts, it is necessary to consider that competitiveness
is a function of past growth rates, but as a strong non-linear function. They argue
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that while high values of previous growth rates may be allowed to have a negative
impact, low values have a positive impact on competitiveness.
In the context of the model discussed here, where competitiveness is predominantly
non-price competitiveness and it is represented by the sectoral income elasticities of
demand for imports and exports, following McCombie and Roberts (2002), equations
(4.11) and (4.12) can be re-written as85:
ε˙i
εi
= φi[bi(yi − zi)− ϕi(yi − zi)2] (4.22)
and
p˙ii
pii
= −φi[bi(yi − zi) + ϕi(yi − zi)2] (4.23)
where ϕ measures the impact of interrelatedness.
Therefore, a faster growth of a given sector increases the income elasticity of de-
mand for exports and decreases the income elasticity of demand for imports due to
Verdoorn's law, such as discussed before, but, at suﬃciently high growth rates, the
impact is reversed and non-price competitiveness start decreasing.
Based on these equations for the income elasticities, equation (4.14) is re-speciﬁed
as
˙yB =
∑ ωXiεi
ωpi
[(εi − ωε)z + φibi(yi − zi)− φiϕi(yi − zi)2]z−
−
∑ ωMipiiωε
(ωpi)2
[(pii − ωpi)y − φibi(yi − zi) + φiϕi(yi − zi)2]z + z˙ (4.24)
Hence, the impact of a faster growth of sector i (considering that it is not com-
pensated by a lower growth of other sectors), can be rewritten as:
∂( ˙yB)
∂(yi)
= φi[bi − 2ϕi(yi − zi)]
(
ωXiεi + ωMipii
ωε
ωpi
)
z
ωpi
(4.25)
Equation (4.25) explicitly shows the main structure of a historical model with cu-
mulative causation but with the possibility of reversion, such as discussed by Setterﬁeld
(1997) and McCombie and Roberts (2002). Because income elasticities are endogenous
85Considering that exogenous technological change is the same domestically and for the rest of the
world.
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to previous growth rates, a faster growth of the sector under consideration increases
the long-term growth rates due to the existence of increasing returns to scale. How-
ever, because it is not linear, at suﬃciently high growth rates the eﬀect is reversal and
country's long-term growth rates start decreasing as it can lead to a region becoming
locked-in to a certain technique of production.
Thereby, a faster growth of the sector under consideration can stimulate through
non-price competitiveness a cumulative process of increasing growth rates. However,
due to the increasing possibility of a country become locked-in, the long-term growth
rate starts decreasing at bi − 2ϕi(yi − zi) = 0. It means that if the diﬀerence between
domestic and world output growth in sector i is larger than bi
2ϕi
, the long-term growth
rate of the country under consideration will decrease.
4.3.4 Technological gap and the opportunities to catch up
Equation (4.11) and (4.12) assumes Verdoorn's law to explain how productivity
growth is positively aﬀected by a faster growth of output and, hence, how the diﬀeren-
tial between domestic and external output growth can explain the dynamics of income
elasticities. However, it was assumed that exogenous technological change is the same
in the country under consideration and in the rest of the world, and so the fact that
exogenous technological change may be diﬀerent among countries has been ignored.
On the one hand, exogenous technological change is determined by the scientiﬁc dis-
coveries, which is strictly exogenous in the model. On the other hand, it might also
depends on countries' distance to those in the innovation frontier. In this sense, it is
also important to consider that the technological gap may aﬀect productivity growth,
and thus Verdoorn's law speciﬁcation should control for that.
The relation between technological gap and the growth bonus, as Cornwall and
Cornwall (2002) named it, was discussed in the ﬁrst chapter. Essentially, the au-
thors who discuss this issue stressed that countries on a lower technological level than
countries on the innovation frontier have the possibility of imitation and thus growing
faster. Thereby, backwardness can be an advantage for productivity growth.
Assuming that λi has a strictly exogenous component, which is given by the exogen-
ous technological change of the rest of the world (λ¯i = λ
∗
i ), but it also has a component
that is determined by the technological gap, Gi, equations (4.11) and (4.12) can be re-
written, as follows to take into account the impact of technological gap on productivity
growth:
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ε˙i
εi
= φi[(λ¯i − λ∗i ) + f(Gi) + bi(yi − zi)] (4.26)
and
p˙ii
pii
= −φi[(λ¯i − λ∗i ) + f(Gi) + bi(yi − zi)] (4.27)
If f is a strictly positive function, thus, the impact of sectoral gap on productivity
growth is always positive, as foolows:
df(Gi)
d(Gi)
> 0⇒ d(Gi)
d(qi)
> 0 (4.28)
Based on equations (4.26) and (4.27), equation (4.14) may be re-speciﬁed as:
˙yB =
∑ ωXiεi
ωpi
[(εi − ωε)z + φibi(yi − zi) + φif(Gi)]z−
−
∑ ωMipiiωε
(ωpi)2
[(pii − ωpi)y − φibi(yi − zi)− φif(Gi)]z + z˙ (4.29)
The impact of a faster growth of sector i will be the same presented in equations
(4.19) and (4.21). However, such as discussed in the end of Section 4.3.2, these equa-
tions do not explicitly show a cumulative causation process, because there is no link
between actual and BPCG rates. In the context that actual growth rates are determ-
ined by BPCG rates, a faster growth of a sector will have a positive impact on its
elasticity of exports and a negative impact on its elasticities of imports. If the sector
under consideration presents higher income elasticities than the average, a process of
cumulative causation will take place because the BPCG will increase, and it, in turn,
will positively aﬀect the actual growth rate (of all sectors).
Nevertheless, this process of cumulative causation has two constraints. Firstly, if
growth rates are suﬃciently high, it will imply a reduction of elasticities due to the
possibility of a country being locked-in to a speciﬁc technique of production (such as
presented in Section 4.3.3). Secondly, because the sector under consideration is growing
faster than the rest of the world, productivity of this sector will grow faster, and the
technological gap will reduce. Consequently, if the level of productivity is suﬃciently
high, elasticities will stop increasing. Thus, although a process of cumulative causation
happens and countries' growth rates become higher than before, instead of presenting
ever-increasing growth rates, countries' growth rates will be constant in the long term.
117
This process of cumulative causation, however, is extremely complex in a multi-
sectoral model because it involves variables in level, such as weight of sectors and
technological gap, and variables in growth rates. Thereby, it will be presented through
simulations in the next sections.
4.4 General simulations: possible results for a two-
sector model
With the aim of assessing the impact of structural changes on countries' long term-
growth rates, the model developed in the last section is simulated assuming diﬀerent
parameters for the sectoral income elasticities and the Verdoorn coeﬃcient. From the
results of these simulations, it will be possible to analyse what the necessary conditions
are for these structural changes to aﬀect positively countries' BPCG rates through a
cumulative causation process.
The basic assumption of the model developed in the last section is that the multi-
sectoral version of Thirlwall's law is the determinant of both long-term and short-term
(or actual) growth rates. In the simulation, the latter, however, it is assumed to be
determined with a lag, because the mechanisms that makes actual rate of growth to
adjust towards the BPCG do not take place instantly.
Thereby, re-writing this model in discrete time, and considering this impact with
a lag we have that:
yt = yB,t−1 =
∑
ωXi,t−1εi,t−1∑
ωMi,t−1pii,t−1
zt−1 (4.30)
where lower cases stand for growth rates (in discrete time).
If one assumes the sectoral weight of export and import growth rates based on
(4.9) and (4.10), it might generate a problem of consistence because these equations
are only linear approximations, and hence the summation of each sector's weight may
be higher (or lower) than one. Thus, let us start by considering the growth rate of
each sector's exports and imports separately:
xi,t = εi,tzt = (εi,t−1 + ∆εi)zt (4.31)
and
mi,t = pii,tyt = (pii,t−1 + ∆pii)yt (4.32)
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Following the idea behind equations (4.11) and (4.12), which assumes that sectorial
income elasticities of exports and imports are determined by the level of productiv-
ity (because it reﬂects the quality of goods), and that productivity is determined by
Verdoorn's law, the probability of lock-in and the technological gap (all in the previ-
ous period86), the income elasticities may be written as a function of the diﬀerential
between domestic output growth and the rest of the world:
∆εi = εi,t−1φi[bi(yi,t−1 − zi,t−1)− ϕi(yi,t−1 − zi,t−1)2 + f(Gi,t−1)] (4.33)
and
∆pii = −pii,t−1φi[bi(yi,t−1 − zi,t−1)− ϕi(yi,t−1 − zi,t−1)2 + f(Gi,t−1)] (4.34)
Replacing equations (4.33) and (4.34) in (4.31) and (4.32), respectively, the growth
rate of exports and imports can be expressed as a function of the following variables:
the past elasticities, the diﬀerential between domestic and external sectoral output
growth rates (in the previous period), the level of technological gap, the world growth
rate and the actual growth rate:
xi,t = εi,t−1φi[1 + bi(yi,t−1 − zi,t−1)− ϕi(yi,t−1 − zi,t−1)2 + f(Gi,t−1)]zt (4.35)
and
mi,t = pii,t−1φi[1− bi(yi,t−1 − zi,t−1) + ϕi(yi,t−1 − zi,t−1)2 − f(Gi,t−1)]yt (4.36)
From these equations, it is possible to determine the level of exports and imports87,
which is necessary to obtain the weight of each sector in total exports and imports
and thus the weighted income elasticity ratio.
Sectoral growth rates will be determined by two diﬀerent process in diﬀerent peri-
ods: (1) there will be periods that the economy will be growing without intervention,
and thus sectoral growth rates will be determined by their income elasticities of de-
mand; and (2) there will be periods where one sector is under direct intervention (and
86According to Setterﬁeld (1997), competitiveness gains are associated with the realisation of in-
duced technical progress (Verdoorn's law), and they require the accumulation of new capital, which
will only come into productive use in some future period. Thereby, we assume that changes in
elasticities are associated with growth rates in the previous period.
87They will be given, respectively, by Xi,t = Xi,t−1(1 + xi,t) and Mi,t = Mi,t−1(1 +mi,t).
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thus its growth rate will be exogenously given) and the other sectors will grow at a
rate that keeps the overall growth rate compatible with income growth rate88. In both
cases, the overall economy will be growing at the same rate: the income growth rate.
The diﬀerence is that whilst without intervention the distribution of sectoral growth
rates is given by their relative income elasticities of demand, during the periods of in-
tervention, one sector grows at a given growth rate and the others sectors compensate
for this growth rate to keep overall growth rate compatible with income growth.
In mathematical terms, the growth rate of sector i is exogenously given during the
periods of intervention, and during the period of non-intervention its growth rate given
by its demand89, as follows:
yi,t =
pi∗i,t∑
ωi,tpii,t
yt (4.37)
Other sectors' growth rates are calculated assuming that the structure of produc-
tion of the country under consideration is the same as the structure of rest of the world
exports and imports, which implies that overall growth rates are the same independ-
ently of whether sector i is under intervention or not:
yj,t =
yt − yi,tωi,t
ωj,t
=
yt − yi,tω∗Xi,t
ω∗Xj,t
(4.38)
Finally, deﬁning the variable that measures the technological gap based on the
sectoral income elasticities ratio, Gi =
ε∗i /pi
∗
i
εi/pii
(which means that there will be no gap,
Gi = 1, if the sectoral income elasticities ratio is the same domestically and in the
rest of the world90, and that the gap will be as higher as the income elasticity ratio
decreases), and assuming91:
88By intervention, it is assumed that a superior institution is able to determine the growth rate of
a given sector. This procedure is applied only for explanatory reasons. The aim of this procedure is
to show the impact of a faster growth of a given sector to the detriment to the others to evaluate its
impact on countries' growth rates.
89The assumption that sectoral output growth reﬂects weights and elasticities of the rest of the
world is only to make the model simple. Once we consider that countries grow at the same rate in the
beginning and their growth rates are given by the same structure, this assumption only reﬂects the
fact that changes in countries' elasticities of imports and exports due to increasing returns to scale do
not play any role in domestic elasticities. An alternative assumption for sectoral growth rates could
be the one presented by Trigg and Araujo (2014), which considers output multipliers. However, it
will make the model even more complex, and it goes beyond the aim of this work.
90Because income elasticities is a measure for non-price competitiveness, and it reﬂects the quality
of the goods produced, such as discussed in Section 4.2, this deﬁnition for technological gap is more
suitable than the usual deﬁnition based on productivity diﬀerential.
91It means that the impact of the gap on productivity is null if there is no gap, but this impact
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f(Gi) = σi(e− e(1/Gi)) = σi(e− e(εi/pii)) (4.39)
where σi is the impact of technological gap on productivity growth rate and ε
∗
i = pi
∗
i ,
equations (4.30) and (4.35)-(4.39) are suﬃcient to start the simulation, as all variables
can be determined by lagged variables92.
However, in order to keep the model consistent in the long term, it is assumed that
sectoral output growth in the rest of the world is equal to its demand, which implies
that
zi,t =
pi∗i,t∑
ω∗i,tpi
∗
i,t
zt (4.40)
and that equations (4.36)-(4.39) also apply for the rest of the world.
Furthermore, it is assumed that at the starting period (t = 0), domestic growth
rate is equal to the rest of the world's growth rate, once, at ﬁrst, the weight of each
sector in exports and imports are the same domestically and for the rest of the world,
as well as each sector's export and import elasticities.
4.4.1 Specialisation in sectors with high elasticities and high
Verdoorn coeﬃcient
With the aim of analysing the impact of an intervention in favour of one sector to
the detriment of the other on countries' long-term growth rates, the simulation assumes
two diﬀerent cases: with and without intervention. In both cases the economy starts
with the same structure and the same elasticities of the rest of the world.
In the case of no intervention, during all series sectoral growth rates are given by
the BPCG rate multiplied by the sectoral relative income elasticities of demand, such
as presented by equation (4.37). As discussed before, it is important to guarantee
that sectoral supply and demand growth rates are the same. In the case of inter-
vention, three diﬀerent periods are considered. During the ﬁrst ﬁve periods there is
no intervention, and hence both sectors are growing at the same growth rate of the
rest of the world, which is given by the BPCG rate multiplied by the sectoral relative
income elasticity of demand. During ﬁve periods of intervention (from periods 6 to
grows exponentially as the gap grows. Moreover, it is assumed that world gap is null because the gap
is being measured in terms of world technology.
92With the exception of sectoral world output growth, which is considered as exogenously given.
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10), sector i is growing at an exogenously given growth rate that is higher than the
period without intervention, whilst the other sector, sector j, is growing at a lower
growth rate to compensate for sector i's faster growth rate in order to keep the overall
growth rate equal to the BPCG rate. Finally, after the intervention (from period 11
onwards), both sectors return growing at the BPCG rate multiplied by the sectoral
relative income elasticities of demand. However, because during the period of inter-
vention sectoral growth rates were diﬀerent in the country under consideration and in
the rest of the world (even though the overall growth rate was unchanged), the BPCG
rate may have changed and the economy may grow faster or slower than if there were
no intervention.
Simulations 1 and 2 assume an economy composed of two sectors that produce
tradable goods. One of these sectors has the highest Verdoorn coeﬃcient (and thus
the highest degree of increasing returns) and the highest income elasticities of demand
for imports and exports; the other, consequently, has the lowest Verdoorn coeﬃcient
and the lowest elasticities. Even though these are theoretical simulations, the sector
with the high elasticities and Verdoorn coeﬃcient may be interpreted as high-tech
manufacturing in middle- and high-income countries based on the results of income
elasticities of demand found in Chapter 2 and Verdoorn coeﬃcients found in Chapter
3, whilst the other sector may be interpreted as low-tech manufacturing93.
Figure 4.1 presents the results of Simulation 1, which is an intervention in the
sector with high elasticities and a high Verdoorn coeﬃcient. From this simulation,
it is possible to understand the mechanisms through structural changes which may
trigger a cumulative process of increasing growth rates. The upper left graph shows
that a ﬁve-period intervention on relative sectoral growth rates can start a cumulative
growth process, even if, at ﬁrst, this intervention does not aﬀect the total output
growth rate.
As the sectoral output growth rates graph (upper right) shows, a ﬁve-period posit-
ive impact on sector i growth rate aﬀects positively the long-term growth rate of this
sector because it initiates a cumulative process. However, it does not aﬀect negatively
the other sector. Conversely, sector j is positively aﬀected in the long term in spite of
being negatively aﬀected during the period of intervention.
93For middle- and high-income countries, the Verdoorn coeﬃcient is higher in high-tech than in
low-tech sector (Chapter 3). Income elasticities of demand for imports and exports are higher in
high-tech sectors in all estimations (Chapter 2).
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Figure 4.1: Simulation 1: impact of an intervention in the sector with the highest
income elasticities and the highest Verdoorn coeﬃcient
This process happens because, during the period of intervention, the faster growth
rates of sector i aﬀect positively its own income elasticity of demand for exports and
negatively its own income elasticities of demand for imports due to the existence of
increasing returns to scale. The converse impact on sector j's income elasticities,
however, is less relevant because once this sector presents a lower degree of increas-
ing returns, the impact on its own elasticities is relatively lower. Consequently, the
economy as a whole grow faster due to an overall increase on the weighted income elast-
icities. Because the economy is growing relatively faster than the rest of the world, the
income elasticities of demand for exports in both sectors increase permanently and the
income elasticities of demand for imports decrease, triggering a process of cumulative
causation.
Essentially, sector i's elasticity ratio is positively aﬀected by the growth of the
sector itself and by the growth of the economy as a whole, whilst sector j's elasticity
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ratio is negatively aﬀected by the growth of the sector itself, but, on the other hand,
it is positively aﬀected by the growth of the economy. Thereby, an intervention that
promotes a structural change in favour of the sector with the highest Verdoorn coef-
ﬁcient and the highest income elasticities of demand initiates a cumulative process of
faster growth rates. In the analysed case, the growth rate of the economy increases
from 4% to 7%, showing that structural changes in favour of an speciﬁc sector may
promote signiﬁcant acceleration in countries' growth rates94.
This intervention, however, will not imply ever-increasing growth rates. Firstly,
because the probability of a country becoming locked-in to a speciﬁc technology
increases as growth rates increase, the greater the diﬀerence between countries' growth
rates is, the harder it is for a country that is growing faster to keep accelerating.
Secondly, because the positive impact of the technological gap on productivity will
decrease as productivity grows, the income elasticities of demand for imports will stop
decreasing and the income elasticities of demand for exports will stop increasing.
4.4.2 Specialisation in sectors with low elasticities and low Ver-
doorn coeﬃcient
Simulation 2 analyses the impact of promoting the sector with the lowest Ver-
doorn coeﬃcient and the lowest income elasticities, which may be interpreted as an
intervention in favour of low-tech manufacturing in middle- and high-income countries.
Figure 4.2 presents the results. As can be seen from the graph in the upper left side,
an intervention that stimulates a faster growth of this sector (to the detriment of the
other sector) negatively aﬀects the economic growth rate, and it initiates a process of
cumulative causation in which the country's growth rate decreases continuously.
The reason for this is the same presented before, but conversely. A faster growth of
the sector with the lowest income elasticities positively aﬀects its own income elasticity
of exports and negatively aﬀects its own income elasticities of imports, promoting
a faster growth of this sector itself. However, because the sector with the highest
Verdoorn coeﬃcient is growing at lower rates in relation to the rest of the world, its
elasticity of exports is decreasing and its elasticity of imports is increasing. The net
impact on the weighted income elasticity ratio is negative, and hence output will grow
at lower rates. Consequently, the income elasticities of demand for exports in both
94If one assume that each period refers to a quarterly or a year, it takes a long time to growth rates
increase signiﬁcantly (as can be seen from Figure 4.1, it takes 150 periods to total output growth rate
increases by 3 p.p.). Thereby, this analysis must be seen in the very long run, and it has to be used
to explain countries' secular stagnation or long-term growth acceleration
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Figure 4.2: Simulation 2: impact of an intervention in the sector with the lowest
income elasticities and the lowest Verdoorn coeﬃcient
sectors will increase, and the elasticities of imports will decrease, negatively aﬀecting
the weighted income elasticities, which, in turn, will trigger a cumulative causation
process of decreasing growth rates.
4.4.3 Specialisation in sectors with low elasticities and high
Verdoorn coeﬃcient
Simulations 3 and 4 also consider two sectors that produce tradable goods, but,
in contrast to those presented before, one of these sectors presents the highest Ver-
doorn coeﬃcient and the lowest income elasticities, and the other, the lowest Verdoorn
coeﬃcient and the highest income elasticities.
This analysis can be interpreted based on the ﬁndings of the latter chapters. The
results of Chapter 3 showed that, for low-income countries, low-tech industries have
higher degrees of increasing returns than high-tech industries, whilst the results of
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Chapter 2 showed that income elasticities are higher in high-tech industries in all
estimations.
Figure 4.3 presents the results for Simulation 3, which considers a ﬁve-period in-
tervention in favour of the sector with the lowest income elasticities but the highest
Verdoorn coeﬃcient, such as low-tech industries in low-income countries. In contrast to
the simulations presented before, the results presented here are not conclusive, because
it depends on the elasticities and the Verdoorn coeﬃcient.
Figure 4.3: Simulation 3: impact of an intervention in the sector with the lowest
income elasticities but the highest Verdoorn coeﬃcient
An intervention promoting a structural change in favour of the sector with the
lowest income elasticities positively aﬀects the income elasticity ratio of this sector,
but it aﬀects negatively the income elasticity ratio of the other sector. As in the former
simulations, one sector is positively aﬀected and the other is negatively.
Nevertheless, in contrast to those simulations, because the sector with the lowest
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income elasticity presents the highest Verdoorn coeﬃcient, the positive eﬀect on this
sector's elasticity ratio is greater than the negative impact on the elasticity ratio of
the other sector. Consequently, although the weight of those sectors with the lowest
income elasticities will increase in total exports and decrease in total imports, the
elasticity ratio of this sector will increase and, depending on the parameters, the latter
eﬀect may compensate for the former, and the weighted elasticities ratio will not be
aﬀected.
4.4.4 Specialisation in sectors with high elasticities and low
Verdoorn coeﬃcient
Finally, Simulation 4, presented in Figure 4.4, shows the impact of an intervention
in favour of the sector with the highest income elasticities but the lowest Verdoorn
coeﬃcient. Based on the ﬁndings of the latter chapters, this sector may represent
high-tech industries for low-income countries. Similar to the result obtained in the
last simulation, the impact of a structural change in favour of this sector on total
output growth rate is dubious: it depends on the parameters.
Although a faster growth rate of the sector with the highest elasticities increases its
own income elasticity of exports and its share on total exports, as well as it decreases
its own elasticity of imports and its share on total imports, these impacts may be
oﬀset by the impacts of the other sector. Because the sector negatively aﬀected by the
intervention presents the highest degree of increasing returns, its elasticities responds
relatively faster to its growth rates and, thus, the weighted elasticities may respond
negatively to this intervention.
Such as in the former simulation, the net impact depends on the relative size of the
parameters. If the diﬀerence in the Verdoorn coeﬃcient is great enough to compensate
for the diﬀerence in elasticities, the weighted elasticities will decrease and hence the
total output growth rate will drop. Nevertheless, if the diﬀerence in elasticities is
greater enough to compensate for the diﬀerence in the Verdoorn coeﬃcient, total
output growth rate will increase, triggering a cumulative process of increasing growth
rates.
The results obtained in these four theoretical simulations demonstrate that both
sectoral income elasticities of demand and sectoral Verdoorn coeﬃcients are import-
ant to explain the origin of a cumulative causation process. An intervention in favour
of sectors with higher Verdoorn coeﬃcients and income elasticities than the average,
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Figure 4.4: Simulation 4: impact of an intervention in the sector with the highest
income elasticities but the lowest degree of increasing returns
such as high-tech sectors for middle and high-income countries, can trigger a process
of cumulative causation of increasing growth rates. On the other hand, an interven-
tion in favour of sectors with lower Verdoorn coeﬃcients and income elasticities than
the average initiates a process of cumulative causation with decreasing growth rates.
Finally, an intervention in sectors with lower Verdoorn coeﬃcients and higher income
elasticities than the average (or vice-versa) may produce both results (increasing and
decreasing growth rates) depending on the parameters.
4.5 Speciﬁc simulations based on estimated values
In the last section, four theoretical cases were simulated to evaluate the con-
sequences for growth of the intervention in sectors with diﬀerent income elasticities
and Verdoorn coeﬃcients. Here, values for these parameter estimated in the latter
chapters are applied to simulate the consequences of countries' specialisations in dif-
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ferent industries95.
The sectoral division is the same as the latter chapters, which is based on the cat-
egories of demand. Sectors are grouped into natural-resources-based products [NR],
consumption goods [CG] and capital goods [KG]. Estimations for these sectors' elasti-
cities and increasing returns, as resumed in Table 4.1, shows that capital goods has the
highest income elasticities of demand for exports and imports, and a high Verdoorn
coeﬃcient for middle- and high-income countries. Consumption goods, on the other
hand, have the lowest Verdoorn coeﬃcient for middle- and high-income countries,
and its incomes elasticities are around the average. Finally, natural-resource-based
products have the lowest income elasticities, but this sector's Verdoorn coeﬃcient is
similar to capital goods (for middle-income countries it is slightly higher). Based on
these values, the long-term impact of a structural change in favour of each of this
group of sectors is simulated.
Table 4.1: Parameters adopted in the simulations based on estimated values
Sim 5 Sim 6 Sim 7 Estimated Values*
bNR 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 (Ch. 3)
bCG 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 (Ch. 3)
bKG 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 (Ch. 3)
εNR = piNR 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.47-2.63 (Ch. 2)
εCG = piCG 2.4 2.4 2.4 1.19-3.56 (Ch. 2)
εKG = piKG 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.73-4.81 (Ch. 2)
z 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%
ϕNR = bNR/2 0.26 0.26 0.26
ϕCG = bCG/2 0.15 0.15 0.15
ϕKG = bKG/2 0.25 0.25 0.25
σNR = σCG = σKG 0.005 0.006 0.015
φNR = φCG = φKG 1.5 1.5 1.5
ωXNR = ωMNR 30% 30% 30%
ωXCG = ωMCG 40% 40% 40%
ωXKG = ωMKG 30% 30% 30%
(*) Simulations are based on the results obtained in the latter chapters. Estimation
of Verdoorn's coeﬃcient is based System GMM panel model for countries with US$
10,000 of GDP per capita (middle-income countries) controlling for human capital and
technological gap. Estimation of income elasticities are based on long panel models
(DOLS and GLS) for South American and South/East Asian countries.
Before proceeding with these simulations, however, the sectoral growth rates for
95These estimations are consistent with those found by other sectoral studies. For elasticities of
demand see, for example, Gouvea and Lima (2010, 2013), and for the degree of increasing returns,
see Angeriz et al. (2009).
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those sectors that are not under intervention must be deﬁned, once equation (4.10) is
only valid for two-sector models. By using same rationale of equation (4.11), which
is important to keep sectoral output growth consistent with income elasticities of
demand, and the idea that the growth of other sectors adjusts to keep total output
growth constant, sectoral growth rates of the other sectors are deﬁned as:
y2 =
pi∗2
ω2pi∗2 + ω3pi
∗
3
(y¯ − ω1y¯1) (4.41)
and
y3 =
pi∗3
ω2pi∗2 + ω3pi
∗
3
(y¯ − ω1y¯1) (4.42)
where sector 1 is the one under intervention, and sectors 2 and 3 are the other
sectors.
4.5.1 Specialisation in capital goods
The sector of capital goods presents the highest income elasticities of exports and
imports and the Verdoorn coeﬃcient higher than the average. Thereby, as we can
see from Figure 4.5, a structural change in favour of this sector will promote a faster
growth of the economy as a whole in the long term, even if, at ﬁrst, the growth of
economy keeps unchanged.
Similar to Simulation 1, a faster growth of capital goods relative to the others
sectors during a ﬁve-period period has a permanent impact on the economic growth
rate. Because this sector presents the highest income elasticities of demand and a
relatively high degree of increasing returns (or Verdoorn coeﬃcient), a positive impact
on the sector increases the elasticities faster than the decrease of the elasticities of
the others sectors, and thus the weighted elasticities ratio is positively aﬀected. An
increase on the weighted elasticities ratio, in turn, promotes an increase in the actual
rate of growth.
As can be seen from the graph, after the intervention, all sectors are growing faster
than without any intervention96. Hence, although the intervention, at ﬁrst, has a
negative impact on the other sectors' elasticities of exports and a positive impact on
import elasticities, a faster growth of these sectors after the period of intervention
96Intervention is assumed to change sectoral growth rates, such as presented in the upper-right
graph of Figure 4.5. However, because faster growth rates aﬀects variables in level, sectoral share
on total GDP also changes. The intervention considered in this section, for example, increases the
growth rate of capital goods from 5% to 7% during ﬁve periods, whilst it reduces the growth rates of
other sectors. Consequently, the share of capital goods in GDP increases from 30% to 33%.
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Figure 4.5: Simulation 5: impact of an intervention in favour of capital goods
increases its own elasticities of exports and decreases its own elasticities of imports,
which also contributes to a faster economic growth. Thereby, not only the capital
goods sector will grow faster, but the economy as a whole, and hence the intervention
will imply on a faster growth of all sectors, triggering a cumulative process of increasing
growth output rates.
4.5.2 Specialisation in natural resources
The production of natural resources presents the highest Verdoorn coeﬃcient for
middle-income countries, but this sector has the lowest income elasticities of exports
and imports. Consequently, as shown in Figure 4.6, a structural change in favour of
this sector triggers a process of decreasing growth rates.
On the one hand, an intervention in favour in favour of this sector promotes, at
ﬁrst, an increase in its own elasticities of demand for exports and a decrease in its
own elasticities of demand for imports. On the other hand, once the rate of growth
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Figure 4.6: Simulation 6: impact of an intervention in favour of natural resources
of capital and consumption goods decreases, the elasticities of demand for exports of
these sectors decrease and the elasticities for imports increase. Because the Verdoorn
coeﬃcient of natural-resource-based products is the highest, the former eﬀect is more
important than the latter, which would suggest an increase in the weighted elasti-
cities ratio. However, the share of natural-resources-based products in total exports
is increasing, and the share in total imports is decreasing. Because this sector has
the lowest elasticities, the weighted elasticity ratio is negatively aﬀected, and hence
economic growth rate decreases due to a fall in the BPCG rate.
A lower economic growth in all sectors (including in natural-resource-based products)
after the period of intervention promotes a decrease in all sectors' elasticities of de-
mand for exports, as well as an increase in their elasticities of demand for imports.
Therefore, the country's growth rate falls continually due to a fall in the weighted
elasticities ratio, characterising a process of cumulative causation with negative im-
pacts for this country. Essentially, the case of natural-resource-based products shows
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that it is not enough to stimulate a sector that has the highest Verdoorn coeﬃcient.
Despite being important to promote a faster growth of the sector that is able to in-
crease productivity the most, an intervention in favour of natural resources decreases
the weighted elasticity ratio, aﬀecting negatively growth rates in the long term.
4.5.3 Specialization in consumption goods
Although consumption goods present income elasticities of demand for exports and
imports higher than the average, the consequences of a structural change in favour of
this sector does not imply a faster growth rate of the economy. Because this sector has
the lowest Verdoorn coeﬃcient, an increase in the growth rate of consumption goods
(to the detriment of the others sectors) will promote decreasing growth rates, as shown
in Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7: Simulation 7: impact of an intervention in favour of consumption goods
An intervention capable of increasing consumption goods' growth rate (to the det-
riment of others sectors growth rates) promotes an increase in its own elasticities of
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exports and a decrease in its own elasticities of imports. However, it also promotes a
decrease in the elasticities of exports and an increase in the elasticities of imports of
the others sectors. During the period of intervention, the impact on the weights of the
elasticities must be positive to promote an increase in countries' BPCG rate. However,
because consumption goods have the lowest Verdoorn coeﬃcient, the increase in its
elasticity of exports (and the decrease in its elasticity of imports) is compensated for
by the fall in the elasticities of exports of the other sectors (and the growth of elasti-
cities of imports), such as presented in Figure 4.7. Consequently, a structural change
towards consumption goods negatively aﬀects the BPCG rate, which implies a slow
growth rate, triggering a negative process of cumulative causation.
4.6 Concluding remarks
Although the process of structural change is at the root of Kaldor's explanation
for economic growth, many Kaldorian models do not incorporate it directly and, con-
sequently, they are unable to present a complete explanation for the origin of the
cumulative causation processes. Setterﬁeld (2011), for example, presented a model
that shows a possible mechanism behind the growth rate divergence across countries.
His model, however, does not explain how structural changes can trigger a process
of cumulative causation, because it is not constructed in a multisectoral framework.
According to this model, a country that is achieving a faster growth rate due to an
increase in demand for agriculture products, for example, will achieve a faster and an
increasing growth rate, even if the manufacturing sector is shrinking. Despite providing
an interesting approach for the existence of cumulative causation in a BPCG model,
Setterﬁeld's approach is unable to show the importance of sectoral speciﬁcities for
long-term growth because it does not incorporate a structural analysis.
On the other hand, the Kaldorian models constructed in a multisectoral frame-
work, despite providing insights about the relevance of sectoral speciﬁcities for long-
term growth, are unable to show how the interaction between these speciﬁcities is
important in triggering a cumulative causation process. The multisectoral version of
Thirlwall's law, for example, shows the importance of structural composition of exports
and imports to explain countries' growth rate divergence. However, this model does
not incorporate endogenous technological change and its impacts on these elasticities,
and hence it does not show the interaction between these two sectoral characteristics.
In this chapter, the process of economic growth and cumulative causation were
understood from a sectoral perspective. The main conclusion is that the divergence
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in countries' growth rates can be explained by the sectoral structure of countries'
production and trade because sectors have diﬀerent income elasticities of demand for
exports and imports, such as presented in the multisectoral version of Thirlwall's law,
and diﬀerent degrees of increasing returns, such as presented by the Verdoorn's law. On
the one hand, an intervention in favour of sectors with the highest income elasticities
of demand and the highest Verdoorn coeﬃcient promotes a faster and an increasing
economic growth (even if, at ﬁrst, total output growth rate is not aﬀected). On the
other hand, specialisation in sectors that present the lowest Verdoorn coeﬃcient and
the lowest elasticities promotes a reduction in countries' growth rates. Finally, if the
specialisation takes place in sectors with a high Verdoorn coeﬃcient but with low
elasticities (or vice-versa) the result is not conclusive: it depends on the relative size
of these parameters.
Assuming the parameters obtained in the last two chapters for the sectoral in-
come elasticities of demand for import and export and for the Verdoorn coeﬃcient,
it was seen that specialisation in capital goods and high-tech sectors is important to
promote a faster economic growth in the long term for middle- and high-income coun-
tries. Because these sectors present the highest income elasticities and high Verdoorn
coeﬃcients for these countries, promoting a structural change towards them can trig-
ger a cumulative process where the faster growth of output of these sectors increases
productivity, which increases income elasticities of exports and decreases income elast-
icities of imports. Consequently, because economic growth is ultimately determined by
the balance-of-payments constraint, specialisation in these sectors promotes a faster
growth of the economy as a whole, which increases productivity and non-price com-
petitiveness of all sectors.
Therefore, a structural approach for the explanation of a cumulative causation is
essential to understanding economic growth in the long term. Although a general ap-
proach for countries' growth divergence can provide important insights, some relevant
features only can be seen from a sectoral perspective, with special regards for the origin
of this cumulative causation processes.
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Chapter 5
Impacts of increase in trade on
countries' sectoral structure of
production and trade: a structural
decomposition analysis
5.1 Introduction
The process of increase in trade, which has resulted to some extent from the trade
liberalization that took place in developing countries during the 1990s and 2000s,
had signiﬁcant impacts on world production chains. From a global perspective, these
countries were integrated into global supply chains, which permitted an increase in
exports that had not been witnessed in decades. On the other hand, these changes
may have resulted in the substitution of imported inputs for domestic suppliers. As a
result, the potential for growth in demand to precipitate economic growth may have
declined, provided that domestic absorption of demand has fallen.
To analyse the consequences of this complex process, a relevant aspect that should
be taken into account is identifying which sectors have changed more substantially
and what implications this has on economic growth. On the one hand, in Asian
economies, the growth in the last two decades was led by the increase of high-tech
exports. On the other hand, in Brazil and other natural resource exporters, the wealth
eﬀect of primary product exports was one of the most important variables in the recent
economic growth. An economic growth led by primary sectors, however, may result
in a relevant constraint for economic growth in the long run. Although one can argue
that expansion based on the production and export of primary goods did not have
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a negative eﬀect on the economy, there is a large (and growing) literature that is
attempting to show the limitations of promoting growth based on these sectors.
As discussed in the ﬁrst four chapters, many mechanisms could explain why pro-
moting structural changes towards speciﬁc sectors (according to countries' stage of
development) is an important source of growth. Two of these mechanisms are espe-
cially relevant to the analysis that follows. First, because some sectors present higher
income elasticities of demand for exports and imports, specialising in them is essen-
tial to avoid balance-of-payments constraints. Second, because some sectors present
higher degrees of dynamic increasing returns (and it determines sectoral productivity
growth rates), specialising in them is essential to explain overall productivity (and
thus competitiveness) growth.
Chapter 4 showed how a process of cumulative causation (and its consequences for
countries' long-term growth rates) can be understood through the interaction of these
two channels. Moreover, Chapter 4 pointed out which sectors can trigger a cumulative
causation process of increasing growth rates: capital goods and high-tech industries.
Hence, specialising in them is likely to promote a faster economic growth in the long
term.
In this context, to understand the eﬀects of increase in trade on economic growth,
one should analyse its eﬀects on countries' sectoral structure of production and trade.
In this chapter, such enquire is addressed through a Structural Decomposition Ana-
lysis, which evince the impact of changes in the structure of demand and supply on
each sector's output.
Structural decomposition analysis (SDA) considers that shifts in total output es-
sentially depend on changes in ﬁnal demand and intermediate consumption. Changes
in ﬁnal demand aﬀect the total output directly, and because intermediate consumption
depends on input-output coeﬃcients, total output is also aﬀected by shifts in them. In
this study, we develop a method for decomposing the changes in intermediate consump-
tion into two parts: technological change and substitution of imported inputs. The
aim of this decomposition is to identify to what extent substitution between domestic
and imported inputs aﬀects output growth across sectors. This analytical tool is rel-
evant to providing a detailed investigation of the consequences of changes in countries'
supply chains on their structure of production and trade.
Furthermore, analysing the decomposition of changes in industrial chains is also
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important to determine those sectors in which the substitution of imported inputs for
domestic inputs is more intense and those in which export growth has compensated for
the negative impacts on output. By using the analytical tool developed in this chapter,
it is possible to compare the negative eﬀects of the substitution between domestic and
imported inputs and its positive eﬀects on export growth across sectors and countries.
In addition to this introduction, this chapter has ﬁve other sections. Section 2 dis-
cusses the process of trade liberalization in developing countries during the 1990s and
2000s. Section 3 discusses the evolution and limitations of SDA, as well as its applic-
ations in Brazil. In section 4, this method is extended to incorporate the substitution
between national inputs and imports. Section 5 applies this analytical tool to the
Brazilian data and compares the results with the contribution of exports to evaluate
the net impacts on output of the substitution between national inputs and imports.
This analytical tool is also applied to other economies, with the aim of comparing
Brazil with other countries. Finally, Section 6 discusses the relevance and limitations
of the proposed approach and provides the concluding remarks.
5.2 Trade liberalization and the growth in inter-country
commerce
Since the 1990s, international commerce has been increasing signiﬁcantly in devel-
oping countries. A relevant issue that cannot be ignored is the removal of tariﬀ and
non-tariﬀ trade barriers. Based on the argument that free trade is the best trade policy
to promote countries' development  and that protectionism is responsible for some
developing countries' low growth rates  multilateral trade agreements, such as the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Co-
operation (APEC), as well as many bilateral agreements, have promoted inter-country
commerce through trade liberalisation.
Among the most important trade barriers are import tariﬀs. These tariﬀs were
widely used to promote speciﬁc sectors, and the removal of these tariﬀs has become
one of the main target of trade agreements under the system of the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO). Besides reducing trade, and the hence the beneﬁts of countries'
specialisation in those goods for which they have comparative advantages, these tariﬀs
are argued to damage countries' competitiveness, once the protected sectors are less
stimulated to compete and innovate. Consequently, as presented in Figure 5.1, eﬀect-
ively applied import tariﬀs, considering both preferential and bound tariﬀs, have been
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reduced for all the largest developing economies between the early 1990s and the late
2000s.
*
Figure 5.1: Eﬀectively applied import tariﬀ (%), weighted average (1992-2008)
Data for 1992 and 2008 for those countries they are available. For those countries data are not
available in these years, the closest year is presented. For Argentina, Indonesia and Malaysia, data
for 1993 are presented, rather than 1992; for Mexico, 1991; and, for the Philippines, 1998. For
Indonesia, rather than 2008, data for 2007 is presented.
Source: World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS)
The average eﬀectively applied import tariﬀs have been reduced in all Latin Amer-
ican countries to less than 10% in the late 2000s. In most of these countries, this
reduction was greater than 7.0 p.p. between 1992 and 2008. In Brazil, for example,
the average tariﬀ has been reduced by 8.1 p.p., while in Argentina it has dropped by
7.5 p.p., and, in Chile, Mexico and Peru, eﬀective tariﬀs have been reduced by 9.0,
10.3 and 13.1 p.p. respectively. In South and East Asia, the reduction of these tariﬀs
were even more signiﬁcant. In China, Thailand and India, average import tariﬀs were
greater than 25% in the early 1990s, but they have been reduced to 3.9%, 4.8% and
6.9%, respectively. In Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, although the level of
import tariﬀs was lower than other developing countries, the average of these tariﬀs
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have been reduced to 4.0% or less. Data for other developing countries, such as Rus-
sia, South Africa and Turkey, shows the same trend. The Average import tariﬀ has
dropped from 11.3% to 8.6% in Russia, from 6.1% to 2.0% in Turkey, and, in South
Africa, it has been reduced by 9.6 p.p., from 13.5% to 3.9%.
Besides the cut or complete removal of import tariﬀs, many other trade barriers,
such as import quotas and regulatory legislation, have been also removed to promote
trade liberalisation under the argument that they protect uncompetitive sectors. All
these measures have resulted in increasing trade between countries. According to WB-
WDI, trade has increased in almost every country. In Brazil, it has increased from
15.2% of GDP in 1990 to a peak of 27.1% in 2008, in Argentina it has increased from
15.0% to 36.7% in the same period, and, in Mexico, from 38.3% to 58.1%. The same
trend is veriﬁed in South and East Asian countries. In China, for example, between
1990 and 2008, trade has increased from 26.7% of GDP to 62.3%; in India it was only
15.2% of GDP and reached 52.2% in 2008. Thereby, the last two decades were marked
as a period of decreasing trade barriers as part of a process of trade liberalisation and
increasing inter-country commerce.
Reduction or removal of import tariﬀs was not a sector-speciﬁc process. Instead, it
was a generalised process ranging from raw materials to sophisticated goods, such as
Chemicals and Machinery. Even though there are few exceptions, import tariﬀs have
dropped for all countries in almost every sector, as presented in Table 5.1.
Import tariﬀs for raw materials, which were lower than the average in the early
1990s, have been reduced or completely removed in all the largest developing countries
but Russia. In Brazil, for example, the average tariﬀ in this sector was 8.7% in
1992 and it has dropped by 8.2 p.p. to 0.5%, in 2008. Similarly, import tariﬀs in
raw materials have been almost completely removed in Argentina, Mexico, China,
Indonesia, Thailand and South Africa. In Russia, it has increased from 10.0% in the
early 1990s to 11.3% in 2008.
In Textiles, import tariﬀs were signiﬁcantly higher than the average in the early
1990s. In all countries but Turkey, it was greater than 10%, and, in some extraordinary
cases, such as Thailand, it was almost 100%. Even though they remain relatively high
when they are compared to other sectors, these tariﬀs have dropped in the vast majority
of countries (the exceptions were Brazil and Russia).
In Chemical, similarly to raw materials, import tariﬀs were relatively low in the
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Table 5.1: Eﬀectively applied import tariﬀ (%), selected sectors (1992-2008)*
Raw Materials Textiles Chemicals Mach/Transp
1992 2008 1992 2008 1992 2008 1992 2008
Latin America
Argentina 3.7% 0.3% 15.8% 15.2% 7.7% 5.2% 14.7% 5.6%
Brazil 8.7% 0.5% 13.8% 18.9% 13.4% 5.2% 25.9% 10.2%
Chile 11.0% 2.6% 11.0% 3.9% 11.0% 1.3% 10.9% 2.2%
Colombia 9.1% 9.9% 16.2% 14.0% 7.7% 5.9% 11.2% 10.7%
Mexico 5.4% 0.6% 15.7% 7.2% 9.8% 0.6% 13.7% 1.9%
Peru 15.2% 1.3% 19.2% 10.8% 15.0% 2.2% 15.2% 1.8%
Venezuela 8.8% 6.0% 12.0% 8.3% 8.8% 7.1% 13.0% 10.1%
South and East Asia (developing)
China 8.6% 1.4% 61.7% 14.7% 22.2% 5.5% 34.0% 5.3%
India 3.9% 4.8% 41.2% 13.5% 58.4% 6.4% 51.6% 6.6%
Indonesia 4.8% 1.0% 13.9% 3.5% 8.5% 3.1% 16.3% 3.4%
Malaysia 8.4% 4.4% 16.4% 6.3% 9.5% 2.6% 8.5% 1.8%
Philippines 8.7% 3.6% 13.1% 7.5% 5.9% 3.2% 4.3% 3.1%
Thailand 45.9% 1.0% 95.6% 7.9% 39.0% 3.8% 34.9% 6.4%
Other developing countries
Russia 10.0% 11.3% 13.8% 14.8% 9.3% 8.6% 11.2% 8.1%
South Africa 2.9% 0.4% 38.6% 25.0% 8.0% 2.1% 15.2% 4.9%
Turkey 6.4% 2.3% 6.7% 3.1% 5.1% 1.2% 5.1% 0.7%
(*) Data for 1992 and 2008 for those countries they are available. For those countries data are
not available in these years, the closest year is presented. For Argentina, Indonesia, Malaysia,
South Africa and Turkey, data for 1993 are presented, rather than 1992; for Mexico, 1991; for
Russia, 1997; and, for the Philippines, 1998. For Indonesia, rather than 2008, data for 2007
is presented.
Source: World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS)
early 1990s and they have dropped to less than 7% in all the largest developing eco-
nomies but Russia. In Brazil, China and India, they have been signiﬁcantly reduced
from more than 13% in the early 1990s to around 6% in 2008. In Mexico, Chile, Peru,
Malaysia, Turkey and South Africa, imports tariﬀs for chemical products have been
reduced to less than 3% in 2008.
Although import tariﬀs vary signiﬁcantly among countries in Machinery and Trans-
port Equipment, they have been signiﬁcantly reduced in all the largest developing
economies. In the early 1990s, they ranged from 4.3% in the Philippines to 51.2% in
India. After almost two decades of trade liberalisation, these tariﬀs have been reduced
to less than 11% in all these economies. In Brazil, for example, they dropped from
25.9% to 10.2%, in China, from 34.0% to 5.3%, and, in India, from 51.6% to 6.6%.
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Therefore, import tariﬀ reduction was a process that took place in almost every
sector in developing countries. With few exceptions, such as the textile industry in
Brazil and raw materials in Russia, import tariﬀs have dropped signiﬁcantly from the
early 1990s to the late 2000s as one of the most important policies in the process of
commerce liberalisation.
Despite being a generalised process, the consequences of this trade liberalisation
are far from being homogeneous across countries and sectors. In some countries, such
as China, Malaysia and Thailand, imports of high-tech goods has increased in parallel
with the growth of exports, whereas exports of primary products has dropped as a
percentage of total exports. On the other hand, in Latin American countries, exports
of primary products have increased signiﬁcantly, whilst the share of high-tech exports
has become stagnated or decreased. Considering that sectors have diﬀerent potential to
promote high and sustained growth rates in the long term, as discussed in the former
chapters, it is important to analyse the consequences of growth in trade and trade
liberalisation to countries' sectoral structure of trade and production. This analysis is
crucial to understand what countries are beneﬁting the most of this process, as well
as to evaluate how the others could beneﬁt more.
5.3 Theoretical and empirical background of SDA
Leontief (1936, 1941) was the ﬁrst to conduct an economic structural analysis by
using input-output (I-O) methods. Following his work, this method has been widely
used in such analyses and to study the eﬀects of economic conditions on political
outcomes, e.g., through the use of backward and forward linkages (Hirschman, 1958;
1968) and through the decomposition of sectoral deviations from proportional expan-
sion (Chenery et al., 1962). Nevertheless, the use of decomposition methods to analyse
the sources of structural changes was only introduced in the 1970s by Skolka's inaug-
ural paper (Skolka, 1977).
Many studies have applied this methodology in diﬀerent countries, such as Feldman,
McClain, and Palmer (1987) in the United States, and Skolka (1989) in Austria. Feld-
man, McClain, and Palmer (1987) decomposed industry output changes in the United
States in 1963 and 1978 into changes in ﬁnal demand (level and mix of products) and
in input-output coeﬃcients. Alternatively, Skolka (1989) analysed the composition of
net output in terms of the contributions of technological shifts, domestic ﬁnal demand,
foreign trade, and labour productivity.
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In the 1980s and 1990s, SDA methods became an important analytical tool in
structural studies, and diﬀerent methods were developed. As a result, Rose and Casler
(1996) and Dietzenbacher and Los (1998) developed critiques of the methodology.
Rose and Casler (1996) described the fundamental principles behind alternative SDA
methods, whereas Dietzenbacher and Los (1998) discussed the problems caused by the
application of diﬀerent SDA methods.
Despite being used widely to understand structural changes in diﬀerent economies,
changes in input-output coeﬃcients are usually interpreted as technological changes
in SDA applications97. However, these coeﬃcients may also change due to the sub-
stitution between domestic and imported inputs, which cannot be taken into account
without an extension of the SDA method.
Based on Chenery et al. (1962)'s decomposition of sectoral deviation from pro-
portional expansion, Pamukçu and de Boer (1999) have proposed a primary extension
for the SDA method to evaluate the demand that was not absorbed domestically as
a consequence of substitution between domestic suppliers and imports in diﬀerent
sectors.
In the case of the Brazilian economy, Guilhoto et al. (2001) decomposed the changes
in economic structure between 1959 and 1980 and compared them with those in the
United States. The authors conﬁrmed prior ﬁndings regarding the role of changes
in ﬁnal demand in determining the growth rate of sectoral output in Brazil during
the 1960s and 1970s. Kupfer et al. (2003) decomposed the Brazilian employment
growth based on I-O tables for the years 1990, 1996 and 2001. According to the
authors, between 1990 and 1996, imports were responsible for a signiﬁcant decrease
in employment, and exports were not able to compensate the negative impact. From
1996 to 2001, however, the result was the converse: exports have aﬀected employment
positively, compensating the negative impact of import growth.
More recently, Messa (2012) and Moreira and Ribeiro (2012) applied SDA methods
to Brazilian data to decompose structural changes in the 2000s. Although Messa (2012)
showed that a decline in the intermediate consumption of domestic industrial output
97In SDA, technological changes mean changes in the input-output coeﬃcients, which do not ne-
cessarily impact on total technological growth (in the Solow or growth accounting sense of the term).
According to Rose and Casler (1996:42), In nearly all SDA formulations, changes in the structural
matrix are ascribed to a nebulous 'technological change', which is often broadly interpreted to in-
clude any factor that causes a change in a technical (structural) coeﬃcient, such as true technological
change, technical substitution (response input price changes) and scale eﬀects.
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is the most important determinant of the growth diﬀerential between services and
industry, the author did not decompose the changes in input coeﬃcients into technical
change and domestic supply substitution. Moreover, Moreira and Ribeiro (2012) did a
similar analysis and concluded that output growth was primarily explained by changes
in ﬁnal demand, whereas technical progress (measured by input coeﬃcients) had less
of an impact.
Thus far, however, studies have failed to account for the eﬀect of substitution
between domestic suppliers and imports on output. Therefore, an analytical decom-
position of recent Brazilian growth in comparison with other economies is necessary
to verify the extent to which this country has been achieving low growth rates as a
result of substitution between imported and domestic inputs in sectors that have the
potential to increase the country's growth rate. From a structuralist perspective, this
approach is crucial to understand why countries' growth rates may decline or increase
in the long run.
5.4 Incorporating imported inputs into SDA
Initially, the changes in gross output by sector are decomposed into impacts of
ﬁnal demand growth and changes in Leontief coeﬃcients (the coeﬃcients of direct
and indirect inputs). The SDA method is applied following Miller and Blair's (2009)
approach. Considering the basic Leontief model for two distinct years (0 and 1), the
vector of gross output x in year t = 0, 1 is given by:
x1 = L1f 1 (5.1)
and
x0 = L0f 0 (5.2)
where L is the Leontief matrix of direct and indirect production coeﬃcients, and f is
the vector of ﬁnal demand. Thus, the observed change in gross output is:
∆x = x1 − x0 = L1f 1 − L0f 0 (5.3)
Some possible rearrangements may be applied to decompose the changes in L and
f , and their eﬀects on ∆x. Two alternative methods are presented:
∆x = L1(f 0 + ∆f)− (L1 −∆)f 0 = (∆L)f 0 + L1(∆f) (5.4)
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∆x = (L0 + ∆L)f 1 − L1(f 1 −∆f) = (∆L)f 1 + L0(∆f) (5.5)
Here, the focus will be on the average approach of these two methods. According to
Dietzenbacher and Los (1998), this approach is often an acceptable method for SDA.
Summing equations (5.4) and (5.5)
2∆x = (∆L)f 0 + L1(∆f) + (∆L)f 1 + L0(∆f) (5.6)
and averaging gives:
∆x =
1
2
(∆L)(f 0 + f 1) +
1
2
(L0 + L1)(∆f) (5.7)
where the ﬁrst term refers to the eﬀects of the change in the Leontief coeﬃcients
over the change in gross output, and the second term refers to the eﬀects of the change
in ﬁnal demand.
Thereafter, the changes in Leontief coeﬃcients have to be divided into technological
changes and substitution between national and imported inputs. Given L1 = (I−AD1)
and L0 = (I−AD0), where AD is the national direct coeﬃcients matrix, post-multiply
L1 through by (I − AD1)
L1(I − AD1) = I = L1 − L1AD1 (5.8)
and pre-multiply L0 through by I − AD0
(I − AD0)L0 = I = L0 − AD0L0 (5.9)
Rearrange (5.8) and post-multiply by L0
L1 − I = L1AD1 ⇒ L1L0 − L0 = L1AD1L0 (5.10)
Similarly, rearrange (5.9) and pre-multiply by L1
L0 − I = AD0L0 ⇒ L1L0 − L1 = L1AD0L0 (5.11)
Subtract (5.11) from (5.10)
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∆L = L1AD1L0 − L1AD0L0 = L1(∆AD)L0 = L1(AD1 − AD0)L0 (5.12)
Because AD is the diﬀerence between the total direct coeﬃcient matrix (A) and the
direct coeﬃcient matrix of imported goods (AM), the change in the Leontief matrix
can be written alternatively as
∆L = L1[(A1 − AM1)− (A0 − AM0)]L0 (5.13)
Rearranging, the decomposition of changes in the Leontief matrix into technological
changes and substitution between national and imported goods is given by
∆L = L1(∆A)L0 + L1(−∆AM)L0 (5.14)
where the ﬁrst term is the contribution of the changes in total direct coeﬃcients
(technological change) to changes in the Leontief coeﬃcient, and the second term is
the contribution of changes in imported direct coeﬃcients (substitution of national
inputs).
Finally, substituting (5.14) in (5.7), the total output growth can be divided into
the contribution of (i) technological change, (ii) substitution between national inputs
and imports, and (iii) ﬁnal demand growth:
∆x =
1
2
[L1(∆A)L0](f 0 + f 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i)
+
1
2
[L1(−∆AM)L0](f 0 + f 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii)
+
1
2
(L0 + L1)(∆f)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(iii)
(5.15)
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Application of the analytical tool in Brazil
The method developed in this study was applied to Brazilian data from 1995 to
2008 and to a set of comparison countries98. The data are available at the World
Input-Output Database (WIOD) (Timmer, 2012). The database covers most of the
major world economies (including Brazil) in the period between 1995 and 2008, and the
data are available in both current and previous years' prices. Thus, changes in prices
98The World International Input-Output Database (WIOD) presents data from 1995 to 2009. How-
ever, the last year may present relevant distortions due to the crisis and it was thus excluded from
the analysis to avoid bias in the results.
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and quantities may be analysed separately, which reduces bias caused by volatility in
exchange rates and relative price changes.
Before conducting the SDA, all tables were deﬂated as follows:
a
t(p1995)
i,j = a
t(pyp)
i,j
t−1∏
t=1995
a
t(pyp)
i,j
a
t(cyp)
i,j
(5.16)
where ai,j is the output of sector i used as input by sector j, t is the table year,
p1995 stands for base year prices (1995), pyp stands for previous year prices, and cyp
stands for current year prices.
The same method was applied to obtain the changes from 1995 to 2008, which
means that 1995 is the base year for all results. Table 5.2 presents the main ﬁndings
for Brazil. Essentially, it shows, in real terms, the impact of each factor (technological
change, substitution of national inputs and ﬁnal demand) on sectoral output. The
total impact, given by the last column is the sum of the impact of each factor99.
Table 5.2: Decomposition of the Brazilian output growth (1995-2008)
Techn. Subst. of Final Total
change national demand output
impact inputs growth growth
Total 9.3% -8.2% 44.9% 46.0%
Agriculture and Mining 24.0% -16.3% 62.2% 70.0%
Manufacturing 5.7% -14.9% 43.0% 33.7%
Low Tech -1.1% -8.4% 35.0% 25.4%
Med/High Tech 18.8% -27.5% 58.5% 49.7%
Chemicals 26.4% -32.1% 32.3% 26.7%
Machinery 3.4% -13.6% 81.5% 71.2%
Electrical 33.8% -44.9% 33.1% 22.0%
Transport 6.3% -15.5% 94.1% 85.0%
Services 9.8% -3.9% 44.3% 50.2%
Authors' elaboration based on WIOD.
The data in Table 5.2 allow assessing the relevance of the decomposition of changes
in the Leontief coeﬃcient into changes in technology and substitution of imported
inputs for domestic inputs. For the economy as a whole, nearly all of the positive eﬀects
99Because the aim of this chapter is to analyse the impact of increase in trade on productive
chains, the impact on the substitution between national and foreign ﬁnal demand is not considered.
An increase in trade could have aﬀected negatively the growth in ﬁnal demand. However, it goes
beyond the aim of this chapter, and hence it is not calculated.
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of changes in technology on total output were oﬀset by the increase in imported inputs.
Although the ﬁnal demand growth had an impact of 44.9% on total output (97.6% of
the total 46.0% output growth in the period 1995-2008), the inclusion of substitution
between imported and domestic inputs permitted by the SDA method allowed us
to conclude that technological change also had a relevant impact on output (9.3%).
However, this impact was compensated for by the increase in import coeﬃcients (-
8.2%), and thus changes in input coeﬃcients (which is given by the sum of the impact
of substitution for imported inputs and technological change) had limited eﬀects on
total output.
Moreover, the analysis of total output was signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the results
in the service sector. Because the inputs of this sector were predominately domestic,
the substitution impact on output was limited to 3.9%. If the substitution eﬀect in
the other sectors were considered, the results would be more relevant. In the primary
sectors (agriculture and mining), the impact of the substitution of imported inputs
on output was 22.6%, which means that the impact of technological change in these
sectors was oﬀset by the increase of imports.
The most important results, however, were observed in the high- and medium-high-
technology manufacturing sectors, in which the eﬀects of technological change had an
impact of 15.1% on output growth. Nevertheless, the substitution of imported inputs
compensated for these eﬀects: it reduced the overall output growth by 16.3%, and the
eﬀects were particularly pronounced in the chemicals and electrical/optical equipment
sectors, in which the negative impact was 32.1% and 44.9%, respectively.
More relevant insights may be extracted from the results through an analysis of the
eﬀects from a historical perspective. Table 5.3 presents the results according to three
distinct periods in Brazilian macroeconomic policies: 1995 to 1999, 1999 to 2003, and
2003 to 2008.
Between 1995 and 1999, there were relevant substitutions of imported inputs for
national inputs in high- and medium-high-technology manufacturing. This substitu-
tion had a negative impact of 4.5% on total output. During these years, the Plano Real
was adopted to reduce inﬂation. This was based on the reduction of tariﬀs with the
aim of opening the economy to imported goods, as well as on real exchange rate appre-
ciation. As a result, the production chains of the most innovative and technologically
advanced sectors were signiﬁcantly aﬀected.
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Table 5.3: Impact of the substitution of national inputs on total output
1995-1999 1999-2003 2003-2008 1995-2008
Total -0.4% -0.2% -7.2% -8.2%
Agriculture and Mining 1.8% -0.9% -13.7% -16.3%
Manufacturing -1.5% -0.1% -12.6% -14.9%
Low Tech 0.0% 0.4% -8.6% -8.4%
Med/High Tech -4.5% -1.0% -20.5% -27.5%
Chemicals -3.8% -0.3% -27.7% -32.1%
Machinery -1.4% -1.0% -10.0% -13.6%
Electrical -8.3% -3.8% -34.0% -44.9%
Transport -3.4% 0.4% -9.6% -15.5%
Services -0.1% -0.1% -3.8% -3.9%
Authors' elaboration based on WIOD.
In contrast with this period, from 1999 to 2003 the Brazilian economy experienced
a period of subsequent balance-of-payments crisis and exchange rate depreciation. The
inﬂation target regime was implemented with the aim of controlling inﬂation; thus,
high interest rates were necessary to maintain the capital inﬂows and control demand
growth. As a consequence, although the substitution of imported inputs had not
signiﬁcantly aﬀected the output growth, Brazilian growth rates were very low.
The process of substitution between imported and national inputs picked up between
2003 and 2008. For the economy as a whole, the increase of imported inputs decreased
the total output by 7.2% during these ﬁve years. Again, high-tech sectors were the
most aﬀected. Their total output was 20.5% lower owing to the increase in imported
inputs. In the chemical and electrical sectors, the impact on total output was 27.7%
and 34.0%, respectively.
This period, however, was characterized by high real exchange rate appreciation
and high growth rates. Thus, the net impact of the substitution was very ambiguous.
On the one hand, it reduced the positive impacts of ﬁnal demand growth on total
output by 7.2%. On the other hand, it may have been essential to the increase of the
ﬁnal demand eﬀects, assuming it may be relevant to reduce costs and increase exports.
Therefore, it was important to consider that despite contributing negatively to the
total output, the process of substitution was not necessarily negative. The positive
results for primary sectors suggested that the increase in exports in these sectors was
related to the substitution of imported inputs, as a result of reducing prices. In the
following section, we identify those sectors in which the growth of exports compensated
for the negative impact of the domestic input substitution, in order to assess the net
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impact of the substitution.
5.5.2 The net impact of exports and the substitution of imports
for national inputs
To evaluate the impact on economic growth of the substitution between imports and
domestic suppliers, we analyse the contribution of exports. As previously mentioned,
this substitution may have reduced economic growth because the ﬁnal demand is not
absorbed by domestic suppliers. However, it may have increased exports, assuming
it reduced the costs of production and increased the quality of goods. Thereby, we
analyse its net impact to evaluate the real consequences of this substitution on output.
Starting from equation (5.7), ﬁnal demand is divided into (i) the contribution of
domestic ﬁnal demand and (ii) the contribution of exports:
∆x =
1
2
(∆L)(f 0 + f 1) +
1
2
(L0 + L1)(∆fD)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii)
+
1
2
(L0 + L1)(∆fE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii)
(5.17)
where ∆fE is the vector of export growth, and ∆fD is the vector of domestic ﬁnal
demand growth.
The contribution of exports to output growth can be divided into two parts: the
direct contribution of the analysed sector export growth and the indirect contribution
of other sectors' export growth to the analysed sector output growth100, which is given
by the diﬀerence between the total contribution and the direct contribution. Table 5.4
presents a comparison between the contribution of export growth and the substitution
of imported inputs on output.
The results show that despite being neutral for the economy as a whole, the net im-
pact of the substitution of domestic suppliers had ambiguous eﬀects when considering
the sectors separately. The impacts were positive for some sectors, such as agriculture
and mining, but they were negative for others, such as chemicals and electrical/optical
equipment.
The last two columns of Table 3 show the positive contribution of export growth
(direct and indirect) and the negative contribution of the substitution of imported
inputs. From these data, we can conclude that high-tech sectors were the most aﬀected
100The indirect impact considers, for example, the impact of car exports on tire output growth.
Because car production indirectly demands tires, car export growth increases the production of tires.
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Table 5.4: Impact of exports on output growth (1995-2008)
Impact of exports growth Substitution of
Direct Indirect Total national inputs
Total 5.4% 5.2% 10.5% -8.2%
Agriculture and Mining 21.7% 13.0% 34.6% -16.3%
Manufacturing 9.7% 6.2% 15.9% -14.9%
Low Tech 7.8% 5.9% 13.7% -8.4%
Med/High Tech 13.5% 6.7% 20.2% -27.5%
Chemicals 2.7% 7.5% 10.1% -32.1%
Machinery 15.3% 4.6% 19.9% -13.6%
Electrical 8.8% 5.2% 14.0% -44.9%
Transport 27.4% 8.4% 35.8% -15.5%
Services 1.5% 3.9% 5.4% -3.9%
Authors' elaboration based on WIOD.
by the substitution. Between 1995 and 2008, the substitution of imported inputs for
national suppliers contributed negatively to agriculture and mining and to high-tech
sectors output growth by 16.3% and 27.5%, respectively. However, export growth had
a 36.4% contribution to agriculture and mining, whereas its contribution to high-tech
sectors was only 20.2%. Thus, although the direct impact of the substitution (not
considering exports) was negative for agriculture and mining, the net contribution of
this substitution process was negative only for high-tech sectors.
Analysing the high-tech sectors, some other relevant results can be seen from Table
3. The net results were negative for chemical products and electrical (low contribution
of exports to growth vis-à-vis high contribution of substitution of imports for domestic
suppliers). However, the results were positive for machinery and transport equipment.
Exports contributed 19.9% (15.3% directly and 4.6% indirectly) to the machinery
sector output growth, whereas the output decreased by 13.6% due to the substitution
of domestic inputs. The transport sector showed even better results. Exports increased
the output by 33.8% (27.4% directly and 8.4% indirectly), whereas the negative direct
impact of the substitution of national suppliers was only 15.5%.
These results bring an important issue to the debate on industrial policies. The
Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) provides many beneﬁts for national
producers of machinery and transport equipment, such as funding with very low in-
terest rates101 and certain beneﬁts to stimulate exports (especially for producers that
101Because Brazilian ﬁnancial markets provide funding with high interest rates, BNDES funding
with low interest rates is a key factor in the growth of these sectors.
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use domestic inputs). Furthermore, the two Brazilian industrial plans launched in
the 2000s (PITCE and PDP) focused on these sectors, providing many tax reductions
and other beneﬁts to promote exports102. Thus, although high-tech sectors were the
most aﬀected by the increase in imported inputs, within this group, those sectors that
Brazilian industrial policies have mainly focused on were the ones that took advantage
of the substitution process and received a positive net contribution.
5.5.3 Comparison between Brazil and other economies
The substitution of imported inputs for domestic suppliers has been an important
aspect of Brazilian output growth in the last two decades, especially in highly techno-
logical sectors. However, it is necessary to evaluate this process in comparison with
other economies to understand whether Brazil may be characterised as a special case
or, alternatively, whether it is merely following a worldwide trend.
The methodology developed in Section 4 was applied to four developing countries
(Brazil, China, India and Mexico) and to the three biggest developed countries (Ger-
many, Japan, and United States) and South Korea. The results for the developing
countries are presented in Table 5.5, and those for the developed countries in Table
5.6.
Table 5.5: Impact of exports and the substitution between imported and national
inputs on output (1995-2008), developing countries
Brazil China India Mexico
Subst. Exp. Subst. Exp. Subst. Exp. Subst. Exp.
Total -8.2% 10.5% -56.8% 202.1% -17.0% 40.4% -12.4% 31.4%
Agric./Mining -16.3% 34.6% -55.0% 62.4% -17.4% 16.1% -16.9% 19.8%
Manufacturing -14.9% 15.9% -72.4% 310.4% -27.6% 58.6% -25.2% 68.5%
Low Tech -8.4% 13.7% -35.3% 209.2% -26.8% 54.2% -13.7% 23.4%
Med/High Tech -27.5% 20.2% -149.7% 521.3% -29.4% 69.4% -42.8% 137.4%
Chemicals -32.1% 10.1% -104.0% 229.7% -38.9% 67.2% -37.2% 16.1%
Machinery -13.6% 19.9% -92.3% 329.4% -18.2% 49.1% -2.1% 83.3%
Electrical -44.9% 14.0% -294.1% 1031.6% -67.1% 165.3% -78.6% 286.1%
Transport -15.5% 35.8% -42.1% 346.0% -15.0% 51.5% -22.5% 117.8%
Services -3.9% 5.4% -34.9% 108.3% -6.7% 33.3% -2.9% 8.2%
Subst.: Impact of substitution of national inputs on output; Exp.: Impact of export growth on output.
Authors' elaboration based on WIOD.
Considering these four countries, it is possible to conclude that developing eco-
102For a brief review of these industrial plans and the BNDES policies for machinery and transport
equipment, see Magacho (2012).
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nomies have experienced a process of increasing imported inputs, which negatively
aﬀected almost every sector. China was the most aﬀected by this process (its output
was 56.8% lower due to the substitution for domestic suppliers), corroborating the
hypothesis that its industrial chains were strongly integrated into global supply chains
during the analysed period.
However, as previously suggested, the results were analysed considering also the
positive impacts of export growth. The data on China indicate that the contribution
of exports compensated for the decrease caused by the substitution of imports for
domestic inputs. Considering the economy as a whole, the net contribution was high.
The export growth increased the output by 202.1%, whereas the substitution of imports
decreased the output by 56.8%. The net contribution was relatively neutral only for
agriculture and mining. In these sectors, exports increased the output by 62.4%, but
the substitution for domestic inputs decreased the output by 55.0%.
Similar results were veriﬁed for the other developing countries, but at a lower
scale. The export growth in Mexico compensated for the negative contribution of the
substitution for domestic suppliers in all analysed sectors. In India, it happened in all
other sectors than agriculture and mining. In this sector, the export growth was not
enough to compensate for the negative impact of substitution for domestic suppliers.
Furthermore, although the substitution for domestic suppliers decreased the output
of high-tech sectors in Mexico and India by 42.8% and 26.8%, respectively, the net
impact was positive, in contrast to the results in these sectors in Brazil.
Thereby, Brazil and India were the only analysed countries in which some sectors
were aﬀected positively and others negatively by the substitution. Nevertheless, al-
though in India mining and agriculture were the negatively aﬀected sectors, in Brazil
the high-tech sectors were the ones that received a negative contribution from the net
impact of the substitution of imports for domestic inputs.
To complement this analysis, the contribution of exports and of the substitution
between imported inputs and national suppliers to the output growth of developed
countries is shown in Table 5.6.
The results for the developed countries show that the negative impact of the sub-
stitution of national suppliers was compensated for by the positive impact of export
growth. Although the diﬀerence between the positive and the negative impacts was
not substantial for the United States and Japan, it was very positive for Germany
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Table 5.6: Impact of exports and the substitution between imported and national
inputs on output (1995-2008)  developed countries
South Korea USA Japan Germany
Subst. Exp. Subst. Exp. Subst. Exp. Subst. Exp.
Total -4.1% 93.4% -5.4% 9.5% -3.9% 13.7% -7.0% 33.0%
Agric./Mining -69.9% 9.5% -44.8% 5.9% -61.5% 4.8% -31.1% 23.3%
Manufacturing 1.7% 172.4% -9.5% 19.8% -4.6% 30.8% -12.0% 63.3%
Low Tech -3.3% 56.3% -8.2% 9.0% -4.1% 13.1% -9.9% 43.2%
Med/High Tech 7.3% 305.1% -10.9% 33.0% -5.2% 51.6% -14.0% 84.0%
Chemicals 5.5% 116.5% -17.2% 16.0% -6.1% 20.0% -14.2% 70.8%
Machinery 2.1% 137.2% -10.5% 18.5% -2.7% 30.7% -9.3% 61.8%
Electrical 17.5% 584.7% -11.4% 66.6% -7.4% 76.3% -22.6% 111.5%
Transport -2.1% 175.8% -6.2% 21.0% -3.8% 57.9% -11.0% 90.1%
Services -3.8% 28.1% -2.4% 5.8% -1.7% 5.2% -3.7% 17.9%
Subst.: Impact of substitution of national inputs on output; Exp.: Impact of export growth on output.
Authors' elaboration based on WIOD.
and South Korea. The substitution of imported inputs impacted negatively on the
output of Germany by 7.0%, and the output of Korea by 4.1%. However, exports
increased the output by 33.0% and 93.4%, respectively, indicating that, similarly to
China, Germany and Korea strongly beneﬁted from the substitution.
Analysing the sectors separately yielded very similar results to those found in In-
dia. Only mining and agriculture did not present a positive net impact in all the
developed countries analysed. In all other sectors, especially the high-tech ones, ex-
ports impacted positively on output and compensated for the negative impact of the
growth in imported inputs.
5.6 Concluding remarks
This study analysed the sources of Brazilian growth during the 2000s in comparison
with other economies. The impacts of changes in countries' production structures and
in demand absorption were investigated through structural decomposition analysis
(SDA). Although this method has been widely applied to understanding the contribu-
tion of particular sources of demand to countries' growth patterns, these applications
have not considered the substitution between domestic suppliers and imports. Thus,
the SDA method is extended to provide a detailed investigation of the sources of na-
tional growth from a sectoral perspective because this substitution may have important
consequences for long-term economic growth.
The empirical investigation suggests that the substitution of imported for national
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inputs is a key factor in SDA, assuming that the impact of technological change is
underestimated if this substitution is not taken into account. Therefore, the extension
of SDA in this chapter is very relevant to analysing structural changes in countries'
production chains.
From the results presented in this chapter, it is possible to verify that production
is signiﬁcantly more fragmented in the late 2000s than in the early 1990s. All the
countries analysed presented the substitution of imported inputs for domestic suppliers,
and this fact was veriﬁed in almost every sector.
The substitution process, however, had positive impacts in many sectors in most of
the countries studied, despite having negative impacts in some cases. The net impact
for Brazil (considering also the impact of export growth in the sectoral output) was
positive for mining and agriculture but was negative for high-tech sectors, especially
for chemicals and electrical equipment. In the other countries analysed, only the
agriculture and mining sectors were negatively aﬀected, whereas positive impacts were
seen in all other sectors.
Thus, in Brazil, the potential for growth in demand to precipitate economic growth
has declined in the most technologically advanced sectors but has increased in agri-
culture and mining, whereas the exact opposite is true in the other countries studied.
Thereby, an important constraint to Brazil's long-term growth has emerged in the past
decades, assuming that high-tech sectors are the ones that present higher increasing
returns to scale, higher positive spillovers in production, and higher potential to boost
productivity growth.
Finally, our ﬁndings show that China, India, Korea, and Germany were the coun-
tries most positively aﬀected by the substitution. Although the substitution of imports
for domestic suppliers contributed negatively to economic growth, this eﬀect was sig-
niﬁcantly compensated for by the increase in exports in all sectors other than mining
and agriculture. The results suggest that these countries beneﬁted the most from the
integration of global supply chains, whereas Brazil's high-tech production sector was
not able to take advantage of the process.
The ﬁndings in this study have to be analysed while considering that the sectoral
structure of production and exports is relevant to explaining the long-term growth rates
of countries. Taking into account the ﬁndings of the previous chapter of this work,
which stressed the importance of high-tech and capital good industries for promoting
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sustainable growth rates through a cumulative causation process, we conclude that
Brazil's specialization in agriculture and mining contributes negatively to the country's
economic growth. On the other hand, the specialization of China and India in high-
tech activities is positive for these countries because it is important to reduce the
productivity gap with the most advanced economies.
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Chapter 6
Structural Decomposition of Vertical
Specialisation and Domestic Content
of Exports
6.1 Introduction
In recent decades, countries' structures of production and trade have been signiﬁc-
antly changing due to the increasing vertical specialisation of production processes. As
part of Global Value Chains (GVC), rather than exchanging ﬁnished goods produced
domestically, countries are increasingly trading intermediate inputs and specialising
production in speciﬁc tasks. The UNCTAD (2013) annual report has estimated that,
in the 2000s, value-added trade contributed almost one ﬁfth of developed countries'
GDP and almost one third of developing countries' GDP.
According to Hummels et al. (1998), three aspects characterise this process of
vertical specialisation: goods are produced in multiple sequential stages; two or more
countries specialise in producing some, but not all, stages; and at least one stage
crosses an international border more than once. Essentially, vertical specialisation is
the process in which a country uses imported inputs to produce goods it later exports.
There are many explanations for this process of fragmentation in the production
systems. Baldwin (2013), for example, argued that the information and communic-
ations technology (ICT) revolution made it possible to coordinate complex systems
of production at distance, and the vast wage diﬀerential between countries made it
proﬁtable for ﬁrms. Furthermore, the reduction of trade and communication costs
have increased the possibility of ﬁrms to specialise production in countries according
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to their comparative advantages.
There is little controversy about the positive impacts of engaging in vertical special-
isation from the perspective of ﬁrms. As stressed by many authors, such as Gereﬃ et
al. (2005), increasing fragmentation is an important source of competitiveness, as the
increasing trade costs are compensated by cost reductions and increasing specialisation
in their core activities. Thereby, they argue that multinational companies ﬁnd it ad-
vantageous to outsource an increasing share of their non-core activities domestically
and abroad. Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (2011), in the same line, argue that for ﬁrms
in developing countries integrating in GVC besides providing new markets for their
products plays a very important role in accessing knowledge and enhancing learning
activities.
When it comes to countries, however, fragmentation of production has a wide range
of positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, the beneﬁts for ﬁrms extends to
countries in the sense that cost reduction and specialisation in ﬁrm's core activit-
ies increases productivity, and hence countries' competitiveness in external markets.
Moreover, because integration into GVC increases countries' access to technologies de-
veloped abroad, the process of internalisation of knowledge is stimulated domestically.
On the other hand, fragmentation of production may cause many irreversible dam-
ages for countries' systems of innovation. Pisano and Shih (2009) argue that the US
has been losing their innovation potential once they are outsourcing industrial activ-
ities. By transferring activities to other countries, American companies have lost the
industrial commons (the collective operational capabilities that underpin new product
and process development in the industrial sector), and hence the US has lost the ca-
pacity to develop high-tech products and the expertise to produce the most advanced
technologies embodied in new products. Furthermore, according to Berger (2013) and
Lundvall (1992), proximity to systems of innovation, markets and suppliers is essential
to develop new technologies, once the interaction between producers and users is at
the root of the learning process. Thereby, critical strengths and capabilities that help
the development of new products and process have been lost, as industrial ecosystems
have disappeared.
Moreover, a critical aspect on the beneﬁts and costs of engaging in vertical special-
isation is related to sectoral specialisation. As discussed in the latter chapters, sectors
present diﬀerent potential to promote high and sustained growth rates in the long
term due to their speciﬁcities. The negative impact of outsourcing production in sec-
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tors that present high dynamic increasing returns to scale, for example, is greater than
outsourcing sectors that present constant returns to scale, once, in the former sectors,
technological progress is induced by output growth. Thereby, rather than discussing
beneﬁts and costs of engaging in vertical specialisation for the economy as a whole,
this chapter discusses to what extent the increase in sectoral vertical specialisation has
promoted an increase in countries' sectoral market share. Essentially, although ver-
tical specialisation has a negative eﬀect by reducing the domestic content of countries'
exports due to outsourcing, it has a positive eﬀect as countries' competitiveness in-
creases and it reﬂects in gains in world market share. The net impact of this process is
analysed in the level of productive chains through a structural decomposition analysis
of countries' vertical specialisation and domestic content of exports.
In order to proceed with this analysis, the impact of vertical specialisation and the
domestic content of exports is decomposed as twofold: (1) the impact of the increase
of imported inputs on the value added in production chains, and (2) the impact of
exports growth. The net impact is the diﬀerence between these impacts, and it can
be interpreted as the impact of production fragmentation on the capacity of sectoral
exports to increase the value added embodied in these exports. The net impacts for
each production chain is thus compared to other countries in order to evaluate what
are those sectoral chains that contributed the most for each country growth.
This chapter is divided into six sections besides this introduction. Section 2 dis-
cusses the process of trade liberalisation in developing countries during the 1990s and
2000s. The following section estimates degree of Vertical Specialisation (VS) based
on Hummels et al. (2001) for some developing and developed countries. In Section
4 this approach is extended by assuming Vertical Integrated Sectors (Pasinetti, 1973)
to obtain a measure of vertical specialisation by productive chains rather than for the
economy as a whole. Section 5 presents and discusses the methodology employed to
decompose the impact of fragmentation on the degree of vertical specialisation and the
domestic content of exports. Section 6 applies this methodology and presents the res-
ults for the same countries analysed before. Finally, in the last section, the concluding
remarks are presented.
6.2 Vertical Specialisation across countries
Hummels el al. (2001) deﬁne vertical specialisation as the increasing intercon-
nection of production processes in a vertical trade chain that stretches across many
countries, with each one specialising in particular stages of a good's production se-
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quence. This concept brings the notion that fragmentation of production process
is related to the increase of imported inputs in countries exports, and, as a direct
consequence, to the decrease of domestic content in their exports. With the aim of es-
timating to what extent this process has taken place in diﬀerent countries, the authors
use input-output matrices to measure the degree of Vertical Specialisation (VS).
The approach adopted by the authors focuses on a speciﬁc feature of this process:
imported intermediate goods are used to produce other goods, which are themselves
exported to another country. VS, in this sense, takes place once a good is produced
in two or more sequential stages in diﬀerent countries and this good (which can be a
ﬁnished or an intermediate good) is exported rather than consumed domestically.
Initially, the authors focused on the direct imported inputs, deﬁning the degree of
vertical specialisation as follow:
V Sk = ι
′AMfE (6.1)
where V S is vertical specialisation for country k, ι′ is the transposed column-
vector of ones, AM is the matrix of direct imported technical coeﬃcients, and fE is
the column-vector of exports by sector. VS is the total imported input content of
exports or, equivalently, foreign value-added embodied in exports. By dividing V Sk
by total exports, the V Sk share of exports is obtained, as follows:
V Sk share of exports = ι
′AMfE(ι′fE)−1 (6.2)
This result presents the degree of VS of a given country. However, it is only taking
into account direct imported inputs. Because domestic inputs also embody imported
inputs, VS has to be extended to consider direct and indirect imported inputs in order
to measure the total foreign value-added embodied in exports.
Deﬁning LM as the matrix of direct and indirect imported inputs, obtained through:
LM = AM(I − AD)−1 (6.3)
where I is the identity matrix and AD is the matrix of domestic technical coeﬃ-
cients, V Sk and V Sk share of exports can be re-written as follow:
V Sk = ι
′LMfE (6.4)
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and
V Sk share of exports = ι
′LMfE(ι′fE)−1 (6.5)
These changes are important to measure the degree of VS among countries by
considering the imported inputs used in the last stage of transformation and all the
intermediate goods embodied in the intermediate stages of production. Table 6.1
presents the result for the degree of VS for a group of selected countries for some years
between 1995 and 2008.
Table 6.1: Vertical Specialisation as a share of total exports (1995 USD prices)
1995 1999 2003 2008 ∆ 1995-2008
Brazil 7.9% 8.6% 9.5% 18.8% 10.9 p.p.
China 16.0% 17.7% 26.2% 38.2% 22.2 p.p.
India 10.5% 12.4% 14.3% 24.0% 13.5 p.p.
Mexico 26.2% 38.5% 42.6% 42.6% 16.4 p.p.
South Korea 24.2% 21.7% 20.6% 25.0% 0.9 p.p.
Germany 17.9% 19.1% 20.8% 25.2% 7.3 p.p.
Japan 6.5% 6.6% 7.2% 11.5% 5 p.p.
United States 10.3% 11.2% 10.7% 13.7% 3.5 p.p.
Simple average 14.9% 17.0% 19.0% 24.9% 10 p.p.
Authors' elaboration based on WIOD.
As can be seen from the table, developing countries' degree of VS has signiﬁcantly
increased during this period, indicating that their production is increasingly more
fragmented. China, India and Mexico presented the highest increase in the degree of
VS, ranging from an increase by 13.5 p.p. in the Indian case to 22.8 p.p. in China.
Moreover, the table shows that more advanced countries presented the lowest increase
in the degree of VS during this period. For some countries, such as South Korea and
Germany, it happened because the value was already high in 1995. In the case of
Japan and US, however, the degree of VS was low in 1995 and it has not increased
signiﬁcantly, resulting in a low level of fragmentation in 2008.
Furthermore, it is possible to see that China, Mexico, South Korea and Germany
have engaged more in this process than the others, and presented high values for VS in
2008. In the case of China and Mexico, the imported content of exports is greater than
35%, and in the case of South Korea and Germany it is around 25%. In contrast with
these economies, Brazil, Japan and the US present the lowest degree of fragmentation.
In Brazil, direct and indirect imported inputs represents 18.8% of exports, whilst in
Japan and the US, this value is lower than 15%.
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6.3 Diﬀerences in Vertical Specialisation among sec-
tors
The approach employed in the last section allowed us to evaluate to what extend
countries are increasingly engaging in fragmentation processes. However, such as dis-
cussed before, a very important issue to understanding the beneﬁts and costs of this
vertical specialisation process is its sectoral impacts. Because some sectors are more
important than others to promote high and sustained growth rates, the analysis of
fragmentation cannot be limited to the measure of the degree of VS for the economy
as a whole. It is crucial to measure VS in the sectoral level to provide a more detailed
assessment of the consequences of these fragmentation processes.
The notion of Vertically Integrated Sectors, developed by Pasinetti (1973), is em-
ployed here to analyse fragmentation processes sectorally. Essentially, rather than
considering sectoral output or value added as their production, in this approach, it is
assumed that the economy only produces ﬁnished goods, and intermediate goods used
in the process of production are components of these ﬁnished goods103. This notion is
important because rather than focusing on the goods themselves, the focus of analysis
moves towards production chains. In this sense, it is possible to analyse the direct
and indirect imported inputs embodied in each of these Vertically Integrated Sectors.
Thus, Sectoral VS can be written as:
V Ski = ι
′LM fˆEµi (6.6)
where fˆE is the diagonalised vector of exports in which the main diagonal is equal
to the vector of exports and the others elements are zero, and µi is a column-vector
in which the element(s) corresponding to the analysed sector(s) is(are) one and the
others are zero.
Analogously to the procedure adopted in (6.2) and (6.5), the sectoral degree of VS,
or the V Ski share of exports can be obtained by dividing the result of equation (6.6)
by the total exports of the analysed sector(s), as follows:
V Ski share of exports = ι
′LM fˆEµi(ι′fˆEµi)−1 (6.7)
Table 6.2 presents the results for developing countries for the starting year (1995)
103In the case of exports of intermediate goods, they are assumed as ﬁnished goods, once they will
not be subject to any process of transformation in the country under consideration after exported.
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and the last year under consideration (2008). For the economy as whole, as expected,
the results are the same as before, once µi is a column-vector of ones, and thus f
E =
fˆEµi. Nevertheless, the sectoral outcomes show that this analysis is very important.
They show that fragmentation of speciﬁc chains does not follow the same trend as the
whole economy, as well as that some chains are signiﬁcantly more integrated into GVC
than others.
Table 6.2: Sectoral VS as a share of exports (1995 USD prices), developing countries
Brazil China India Mexico
1995 2008 1995 2008 1995 2008 1995 2008
Total 7.9% 18.8% 16.0% 38.2% 10.5% 24.0% 26.2% 42.6%
Primary Sectors 5.7% 15.9% 7.1% 32.8% 3.2% 7.0% 5.6% 10.3%
Agriculture 4.3% 10.8% 5.8% 17.0% 2.7% 4.7% 8.5% 15.5%
Mining 7.9% 22.4% 9.3% 55.1% 5.8% 11.6% 4.5% 9.1%
Manufacturing 9.0% 22.5% 17.6% 39.4% 12.3% 29.8% 35.4% 49.2%
Low Tech 8.2% 19.0% 16.2% 26.9% 11.7% 34.1% 21.4% 31.8%
Med/High Tech 10.8% 28.0% 20.5% 45.7% 14.4% 21.5% 42.0% 53.2%
Chemicals 9.9% 31.0% 15.4% 55.2% 15.8% 26.9% 12.9% 21.9%
Machinery 9.3% 20.5% 14.9% 30.7% 15.4% 21.2% 30.7% 55.9%
Electrical 13.1% 37.0% 22.3% 49.9% 10.9% 17.7% 54.4% 61.1%
Transport 11.4% 27.0% 16.3% 28.1% 13.4% 20.7% 34.8% 42.2%
Services 4.0% 7.2% 9.8% 30.3% 6.3% 10.0% 7.5% 11.5%
Authors' elaboration based on WIOD.
The ﬁrst important result from this table is that the degree of vertical special-
isation has increased in every sector, indicating that the process of production frag-
mentation is generalised rather than speciﬁc to countries or sectors. However, some
sectors are signiﬁcantly more integrated into GVC than others. Manufacturing is the
most fragmented sector, with special regards to high-tech industries. Among develop-
ing countries, Brazil is the one whose manufacturing exports have the lowest share of
imported inputs. Although manufacturing VS share of exports in Brazil has increased
from 9.0% to 22.9%, this value is signiﬁcantly lower than for the other developing
economies. China and Mexico, on the other hand, present the highest degrees of VS
in manufacturing. In China, imported inputs accounted for 39.4% of exports in 2008,
while, in Mexico, they accounted for almost half of manufacturing exports.
The comparison between Brazil and India brings another important issue to the
debate on the importance of a sectoral approach. Whilst low-tech industries are those
with the highest degree of VS in India (in 2008, imported inputs accounted for 32.9%
of exports), in Brazil, high-tech industries are those with the highest degree of frag-
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mentation, with special regards to chemicals and electrical. In the case of chemicals,
the Brazilian degree of VS is greater than India and Mexico, and it has increased by
21.1 p.p. between 1995 and 2008. Moreover, relatively to other countries, transport
equipment industry is also very fragmented in Brazil. The degree of VS in this in-
dustry is similar to China and signiﬁcantly greater than the India's transport industry.
Thereby, it is clear that even though the Brazilian manufacturing is not as integrated
in GVC as other developing countries, it is a speciﬁc characteristic of low-tech manu-
facturing, once high-tech industries present degrees of VS similar to Mexico and India
and, in transport equipment, similar to China.
Finally, by analysing primary sectors, the outcomes are, again, signiﬁcantly diﬀer-
ent from the ﬁnding for the economy as a whole. Although the fragmentation in these
sectors is lower than the total for every country, in Brazil and China, mining presents
a relatively high degree of VS. In India and Mexico, the share of imported inputs in
mining is 11.6% and 9.1%, respectively, whilst in Brazil, it is 22.4%, and, in China,
55.1%.
Comparing these ﬁndings for developing countries with more advanced economies,
many other important results can be obtained. Table 6.3 presents the sectoral VS as a
share of exports for developed countries. In contrast to the results obtained for devel-
oping economies, in all developed countries, low-tech industries are more fragmented
than high-tech industries. In Korea, where the production is the most fragmented
among developed economies, low-tech exports embodied 64.7% of imported inputs
in 2008, whilst high-tech industries embodied only 20.0%. In the other developed
countries, despite lower diﬀerences, the trend is the same: in contrast to developing
countries, in Germany, Japan and the US, the share of imported inputs embodied in
high-tech exports is lower than in low-tech exports.
Furthermore, in all these four countries, the increase in fragmentation was lower
than it was for developing economies, with special regards to high-tech industries.
Between 1995 and 2008, the degree of VS in high-tech industries has increased by 7.8
p.p. in Germany, by 3.3 p.p. in Japan, and only by 0.5 p.p. in the U.S. In the Korean
case, there were a reduction of the degree of VS in high-tech activities from 26.2% to
20.0%, led by the electrical sector: the imported inputs embodied in Korean electrical
exports has dropped from 28.1% to 15.0%.
From these results, it is possible to conclude that focusing only on the ﬁndings for
the economy as a whole is not enough to analyse the fragmentation process that took
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Table 6.3: Sectoral VS as a share of exports (1995 USD prices), developed countries
South Korea Germany Japan United States
1995 2008 1995 2008 1995 2008 1995 2008
Total 24.2% 25.0% 17.9% 25.2% 6.5% 11.5% 10.3% 13.7%
Primary Sectors 9.5% 11.6% 10.9% 15.3% 13.1% 28.2% 6.9% 15.6%
Agriculture 9.6% 12.3% 11.3% 15.2% 5.2% 7.2% 7.2% 13.0%
Mining 9.2% 16.8% 10.3% 16.0% 16.1% 38.3% 6.1% 28.4%
Manufacturing 27.1% 25.1% 19.2% 27.7% 6.9% 12.2% 14.1% 17.8%
Low Tech 28.6% 64.7% 19.1% 29.3% 8.7% 25.0% 11.9% 25.8%
Med/High Tech 26.2% 20.0% 19.2% 27.0% 6.5% 9.8% 15.1% 15.6%
Chemicals 27.0% 42.3% 17.7% 24.5% 6.9% 19.2% 11.7% 25.8%
Machinery 24.0% 26.4% 17.0% 27.3% 6.3% 9.8% 12.9% 21.1%
Electrical 28.1% 15.0% 19.0% 22.4% 6.9% 7.5% 15.8% 8.6%
Transport 22.1% 30.5% 22.2% 32.6% 5.8% 11.4% 17.5% 23.4%
Services 12.1% 24.4% 7.3% 10.1% 4.3% 6.6% 3.3% 5.9%
Authors' elaboration based on WIOD.
place in recent decades. Although there is a general trend for increasing vertical spe-
cialisation as countries has become more integrated into GVC, a sectoral perspective
shows that some industrial chains were more aﬀected than others, and this outcome
varies signiﬁcantly according to countries' stages of development. Whereas fragment-
ation is very important for high-tech industries in developing countries, in advanced
economies, it was a process veriﬁed specially in low-tech sectors. Moreover, integration
into GVC was seen to be more generalised process for some countries, such as in China
and Mexico, whilst in others, it is speciﬁc in some sectors, such as in the Brazilian
mining and high-tech industries, in the Indian high-tech industries and in the Korean
low-tech industries.
6.4 Decomposition of the net impact of fragmenta-
tion
By analysing only the degree of VS it is not possible to evaluate the importance of
the fragmentation process to boost economic growth. On the one hand, an increase of
VS impacts directly on the value added embodied in exports by decreasing the domestic
content of exports, once the share of foreign value added increases. On the other hand,
production fragmentation can boost sectoral exports as countries are integrated into
GVC, and hence it can increase the market share of this economy. Thereby, to analyse
the impact of these changes in the structure of production and trade it is necessary to
take into account the net impact of the increase in VS.
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Moreover, such as discussed before, the beneﬁts and costs of losing linkages and
industrial commons due to outsourcing depends signiﬁcantly on the sector this in which
process is taking place. Because sectors have diﬀerent potential to promote growth
in the long term, the analysis of whether fragmentation brings beneﬁts or costs for
high and sustained economic growth, besides considering the net impact of VS, must
consider this impact sectorally.
In order to measure the net impact of the process of integration into GVC from
a sectoral perspective, changes in the V Ski are decomposed into the impact of ex-
ports growth and the impact of changes in the imported inputs coeﬃcients through
a Structural Decomposition Analysis (SDA)104. Changes in the V Ski from period t=0
to period t=1 is given by:
∆V Ski = V S
1
ki − V S0ki (6.8)
where the superscripts stands for the period under consideration.
Based on equation (6.6), and deﬁning LM1 = LM0 + ∆LM , and ˆfE1 = ˆfE0 + ∆fˆE,
changes in VS can be expressed through the SDA average approach105 method as:
∆V Ski =
1
2
ι′(∆LM)( ˆfE0 + ˆfE1)µi +
1
2
ι′(LM0 + LM1)(∆fˆE)µi (6.9)
The ﬁrst component of equation (6.9) measures the direct and indirect impact
of changes in the matrix of imported inputs on the foreign value added embodied in
exports in absolute terms, whilst the term on the right side measures the impact of the
increase in exports also in absolute terms. Thereby, an increase in the fragmentation of
production (given exports) positively aﬀects the term on the left side, and an increase
in exports (given the degree of VS) positively aﬀects the term on the right side.
Equation (6.9) measures the direct impact of vertical specialisation and impact of
exports growth in imported inputs. However, because this chapter is focused on the
impacts on the domestic value added embodied in exports, rather than analysing the
growth of imported inputs, the domestic content of exports (DCE) is considered. Ana-
logously to the procedure adopted to estimate it in equation (6.9), following Castillo
and de Vries (2014), the impacts of production fragmentation in the DCE can be
measured by considering that:
104See Miller and Blair (2005) for details about this approach.
105According to Dietzenbacher and Los (1998), this approach is a preferable method for SDA.
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DCEki = ι
′fˆEµi − V Ski (6.10)
This equation shows that exports growth increases the domestic content of exports,
but this impact is reduced due to the direct impact vertical specialisation, or, in other
words, due to the increase of imported inputs embodied in exports.
Deﬁning changes in DCEki as:
∆DCEki = DCE
1
ki −DCE0ki (6.11)
and replacing equations (6.6) and (6.10) in equation (6.11), the growth in the DCE
can be written as a function of the matrix of direct and indirect imported inputs and
the vector of exports, as follows:
∆DCEki = ι
′(I − LM1) ˆfE1µi − ι′(I − LM0) ˆfE0µi (6.12)
Proceeding with the average method for the SDA, the growth in the domestic con-
tent of exports can be divided into two components: (i) the direct impact of increasing
vertical specialisation, which negatively aﬀects the domestic value added embodied in
exports, and (ii) the impact of exports growth, which aﬀects value added positively:
∆DCEki =
1
2
ι′(−∆LM)( ˆfE0 + ˆfE1µi︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i)
+
1
2
ι′(2I − LM0 − LM1)(∆fˆE)µi︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii)
(6.13)
Equation (6.13) divides the changes in the DCE into the direct impact of production
fragmentation, presented by the term on the left side, and its indirect impact, on the
right side, if one assumes that all increase in exports is due to increasing in VS.
However, due to many factors, countries' exports tend to grow independently of this
fragmentation process. Thereby, in order to measure the net impact of this process,
it is more appropriate to compare the direct negative impacts of the increase of VS in
the domestic value added embodied in exports with the impact of the growth in the
market share of the sector under consideration. Essentially, by doing this, it is assumed
that the fragmentation of production has two impacts on the value added embodied
in exports. Firstly, one negative, which is due to the substitution of domestic content
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for imported inputs, and, secondly, one positive, which is the impact of the increase
in the market share of the sector in world exports.
In order to proceed with this analysis, sector i's export growth is divided into two
components: the impact of world exports and the impact of the growth in the world
market share:
∆fEi = ∆Z
E
i
MSE0i +MS
E1
i
2
+ ∆MSEi
ZE0i + Z
E1
i
2
(6.14)
where ZEi is sector i's world exports, and MS
E
i is sector i's market share in world
exports. The term on the left side measures the impact of the increase in sectoral
world exports on countries' export growth and the term on the right measures the
impact of countries' growth in the world market share on its export growth.
Replacing equation (6.14) in equations (6.9) and (6.13), we are ﬁnally able to
measure the net impact of VS on productive chains, as follow:
∆V Ski =
1
2
ι′(∆LM)( ˆfE0 + ˆfE1)µi︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i)
+
1
4
ι′(LM0 + LM1)∆ZˆE( ˆMSE0 + ˆMSE1)µi︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii)
+
+
1
4
ι′(LM0 + LM1)∆ ˆMSE( ˆZE0 + ˆZE1)µi︸ ︷︷ ︸
(iii)
(6.15)
and
∆DCEki =
1
2
ι′(−∆LM)( ˆfE0 + ˆfE1)µi︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i)
+
1
4
ι′(2I − LM0 − LM1)∆ZˆE( ˆMSE0 + ˆMSE1)µi︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii)
+
+
1
4
ι′(2I − LM0 − LM1)∆ ˆMSE( ˆZE0 + ˆZE1)µi︸ ︷︷ ︸
(iii)
(6.16)
The ﬁrst component of equations (6.15) and (6.16), (i), such as discussed before,
measures the direct impact of VS in the foreign and domestic value added embodied in
sectoral exports. If fragmentation of production is increasing, this value will be positive
in (6.15) and negative in (6.16), once imported inputs are increasing to the detriment
of domestic content. The second component, (ii), measures the impact of the growth
in world exports in the sectoral foreign and domestic value added in exports. This
168
component is considered to be autonomous and independent of the increase in the
degree of VS. Finally, the third component, (iii), is the impact of the growth in the
market share of the sector under consideration, and it measures the positive impact
of production fragmentation. The rationale behind this assumption is that although
fragmentation of production decreases the domestic content of exports because it is
replaced by imported inputs, VS increases the competitiveness of the sector in external
markets, promoting gains in the market share, which, in turn, increases both the foreign
and domestic value added in exports. Thereby, to analyse the net impact of countries'
integration in GVC, one should compare the direct negative impact on DCE provided
by the ﬁrst component of equation (6.16) and the indirect positive impact provided
by the last component of this equation.
Finally, because these results present the impact of VS in absolute terms, it is inad-
equate to compare countries and sectors. In order to make these impacts comparable,
it is necessary to consider these impacts relatively to exports. Deﬁning ∆%V Ski and
∆%DCEki as the change in VS and DCE as a share of sectoral exports, the impact of
fragmentation on these variables can be written as:
∆%V Ski =
ι′(∆LM)( ˆfE0 + ˆfE1)µi
ι′( ˆfE0 + ˆfE1)µi︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i)
+
ι′(LM0 + LM1)∆ZˆE( ˆMSE0 + ˆMSE1)µi
2ι′( ˆfE0 + ˆfE1)µi︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii)
+
+
ι′(LM0 + LM1)∆ ˆMSE( ˆZE0 + ˆZE1)µi
2ι′( ˆfE0 + ˆfE1)µi︸ ︷︷ ︸
(iii)
(6.17)
and
∆DCEki =
ι′(−∆LM)( ˆfE0 + ˆfE1)µi
ι′( ˆfE0 + ˆfE1)µi︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i)
+
ι′(2I − LM0 − LM1)∆ZˆE( ˆMSE0 + ˆMSE1)µi
2ι′( ˆfE0 + ˆfE1)µi︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii)
+
+
ι′(2I − LM0 − LM1)∆ ˆMSE( ˆZE0 + ˆZE1)µi
2ι′( ˆfE0 + ˆfE1)µi︸ ︷︷ ︸
(iii)
(6.18)
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6.5 Empirical results: the net impacts of fragmenta-
tion
Using the same database method to deﬂate data and aggregation used in Section
6.2, the impact of fragmentation of production is analysed for some developing and
developed economies between 1995 and 2008 through equations (6.17) and (6.18).
6.5.1 Results for the overall economy
Table 6.4 presents the results for the overall economy. It shows that the net
impacts of integration in GVC varies signiﬁcantly across countries. The ﬁrst three
columns present the structural decomposition of VS and, the last three, the structural
decomposition of DCE. The ﬁrst and forth columns present the impact of changes in
imported inputs coeﬃcients, the second and the ﬁfth, the impact of exports growth in
the world market share, and, the third and sixth, the impact of world exports growth.
Table 6.4: Structural Decomposition of VS and DCE, 1995-2008 (1995 USD prices)
Vertical Specialisation Domestic Content of Exports
Imp. MS WLD Imp. MS WLD
Brazil 2.7% -0.4% 2.9% -2.7% -1.0% 17.3%
China 5.0% 6.7% 5.2% -5.0% 17.1% 12.7%
India 3.1% 2.7% 3.1% -3.1% 11.5% 14.7%
Mexico 1.9% 0.4% 9.2% -1.9% -4.1% 16.0%
South Korea 0.0% 2.6% 5.7% 0.0% 8.1% 16.3%
Germany 1.9% -0.4% 4.8% -1.9% -1.0% 17.5%
Japan 1.3% -0.6% 2.3% -1.3% -4.9% 22.9%
United States 0.9% -1.3% 3.2% -0.9% -7.7% 22.1%
Simple average 2.1% 1.2% 4.6% -2.1% 2.2% 17.4%
Imp.: Impact of changes in imported inputs coeﬃcients; MS: Impact of exports growth in
the world market share; WLD: Impact of world exports growth.
Authors' elaboration based on WIOD.
In every analysed country, the direct impact of changes in imported inputs is pos-
itive for VS and negative for DCE. This result could be expected once fragmentation
of production has increased in all these economies, such as presented in Section 6.2.
In China, where the increase in fragmentation was the greatest, the increase of impor-
ted inputs has increased the foreign value added of exports as a share of exports by
5.0%, while it has decreased the domestic value added of exports by the same amount.
In contrast to China, in South Korea and the US, the impact of this fragmentation
process was less signiﬁcant: in the US, fragmentation has increased imported inputs
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embodied in exports by 0.9%, whilst in South Korea, where the degree of VS virtually
remained unchanged, the impact of fragmentation was neutral.
However, focusing only on the direct impact of fragmentation (ﬁrst and forth
columns) can lead to a false recognition that fragmentation is certainly a process
that increases imported inputs and decreases the domestic content of exports. If one
considers that growth in the world market share is, to some extent, an indirect eﬀect of
this fragmentation process, diﬀerent results can be observed. In China and India, for
example, the impact of the growth of market share on the DCE has compensated for
the negative impact of the increase in imported inputs due to production fragment-
ation. In China, the growth in the market share increased the domestic content of
exports by 17.1%, and thus the net impact of fragmentation on the DCE was 12.1%.
In India, although fragmentation has negatively aﬀected the DCE by 3.1%, this im-
pact was compensated for a growth in the world market share, which has increased
the value added embodied in Indian exports by 11.5%.
Among the more advanced countries, South Korea was the only economy where the
net impact was positive. In South Korea, because the degree of VS has not changed
signiﬁcantly, fragmentation has a neutral direct impact. However, the growth in market
share has positively aﬀected the value added embodied in exports, increasing it by
8.1%. In the other developed countries, as well as in Mexico and Brazil, the increase
in the market share has not compensated for the negative impact of the growth in
imported inputs. In these countries, the market share in world exports has reduced
and thus the net beneﬁts of increasing fragmentation was negative. In Mexico, Japan
and the US, the decrease of market share has signiﬁcantly aﬀected the domestic value
added embodied in exports, decreasing it by more than 4.0%, whereas the negative
impact in Brazil and Germany was less signiﬁcant (1.0% in both cases).
6.5.2 Results for the sectoral chains
The analysis for the overall economy is important once it shows to what extent
the fragmentation process has been aﬀecting their value added embodied in exports,
and hence countries' GDP. However, as stressed before, the beneﬁts and costs of frag-
mentation varies signiﬁcantly among sectors, once they have diﬀerent capabilities to
promote high and sustained growth rates. Thereby, the analysis of the impact of pro-
duction fragmentation on countries' value added embodied in exports must consider a
sectoral approach.
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Table 6.5 presents the impact of the increase in imported inputs and the impact of
the growth in world market share for developing countries sectorally. The net impact
of the fragmentation process on the domestic content of exports (the sum of the direct
impact of decreasing value added due to the substitution for imported inputs and the
impact of the increase in the world market share) varies signiﬁcantly among countries,
such as stressed before, but it varies mainly across sectors in the same country.
Table 6.5: Decomposition of DCE, 1995-2008 (1995 USD prices), developing countries
Brazil China India Mexico
Imp. MS Imp. MS Imp. MS Imp. MS
Total -2.7% -1.0% -5.0% 17.1% -3.1% 11.5% -1.9% -4.1%
Primary Sectors -2.5% 6.2% -6.2% -17.5% -0.8% 3.8% -1.3% -17.1%
Agriculture -1.6% 11.1% -2.8% -12.9% -0.5% 3.9% -1.7% -9.8%
Mining -3.6% -0.4% -11.5% -24.5% -1.5% 3.5% -1.1% -19.1%
Manufacturing -3.2% -3.0% -5.0% 17.1% -3.9% 10.1% -2.1% 0.3%
Low Tech -2.5% -3.8% -2.6% 15.8% -4.8% 8.0% -2.6% -4.4%
Med/High Tech -4.3% -1.7% -6.3% 17.8% -2.0% 14.7% -1.9% 1.6%
Chemicals -5.3% -14.3% -10.0% 17.7% -2.8% 7.9% -2.3% -13.7%
Machinery -2.8% -1.7% -4.0% 24.2% -1.5% 14.6% -6.3% 2.6%
Electrical -6.0% -10.2% -6.9% 15.8% -1.7% 16.3% -1.7% 1.6%
Transport -3.9% 6.2% -2.9% 24.7% -1.8% 21.0% -1.8% 3.3%
Services -0.8% -0.1% -4.9% 20.2% -0.9% 19.0% -1.1% -22.1%
Imp.: Impact of changes in imported inputs coeﬃcients; MS: Impact of exports growth in the world
market share.
Authors' elaboration based on WIOD.
Although the direct impact negative of increasing vertical specialisation on the do-
mestic value added embodied in exports is generalised for all countries and all sectors,
it was more signiﬁcant for some sectors than for others. In China, for example, the
negative impact on the high-tech industries was signiﬁcantly greater than it was in the
low-tech industries. However, the growth in the market share in the most technolo-
gically advanced sectors has compensated more signiﬁcantly for this negative impact,
with special regards to machinery and transport. In high-tech manufacturing sec-
tors, although fragmentation has reduced the DCE as a share of exports by 6.3%, the
growth in the market has contributed for an increase of 17.8%, providing a net impact
of 11.5%. Chinese primary sectors, on the other hand, have become more fragmented,
but it was not compensated for by an increase in the market share. The increase
in imported inputs has negatively impacted the Chinese domestic content of primary
exports by 4.2%. However, Chinese market share in world exports has decreased, and
hence the net impact of fragmentation was negative for primary sectors.
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Value added embodied in Brazilian manufacturing exports was negatively impacted
by the increase in fragmentation, but, in contrast to China, it was not compensated for
by the increase in the market share. In primary sectors, on the other hand, although
the direct impact of fragmentation has reduced the DCE, an increase in the market
share, in which agriculture plays a prominent role, has a signiﬁcant impact, and hence
the net impact was positive. The growth of the degree of VS in primary sectors,
which increased from 5.7% to 15.9% between 1995 and 2008 (as presented in Section
6.3), negatively impacted the domestic value added embodied in exports by 2.5%.
However, Brazil has increased its market share in world exports in primary sectors,
and, once the DCE increased by 6.2%, the net impact was positive. Moreover, although
the net impact of VS in Brazilian high-tech industries was negative, not all high-tech
sectors follow the same pattern. In transport, fragmentation of production has directly
impacted by reducing the DCE by 3.9%. However, the growth in the market share of
world exports has compensated for this negative impact, increasing the domestic value
added by 6.2%, and hence guaranteeing a positive net impact in this industry.
The results for India are very similar to those found for China. In manufacturing
sectors, the loss of DCE due to the direct impact of fragmentation was compensated
for by the positive impacts of growth in the market share in both high-tech and low-
tech industries. The main diﬀerence between China and India is that the net impact of
fragmentation on Indian value added embodied in exports was positive also in primary
sectors, whilst it was negative in China. Fragmentation has reduced Indian domestic
content of primary sectors exports by 0.8%, but the increase in world market share
has aﬀected it positively, increasing the DCE by 3.8%.
Finally, in the case of Mexico fragmentation has aﬀected negatively both low-tech
and high-tech manufacturing, as well as primary sectors. Although the market share
of high-tech exports has increased, it was not enough to compensate for the direct
negative impact of production fragmentation on the domestic value added embodied
in exports. Only in transport has the increase of market share compensated for the
negative impacts of fragmentation. The diﬀerence between the negative impact in
primary sectors, low-tech industries and high-tech industries, however, shows that
although negatively aﬀected by this process, primary sectors were the most damaged
sectors, whereas high-tech industries relatively beneﬁted from this process.
The analysis of the results for developed countries, presented in Table 6.6, reinforces
the importance of analysing the impact of countries' integration in GVC sectorally,
once the net impact of fragmentation varies signiﬁcantly among sectors. Even though
173
the analysis of the aggregate economy showed that South Korea was the only developed
country that beneﬁted from this process of fragmentation, the sectoral analysis shows
that low-tech manufacturing industries in Germany has increased the market share,
as well as services and agriculture. Moreover, in the case of agriculture and services,
the growth in world market share was enough to compensate for the negative impacts
of fragmentation.
Table 6.6: Decomposition of DCE, 1995-2008 (1995 USD prices), developed countries
South Korea Germany Japan United States
Imp. MS Imp. MS Imp. MS Imp. MS
Total 0.0% 8.1% -1.9% -1.0% -1.3% -4.9% -0.9% -7.7%
Primary Sectors -0.7% -35.7% -1.1% -4.3% -4.0% -5.6% -2.3% -15.9%
Agriculture -0.7% -29.8% -1.0% 6.2% -0.5% 9.2% -1.4% -7.3%
Mining -1.9% ..* -1.4% -42.7% -5.5% -12.2% -5.6% -47.1%
Manufacturing 0.4% 9.5% -2.1% -1.7% -1.4% -4.2% -1.0% -7.3%
Low Tech -6.0% -7.1% -2.5% 0.7% -3.9% -6.2% -3.1% -8.9%
Med/High Tech 1.6% 12.5% -1.9% -2.8% -0.9% -3.8% -0.2% -6.8%
Chemicals -3.8% 4.7% -1.7% -2.2% -3.1% -8.9% -3.5% -9.8%
Machinery -0.6% 12.3% -2.6% -3.1% -0.9% -3.3% -2.0% -8.8%
Electrical 3.3% 13.4% -0.9% -6.1% -0.1% -6.1% 1.8% -6.1%
Transport -2.1% 12.3% -2.6% -0.2% -1.4% 0.7% -1.5% -5.4%
Services -3.1% -3.4% -0.7% 4.7% -0.7% -9.5% -0.7% -7.6%
(*) Korean mining exports were negative in 1995. Thus, the impact cannot be computed.
Imp.: Impact of changes in imported inputs coeﬃcients; MS: Impact of exports growth in the world
market share.
Authors' elaboration based on WIOD.
In the US and Japan, the same result found for the aggregate was found in the
sectoral chains. In all sectors, the negative impact of fragmentation has not been
compensated for by the increase of market share. The intensity of the negative impact,
however, varies among sectors. The net impact was higher in primary sectors than
manufacturing in both countries, and, inside manufacturing, low-tech industries were
aﬀected the most. In high-tech industries, the negative impact of fragmentation was
not as signiﬁcant as in industries with low technologic intensity, and the impact of
the loss of market share was also less relevant. The Transport industry in Japan was
an exception in this trend. Despite not being suﬃciently high to compensate for the
direct negative impact of fragmentation, this industry has gained market share and it
has impacted positively by 0.7% in the domestic value added embodied in Japanese
exports.
In South Korea, although results for the aggregate economy are positive in net
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terms, in some sectors the impact was signiﬁcantly negative, whilst in other sectors it
was very positive. Primary sectors were the most negatively aﬀected: fragmentation
has reduced the domestic content of primary sectors exports by 0.7%, and the loss
of market share has reduced it by 35.7%. The net impact on low-tech industries was
negative as well, with the outsourcing process decreasing the DCE by 6.8% and the loss
of market share by 5.7%. The Korean high-tech industries, on the other hand, have
been positively aﬀected in net terms. Although the direct impact of fragmentation
has decreased domestic value added embodied in chemicals, machinery and transport
exports by 3.8%, 0.6% and 2.1%, respectively, the gain in world market share has
increased the DCE of these industries by 4.7%, 12.3% and 12.3%, respectively. In
electrical, both the direct and indirect impacts were positive because the degree of VS
has decreased and the market share has increased. Thereby, looking for productive
chains rather than for the aggregate can bring us important conclusions about this
process of fragmentation, showing that this impact is far from being homogeneous
among sectors.
6.6 Concluding remarks
In recent decades, countries' productive chains have become more integrated in-
ternationally and, therefore, more fragmented domestically. From the perspective of
ﬁrms, this process is usually seen as positive, once fragmentation has increased their
competitiveness by reducing costs and increasing the possibility for an interchange of
knowledge and technologies, especially for ﬁrms in developing countries. Nevertheless,
the beneﬁts for countries is much more controversial: although these beneﬁts for ﬁrms
can be extended for countries, many authors, such as Pisano and Shih (2009) and
Berger (2013), have argued that the critical strengths and capabilities that help the
development of new products and process have been lost due to this outsourcing pro-
cess. Moreover, such as discussed in the latter chapters, especially regarding high-tech
and capital good products, technological change is induced by production, and hence
outsourcing may damage countries' potential to innovate if it is not compensated for
an increase in competitiveness. Thereby, a sectoral analysis of this fragmentation pro-
cesses is necessary to understand its consequences for countries' growth in the long
term.
This chapter showed that, despite being a generalised process, vertical specialisa-
tion of production varies signiﬁcantly among sectors and countries. In some countries,
such as China, Mexico and India, fragmentation was more generalised, aﬀecting all
sectors and industries. In contrast to these countries, in South Korea, Japan and in
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the US, this process was much more intense in low-tech manufacturing and primary
sectors than in high-tech industries, showing that the increase in the foreign value
added as a share of exports was not homogeneous among countries and sectors.
The analysis of the impact of fragmentation, however, went further than the direct
impact of replacing domestic for foreign value added in exports. Once it is expected
that countries that have engaged in integration in GVC might beneﬁt from increasing
competitiveness, and hence from gains in the world market share, the positive impact
of fragmentation on the DCE was compared to the negative impact. By analysing
the net impact of this process, results are very diﬀerent across countries. In China,
India and South Korea, the impact of the increase in the world market share in the
value added embodied in exports has compensated for the direct negative impact of
fragmentation. However, in the other countries, with especial regards to the US, Japan
and Mexico, the growth in the market share was unable to compensate for the negative
impact of vertical specialisation on the DCE.
Nevertheless, a sectoral analysis of this process shows that production fragment-
ation has a heterogeneous impact on the domestic value added in exports among
countries. In China and South Korea, for example, the most beneﬁted industries were
those classiﬁed as high-tech industries (especially Machinery and Transport Equip-
ment), whilst value added in primary sectors exports was negatively aﬀected by out-
sourcing. In Mexico, for all industries but Electrical and Transport Equipment, the
growth in the market share was unable to compensate for the negative impact of frag-
mentation, as well as in Brazil for all sectors except for Agriculture and Transport
Equipment. The only country that has beneﬁted from this process in all sectors was
India, although in high-tech industries the beneﬁt was signiﬁcantly lower than it was
in China.
Considering the ﬁndings of the latter chapters, which has showed that specialisa-
tion in high-tech and capital goods industries is an important source of cumulative
causation, these results shows that some countries, such as Japan, the U.S. and Mex-
ico, are not beneﬁting from this process once the DCE is decreasing in every sector.
Moreover, the sectoral analysis shows that although Brazil has engaged in a process
of integration into GVC, it is not taking the beneﬁts of this. The sectors where the
positive impact of an increase of the market share has compensated for the direct neg-
ative impacts of fragmentation in Brazilian DCE are those that do not have potential
to guarantee high growth rates in the long term. On the other hand, Chinese, Indian
and South Korean high-tech industries were the most beneﬁted industries from this
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fragmentation process, and, once these industries have the highest potential to pro-
mote high and sustained growth rates, these countries are beneﬁting the most from
this process of integration into GVC.
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Conclusion
Based on the Kaldorian approach, which stresses the importance of the interaction
between demand and supply to explain why countries' growth rates diverge in the
long run, this thesis expounds theoretical and empirical evidence that the sectoral
structure of production and international trade is a crucial aspect to understanding
countries' growth patterns. In the supply-side, once dynamic increasing returns to scale
diverge among sectors, productivity growth depends on the sectoral specialisation of
production. Nevertheless, because growth is ultimately determined by the growth of
demand, with special regard to the dynamics of international trade, countries' long-
term growth rates diverge due to the sectoral composition of their exports and imports.
In this work, a reconciliation of these two statements is presented to explain how
a cumulative causation process of increasing growth rates depends on the sectoral
structure of production and trade.
The ﬁrst chapter provided the theoretical basis of the approach adopted. It ar-
gued that although Kaldor stressed the importance of sectoral dynamics to explain
cumulative causation in open economies, Kaldorian models did not incorporate it com-
pletely, and hence they are unable to provide a systematisation of the importance of
sectoral specialisation. Some models show how cumulative causation takes place con-
sidering balance-of-payments constraints, but not in multisectoral framework. Other
Kaldorian models show how cumulative causation take place in a multisectoral frame-
work through the interaction between scale economies and income elasticities, but they
ignore balance-of-payments constraints and their importance as ultimately determin-
ant of countries' growth in the long run. Finally, a third group considers balance-
of-payments constraints in a multisectoral framework, but cumulative causation does
not arise from sectoral specialisation once technological progress is not endogenous to
output growth. In this vein, this chapter advocated for the need for a dynamic model
that shows how a cumulative causation takes place in a multisectoral framework for an
open economy  which is balance-of-payments constrained in the long term  in order
to identify what sectors are capable of promoting the highest growth rates in the long
run.
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Chapter 2 expands the BPCG models to a multisectoral and multilateral framework
in order to evaluate whether the high growth rates experienced by natural-resource
exporters' in the 2000s were sustainable in the long term. Due to developing coun-
tries' growth acceleration in the 1990s and 2000s, the structure of world demand has
changed and the demand for natural-resource-based products has increased relatively
faster. Consequently, countries that export predominantly these products, such as
South American economies, have experienced an increase in their BPCG rate. Nev-
ertheless, this chapter also shows that capital goods and high-tech manufacturing
products present the highest income elasticities of demand for exports and imports,
and thus countries must increase the share of exports of these products (and reduce the
share of imports) to increase their weighted income elasticity ratio and, consequently,
their long-term growth rates.
The following chapter estimates the degree of dynamic increasing returns to scale of
individual industries according to countries' income per capita to understand to what
extent productivity is induced by output growth. Because the beneﬁts provided by
increasing in production varies among industries according to countries' stage of devel-
opment due to many factors, such as the supply of skilled labour and the existence of
a complex system of innovation, it was expected that the degree of increasing returns
was not homogenous among countries. Indeed, the results show that the production
of consumption goods and low-tech manufacturing, such as Textiles, present a relat-
ively high degree of increasing returns for low-income countries, but constant returns
to scale for high-income countries. On the other hand, production in capital goods
and high-tech industries present relatively low degree of increasing returns for low-
income countries, but it rises as countries' income per capita increases. Thereby, for
middle- and high-income countries, productivity growth depends on the specialisation
of production in the most technologically advanced sectors.
Chapter 4 is dedicated to developing a sectoral model that combines the explan-
ation for productivity growth, given by dynamic increasing returns to scale, and the
divergence of demand growth among countries, given by the BPCG approach. In
this model, despite being the ultimately determinant of countries' growth, elasticities
are considered partially endogenous to output growth. Because sectoral elasticities
reﬂects non-price competitiveness and this competitiveness, in turn, depends on tech-
nological progress, a faster growth rate may induce innovations and increases non-
price competitiveness. Consequently, countries' long-term growth rates are induced
by output growth, which, in turn, depends on countries' competitiveness in external
markets. Based on this, this chapter shows that a process of cumulative causation
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might take place if countries stimulates those sectors with the highest income elasti-
cities of demand and the highest dynamic increasing returns to scale. Based on the
former chapters' results, it shows that, for middle- and high-income countries, spe-
cialisation in capital goods and high-tech manufacturing is important to trigger a
cumulative causation process of increasing growth rates, whereas specialisation in con-
sumption goods, natural-resource-based products and low-tech manufacturing, on the
other hand, might produce a vicious cycle of stagnation.
In Chapter 5, the SDA method is extended to evaluate the impact of substitution
between domestic and imported inputs in the overall economy on the sectoral output
growth. Based on this approach, it is possible to investigate the sources of countries'
growth from a sectoral perspective, as well as to compare the negative impact of
this substitution with the positive impact of exports growth that this substitution
might have promoted. Although all the analysed countries experienced substitution
of imported inputs for domestic suppliers, this process had positive impacts in the
vast majority of sectors in the analysed countries. However, the comparison between
Brazil, China and South Korea shows that developing economies have been aﬀected
diﬀerently in sectoral terms. The net impact was positive in Brazil for mining and
agriculture, but it was negative for high-tech industries. In China and Korea, high-tech
industries beneﬁted the most from this process, and only the agriculture and mining
have been negatively aﬀected. Considering the ﬁndings of the previous chapters, it
is possible to infer that China and Korea has been taking advantage of this process,
whilst the impact of substitution of imported inputs on the Brazilian sectoral output
has contributed negatively for its long-term growth rates.
Finally, in Chapter 6, the impact of countries' integration into GVC on their pro-
ductive chains is evaluated through the structural decomposition of the domestic con-
tent of exports. The results shows that although vertical specialisation of production
is a generalised process, the degree of fragmentation varies signiﬁcantly among sectors
and countries, as well as its net impact on the value added embodied in exports. In
China, India and South Korea, the impact of growing market share has compensated
for the negative impact of fragmentation, whilst in the other analysed countries, the
negative impact of vertical specialisation on the domestic content of exports was not
compensated by competitiveness gains. The sectoral analysis shows that the most
beneﬁted sectors in China and South Korea were those classiﬁed as high-tech indus-
tries, whilst fragmentation has impacted negatively on the value added in primary
sectors exports. In Mexico, all sectors except for Electrical and Transport Equipment
were negatively impacted, as well as all sectors except for Agriculture and Transport
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Equipment in Brazil. Based on the ﬁndings of the last chapters, these results show that
despite the increasing integration into GVC, Mexico and the more advanced countries
have been negatively aﬀected by this process once they have experienced a loss of the
value added embodied in exports in almost every sector. Moreover, the results shows
that Brazil is not taking the beneﬁts of this, once high-tech industries have been neg-
atively impacted, while those sectors that have less potential to guarantee high growth
rates in the long run, such as agriculture, were beneﬁted from this integration. In
China, India and South Korea, on the other hand, high-tech industries, which are the
sectors with the highest capability to promote high growth rates in the long run, were
the most beneﬁted industries from the process of vertical specialisation.
Despite its clear importance in the historical analysis focused on explaining coun-
tries' growth divergence and catching-up processes, sectoral dynamics have received
little attention in economic growth theories. The vast majority of approaches either
completely ignore this aspect or consider it only implicitly. Not by chance, policy ori-
entations of the most important development institutions are usually sector-neutral.
They are based on the belief that industrial policies, with special regards to selective
or vertical industrial policies, should be avoided because they create market distor-
tions in favour of non-competitive sectors. They advocate that governments should
help all business activities homogenously, independently of what they produce, and, if
any assistance is given to industries, they should be through horizontal policies, such
as investing in infrastructure supply and skilled workforce or subsided credit for small
and medium ﬁrms, once they have limited access to ﬁnancial markets due to market
failures. As the Nobel laureate Gary Backer once said, the best industrial policy is
none at all.
In contrast to this view, this work has shown that growth and stagnation in de-
veloping countries are intrinsically related to their sectoral composition of production
and trade. Thus, stimulating speciﬁc sectors may be important to promote sustained
high growth rates in the long-term. Because goods produced by sectors are diﬀer-
ent (and consumers value it), income elasticities of demand for imports and exports
varies among sectors. Consequently, what you export (and import) matters. Fur-
thermore, because the process of production is intrinsically diﬀerent among sectors,
sectoral specialisation determines countries' potential to promote technological pro-
gress and productivity growth. Thereby, there is no sense of neglecting selective
industrial policies only because it promotes market distortions, once these distortions
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are important to guarantee sectors growing at diﬀerent rates. Sector-speciﬁc indus-
trial policies are crucial to promote structural changes in favour of those sectors able
to promote positive cycles of cumulative causation.
This work has focused on middle-income countries, especially regarding the diﬀer-
ence between Latin American and East Asian countries' patterns of growth. Diﬀer-
ent from low-income countries, which has (quasi)unlimited labour supply and hence
can grow by transferring workers from less productive to more productive sectors,
middle-income countries must promote productivity growth within sectors to reach
faster growth rates. However, they cannot compete in international markets with low-
income countries in low-tech sectors, where wages tend to be higher in middle-income
countries, and they ﬁnd it diﬃcult to compete in high-tech industries with high-income
countries, once they have been producing these goods for decades and they already
have a complex ecosystem of production and innovation. The middle-income trap
relies on the fact that middle-income countries must move from low-tech sectors to
high-tech sectors to avoid a vicious cycle of decreasing growth rates, but letting the
market work by itself is not enough. Therefore, selective industrial policies focused
on promoting more technological advanced industries is crucial to re-orientate these
countries towards a virtuous cycle of increasing growth rates.
Before discussing direct selective industrial policies, however, it is necessary to
consider the importance of the management of macroeconomic variables for sectoral
dynamics. Even though one may argue that macroeconomic policies are sector-neutral,
the management of macroeconomic variables, such as exchange and interest rates, af-
fects diﬀerently sectors according to their structure of production and trade. Nowadays,
macroeconomic policies in the vast majority of developing countries are mainly focused
on price stability under the argument that it is a necessary condition for investment.
However, in countries that adopt inﬂation targeting monetary policies , for example,
the costs of inﬂation control is sometimes paid by currency overvaluation, because in-
creasing interest rates promote capital inﬂows. Consequently, more outward oriented
sectors are negatively aﬀected, whilst those focused on domestic markets tend to be
positively aﬀected. Exchange rates management is an important issue especially for
natural-resource exporters due to the Dutch disease. Because export of natural-
resource based products might stimulate currency valuation in the absence of capital
controls, high-tech manufacturing exports might be negatively aﬀected. Hence, the
degree of ﬁnancial openness and the management of exchange rates are not sector-
neutral. Moreover, not only the level, but also the degree of volatility of exchange
rates is an important determinant of countries' sectoral dynamics. Macroeconomic
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policies oriented to pursue stable exchange rates are crucial to promote countries' in-
tegration into GVC. Because in fragmented production processes imported inputs are
relevant part of costs, the adoption of measures to reducing currency volatility reduce
the uncertainty of these investments. Therefore, due to the above-mentioned factors,
one cannot ignore the eﬀects macroeconomic policies on sectoral dynamics. Despite
not being a selective industrial policy per se, the management of macroeconomic vari-
ables can be used to promote some sectors to the detriment of others. Moreover, if
not well managed, macroeconomic policies can turn out selective industrial policies
ineﬀective.
A good design of industrial policies is important to increase their probability of suc-
cess. Although industrial policies are sometimes associated with selective import tariﬀs
or subsides for exports, the core of possibilities is much more embracing, and they must
be thought according to sectoral needs. Once countries deﬁne the sectors that will be
the target of these policies, one should assess the stage of development of these sectors
in terms of their international competitiveness, technological gap and integration into
global networks to decide what kind of policy will be adopted. In middle-income coun-
tries, the stage of development varies signiﬁcantly among segments inside an industry,
and one of the most important features of selective industrial policies is that they can
be designed for very speciﬁc cases according to their needs.
Target industries in early stages of technological development demand policies fo-
cused on technological absorption from abroad to create local ﬁrms with world-class
productive capabilities. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) plays an important role in
these cases because it is very diﬃcult to reach the technological level of competit-
ive ﬁrms without their cooperation. Thereby, governments should create favourable
conditions to attract FDI oﬀering custom-designed incentives. Temporary imports
tariﬀs and quantitative restrictions were methods employed by the vast majority of
developed countries to develop new or infant industries in the past. Although these
methods cannot be discarded, they must be combined with technological incentives,
such as networks of science parks and incubators. Nevertheless, direct technological
transfer needs coordination to ensure that imported technology is not obsolete and
outdated, and hence governments must have explicit conditions in these transfers to
ensure that technological capabilities will be created domestically. The process of cre-
ation of competitive local producers takes time and needs the cooperation of current
internationally competitive ﬁrms, but it will only succeed with strong government co-
ordination through special requirements for joint ventures and direct investments of
Trans-National Companies (TNC).
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In the case of already established ﬁrms, selective policies focused on increasing
competitiveness in target sectors are diﬀerent from those focused on creating com-
petitive industries. Industrial policies need to promote continuous investment in pro-
ductivity capacity and R&D to guarantee ﬁrm's technological update. Instruments
of industrial policy to promote competitiveness goes beyond those traditional meas-
ures. Coordination of investment between diﬀerent industries, for example, promotes
complementary investments. Finance systems focused on industrial development with
subsided interest rates for target sectors makes long-term investments more attractive.
Long-term strategies and investments to develop skilled workers for speciﬁc activities
ensure that growth of these activities will not be constrained by skilled labour short-
age. Public investment in basic science and industrial research, subsides for R&D and
special conditions for speciﬁc innovation activities ensure that companies will have ac-
cess to cutting-edge technologies and that they will able to take part of most advanced
technology developments. The coordination of all these policies is necessary to ensure
that local industries of target sectors will reach the technological frontier and will be
able to keep as world-class competitors.
Selective industrial policies also need to consider the importance of insertion in
global value chains to promote sectoral growth. The beneﬁts of countries' engagement
into these global networks depends on the capacity of countries to promote sectors with
the highest income elasticities if demand and the highest potential to induce techno-
logical progress. Thereby, subsides for exports, reduced utility bills, preferential tax
breaks, as well as the provision of adequate infrastructure focused on speciﬁc activit-
ies are important to integrate globally sectors considered essential to ensure high and
sustained growth rates. Moreover, it is also important to promote a national team
of strategic companies through consolidation of small uncompetitive ﬁrms. Besides
creating conditions for these companies to compete internationally, they can be pillar
industries for clusters of small and medium ﬁrms with high technological capabilities.
The examples of South Korea and China, which have been beneﬁting from the pro-
duction fragmentation process, show that increasing the world market share through
vertical specialisation demands the consolidation of large national groups in target
sectors.
All these industrial policies, however, depend on strong institutional cooperation.
The consolidation of a national plan for long-term development based on target sectors
needs to be validated by the whole society. Industrials of non-target industries have
to agree with the transformation that will take place in country's sectoral structure
of production and trade because they have to move to these target sectors. Financial
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markets need to be structured to provide long-term capital to these sectors. Workers
must be clearly informed that structural changes are costly and it might have some
drawbacks in the early stages. Finally, governments (especially those of democratic
countries) need to have a long-term perspective, that it may take more than four
or ﬁve years (which is usually the government mandates) before the beneﬁts of these
structural changes start being reaped. Thereby, intermediate institutions that promote
communication and cooperation, such as labour, industrial and bank aﬃliations, public
and semi-public institutions and local governments need to participate in the discussion
of which are those sectors that promote countries' long-term development, and hence
which of these will be the target of industrial policies.
In this vein, based on the Kaldorian approach, this work showed which sectors
are capable of sustaining high economic growth rates in the long term. Essentially, it
argues that once high-tech and capital good sectors present the highest dynamic scale
economies and the highest income elasticities of demand for imports and exports,
promoting these sectors is important to trigger a cumulative process of increasing
growth rates. Those countries that have been promoting these sectors are the ones
more able to reach sustainable high growth rates in the long term. Thereby, Latin
American countries should promote these sectors through custom-designed industrial
policies to avoid a vicious cycle of decreasing growth rates and stagnation.
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Appendix A
Classiﬁcation and deﬂators, Chapter 2
Table A.1: Correspondence table to aggregate and deﬂate data according to
categories of demand
BEC (based on SITC, Rev.1) Group Source/Price index*
11  Food and beverages, primary NR UN/Agric. raw materials
12  Food and beverages, processed NR UN/All food
2  Industrial Suppliers n.e.s. NR UN/Minerals, ores and metals
3  Fuels and lubricants NR UN/Minerals, ores and metals
4  Capital goods KG PWT/Capital formation
51  Transport equip., passenger motor cars CG PWT/Household Consumption
52  Transport equip., others KG PWT/Capital formation
53  Transport equip., parts and accessories KG PWT/Capital formation
6  Consumer goods, n.e.s. CG PWT/Household Consumption
7  Goods, n.e.s. CG PWT/Household Consumption
(*) UN: UNCTAD Free Market Commodities Price Index; PWT: Penn World Table  imports are deﬂated
by each country's price indices, and exports are deﬂated by the US price indices.
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Table A.2: Correspondence table to aggregate and deﬂate data according to
technological intensity
ISIC, Rev. 2 (based on SITC, Rev.1) Group Source/Price index*
1 - Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing PR UN/Agricultural raw materials
2 - Mining and Quarrying PR UN/Minerals, ores and metals
31 - Food, Beverages and Tobacco LT PWT/Household Consumption
32 - Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather LT PWT/Household Consumption
33  Wood Products, Incl. Furniture LT PWT/Household Consumption
34 - Paper Products, Printing and Publishing LT PWT/Household Consumption
351 - Industrial chemicals HT PWT/Capital formation
352 - Other chemical products HT PWT/Capital formation
353 - Petroleum reﬁneries LT PWT/Household Consumption
354 - Miscellaneous products of petr. and coal LT PWT/Household Consumption
355 - Rubber products LT PWT/Household Consumption
356 - Plastic products not elsewhere classiﬁed LT PWT/Household Consumption
36 - Non-Metallic Mineral Products LT PWT/Household Consumption
37 - Basic Metal Industries LT PWT/Household Consumption
381 - Fabricated metal products, except M&E LT PWT/Household Consumption
382 - Machinery except electrical HT PWT/Capital formation
383 - Electrical machinery apparatus HT PWT/Capital formation
384 - Transport equipment HT PWT/Capital formation
385  Optical, profess. and scientiﬁc equip. HT PWT/Capital formation
39 - Other Manufacturing Industries LT PWT/Household Consumption
(*) UN: UNCTAD Free Market Commodities Price Index; PWT: Penn World Table  imports are deﬂated
by each country's price indices, and exports are deﬂated by the US price indices.
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Appendix B
Estimation method and results for
income elasticities, Chapter 2
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